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The costs of tax compliance refer to the additional expenses that business taxpayers incur in 
order to comply with the requirements of tax law. Recognising the negative effects that the 
costs of tax compliance have on business, numerous studies, predominately empirical, have 
been undertaken by researchers in a number of jurisdictions in order to measure the costs of 
tax compliance and determine what factors are driving these costs.    
However, due to the regressive nature of the tax compliance costs, the majority of these studies 
have predominately been focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). By way of 
contrast, large enterprises have received very little attention in the literature mainly because 
large enterprises have been considered to enjoy economies of scale which significantly lessen 
the burden of tax compliance costs. As a result the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises 
has remained a largely understudied area and still little is known about the composition, 
magnitude and factors driving costs of compliance in large enterprises. Furthermore, the 
concept of a large enterprise itself remains unclear in the literature as no common definition of 
a large enterprise, which considers the intrinsic features of a large enterprise, has been 
established in prior studies.  
Considering the lack of studies on large enterprises, particularly in New Zealand, the purpose 
of this study is to analyse how a common definition of large enterprises in New Zealand can 
be established and to conduct an explorative analysis of the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand. In addition, this study will discuss the application of a 
mathematical model used to describe cost efficient tax compliance administration in large 
enterprises.   
Analysis of the common definition of large enterprises in New Zealand shows that for a more 
accurate definition of large enterprises, which would be defined not only by the size of their 
turnover but also on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics, use of qualitative criteria along 
with quantitative criteria can be very useful.  
Applying a qualitative methodology based on explorative analysis, semi-structured interviews 
with selected tax practitioners and an Inland Revenue (IR) official were conducted in order to 
ascertain the magnitude, composition and driving factors of the compliance costs in large 
enterprises. The interviews were also used in order to gain an understanding of how the tax 
practitioners and the IR define large enterprises in New Zealand. 
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The findings from the interviews indicate that there is no common understanding amongst tax 
practitioners of what a large enterprise is in New Zealand. In addition, the IR applies the 
concept of “significant enterprise” instead of “large enterprise”, using this concept 
predominately for monitoring the tax compliance of large enterprises.  
Further findings reveal that income tax is likely to be the most expensive tax to comply with 
for large enterprises. Complexity caused by business operations and restructuring initiated by 
large enterprises appears to be one of the driving factors of compliance costs. Overseas 
transactions and operations in foreign jurisdictions through controlled foreign companies were 
also found to add to the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that large enterprises in New Zealand organise their tax compliance function in a 
different way to SMEs. In addition, they have a different composition of external costs of tax 
compliance, with more emphasis on tax planning, tax review and legal services.  
Despite these limitations, the findings in this study and the analysis of the common definition 
of large enterprises in New Zealand can be useful for future empirical studies concerned with 
the estimation of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
1.1.1 Tax Compliance Costs: Rationale behind Research and Measurement 
Businesses, whether small or large, have to deal with a variety of regulations a government 
imposes on them for achieving their market and non-market policy objectives, which are aimed 
at protecting the broad public interest.1  The United States Small Business Administration 
generally classifies these regulations as “economic, environmental, tax compliance, and 
occupational safety”.2 Although the purpose of regulations is to benefit society, regulation 
itself ultimately generates costs - the precise estimations of which are difficult to ascertain. 
There exists an array of views on the issue of the “dead weight losses” emanating from these 
regulations depending on the perspective taken and assumptions made.3  Methods used to 
estimate the costs of regulation also vary. Despite the difficulty in estimating the costs of 
regulation, there has been ongoing concern that the burden of these costs appears to be 
excessive for businesses, which in turn impedes economic growth and has a negative effect on 
the total factor of productivity. This has given strong incentive towards deregulation and 
simplification programs around the world.  
An empirical study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 4  established that a significant portion of costs (46%) incurred by 
businesses relate to tax compliance. The research literature has two main approaches to 
defining tax compliance. The first one is the legal approach, which defines tax compliance as 
“the willingness of individuals and other taxable entities to act in accordance within the spirit, 
                                                     
1  Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance as a Red Tape to Business: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Evidence from 
Australia” (2015) 2 Journal of Business and Economic Policy 76 at 76.  
2  Nicole V Crain and Mark W Crain “The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, US Small Business 
Administration” (Small Business Research Summary No. 371, September 2010).  
3 Tran-Nam, above n 1, at 76. 
4 OECD “Businesses’ Views on Red Tape: Administrative and Regulatory Burdens on Small- and Medium-Sized 






as well as the letter of tax law, and administration without the application of enforcement 
activity”.5 Therefore, from a legal perspective tax compliance is interpreted as fulfilment of the 
legal obligations imposed on taxpayers by the tax legislature and accordingly tax avoidance is 
regarded as tax noncompliance.6 
The second approach to the definition of tax compliance is the operational approach, which is 
seen as an alternative to the legal definition. This approach has been adopted by tax authorities 
and, according to Tran-Nam,7 defines tax compliance as a process consisting mainly of tasks 
such as: 
  1. Registration in the system whether for tax, payroll and social insurance purposes 
2. Maintaining complete and accurate information through an established system of 
record keeping  
   3. Filing the required tax information with tax authorities in due time, and  
  4. Timely payment of the assessed amount of tax  
This operational approach emphasises administrative and procedural aspects of tax compliance 
where a taxpayer’s attitude towards the tax system is not viewed simply in terms of compliance 
or non-compliance but in terms of the wide spectrum of available actions.8 It should be noted, 
that this current study considers tax compliance in terms of the second definition, as the focus 
of the study is on the costs that business taxpayers incur from dealing with tax compliance 
procedures. 
As the literature, and research reports by various tax authorities indicate, all of these 
compliance tasks require considerable use of business resources, expressed in monetary terms, 
which in the absence of tax compliance requirements could be used more productively. Thus, 
according to the Business Compliance Cost Survey of 2009 commissioned by the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), total income tax compliance costs for registered types of businesses (C 
                                                     
5 Simon James and Clinton Alley “Tax Compliance, Self-Assessment and Tax Administration” (1999) 2 Journal 
of Finance and Management in Public Services 27 at 32. 
6 Tran-Nam, above n 1, at 76. 
7  At 76. 
8  At 76.  
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Corporations, S Corporations, Partnerships) were estimated to be US$110 billion (NZ$158 
billion).9 Moreover, compliance by businesses with regulations and tax law can be viewed as 
a form of hidden taxation in addition to the tax burden itself. Therefore, a low rate of income 
tax and other taxes established in a particular jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that the 
tax regime is favourable for businesses in that jurisdiction, as at the same time the high cost of 
compliance with that tax regime might negate the favourable effect of a low tax rate. 
From the standpoint of economic theory, costly compliance activities are no more than “dead 
weight losses”, in other words, pure losses for society and businesses, as they only increase the 
effective tax burden without increasing tax revenue.10 High costs of tax compliance could 
distort economic decision-making creating disincentives to produce and invest. The 
consequences of high tax compliance costs are the diminished ability to compete in the global 
economy11 and negative effects on the general investment climate.  
In the light of the ongoing concerns that excessively high levels of tax compliance costs, 
referred to by Sandford 12  as “taxation hidden costs”, can significantly impede business 
productivity, economic growth and decrease the attractiveness of a country for foreign 
investments, many tax simplification programs have been launched around the world. 
Examples of such programs are the establishment of the Office of Tax Simplification in the 
United Kingdom (UK)13 and the Rewrite Project in New Zealand.14  
Strong interest towards the issue of tax compliance costs has been demonstrated by academics 
and other researchers who have primarily explored the theoretical aspects of tax compliance 
                                                     
9  George Contos and others “Taxpayer Compliance Costs for Corporations and Partnerships: A New Look” 
(Paper presented at the 2012 IRS-TPC Research Conference, Washington DC, 21 June 2012). Exchange rate 
between US$-NZ$ as at 15 November 2018. See the IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 27 December 2018).    
10 Sebastian Eichfelder and Francois Vaillancourt “Tax Compliance Costs: A Review of Costs Burdens and Cost 
Structures” (Arqus Discussion Paper No. 178, 2014) at 1.  
11 Arthur Laffer, Wayne Winegarden and John Childs “The Economic Burden Caused by Tax Code Complexity” 
(Laffer Centre for Supply Side Economics, April 2011) at 7. 
12 Cedric Sandford (ed) Taxation Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1995). 
13 UK Government “Office of Tax Simplification” <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-tax-
simplification> (last accessed 10 January 2019).     
14 Adrian Sawyer “Rewriting Tax Legislation Rewriting Tax Legislation-Can Polishing Silver Really Turn It into 
Gold” (2013) 15 Journal of Australian Taxation 1. 
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costs and applied various methods to measure the costs of tax compliance. Many studies have 
been dedicated to the measurement of tax compliance costs for businesses, whether in a single 
jurisdiction, (for example, Australia15 and New Zealand16), or among a group of jurisdictions 
(for example, Australia, Canada, South Africa and UK).17     
However, the majority of studies, whether undertaken by academic researchers or national 
taxation offices, have focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).18 This is due to the 
regressive nature of tax compliance costs such that there has been ongoing concern that SMEs 
are enduring most of the tax compliance burden and thus SMEs have traditionally been at the 
centre of researchers’ attention. In contrast to SMEs, large enterprises have been largely 
neglected and, as the result, presently very little is known about tax compliance costs of large 
enterprises in New Zealand, as well as in other countries.  
Despite the focus of prior research being on SMEs, the fact that large enterprises also play a 
significant role in national and global economies should not be neglected. According to a report 
published by European Firms in a Global Economy in 2012,19 large entities are found to be 
more productive, to pay higher wages, to enjoy higher profits and to be more successful in the 
international markets. Thus, taking into account the increasing role that large enterprises are 
playing in national economies and the existing gap in the literature, research into the tax 




                                                     
15  Binh Tran-Nam, Chris Evans, Michael Walpole and Katrine Ritchie “Tax Compliance Costs: Research 
Methodology and Empirical Evidence from Australia” (2000) 52 National Tax Journal 229. 
16 Ranjana Gupta and Adrian Sawyer “The Costs of Compliance and Associated Benefits for Small and Medium 
Enterprises in New Zealand: Some Recent Findings” (2015) 30 Australian Tax Forum 135. 
17 John Hasseldine and others “A Comparative Analysis of Tax Compliance Costs and the Role of Special 
Concessions and Regimes for Small Businesses in Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom” 
(Paper presented at the National Tax Association Conference, Providence, 2012). 
18  European Commission “A Review and Evaluation of Methodologies to Calculate Tax Compliance Costs” 
(Taxation Papers Working Paper N.40, 2013) at 8. 
19 Loris Rubini and others “Breaking down the barriers to firm growth in Europe: The fourth EFIGE policy report” 
(European Firms in a Global Economy, 2012) at 1. 
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1.1.2 Tax Compliance Costs: Conceptual and Measurement Issues 
As mentioned in the preceding subsections, tax compliance is viewed as a set of sequential 
activities performed by a business in order to comply with the legal obligations of the tax 
system. All of these activities come at a cost for a business, as they require time for dealing 
with tax regulations or researching particular parts of the tax law and making outlays on salaries 
for in-house accounting personnel or remunerations to external tax advisers. Incidental 
expenses related to the performance of tax activities, for example, the purchase of specialised 
tax accounting software are also incurred. These costs are known as “tax compliance costs” 
and are defined by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick as: “the costs incurred by taxpayers in 
meeting the requirements imposed on them by the tax law and the revenue authorities”.20  
There is a distinction between gross and net tax compliance costs. Gross tax compliance costs 
are referred to as total or social costs of compliance and net tax compliance costs are referred 
to those costs that are directly incurred by taxpayer. 21  Therefore, the first type of tax 
compliance costs are likely to be of interest to economists or government institutions, while 
the second type of costs are more likely to draw interest to businesses and revenue authorities.22 
Both gross and net tax compliance costs will be discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis.   
 
1.1.3 Methods Used to Measure Tax Compliance Costs  
According to Evans and Tran-Nam, 23  although both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods have been used in studies on the measurement of business tax compliance costs, the 
quantitative method has prevailed in the majority of studies.  
                                                     
20 Cedric Sandford, Michael Godwin and Peter Hardwick Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation 
(Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1989). 
21 Binh Tran-Nam and others, above n 15. 
22  Chris Evans and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs in New Zealand: An International Comparative 
Evaluation” (Tax Administration for the 21st Century Working Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2014) 
at 7.  
23  Chris Evans “Taxation Compliance and Administrative Costs: An Overview” in Michael Lang and others (eds) 
Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an Enlarged European Community (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007).    
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Quantitative methods require defining a representative sample of a population of business 
entities for which the costs of tax compliance are measured. The traditional way of collecting 
data has been through conducting large-scale surveys, also known as the “Sandford 
methodology”.24  However, this method generally produces a low response rate, which in many 
cases is not sufficient to form a representative sample for conducting empirical analysis and 
for generalising results over the population of business entities. Sandford25 found that the 
average response rate in large-scale surveys of tax compliance costs was around 30%. Tran-
Nam26 reports that the response rates from the large scale survey conducted among Australian 
business taxpayers in 2011-2012 were 7.5% for SMEs and 42% for large enterprises, 
respectively. A study performed by Gupta and Sawyer27 on the measurement of tax compliance 
costs among New Zealand SMEs had a response rate of 2.7%. This is in line with findings in a 
number of studies showing that response rates for SMEs are considerably lower than for large 
enterprises.28  
As an alternative to quantitative methods, researchers can employ qualitative methods in their 
studies of business tax compliance costs. Such methods include interviews,29 expert interviews 
and expert assessments,30 documentary analysis and diary,31 and case studies.32 Case studies 
have generally focused on tax compliance costs in a particular jurisdiction.  
 
                                                     
24  Evans and Tran-Nam, above n 22, at 13. 
25  Sandford, Godmin and Hardwick, above n 20, at 378. 
26  Tran-Nam, above n 1, at 81.  
27  Gupta and Sawyer, above n 16. 
28  Contos and others, above n 9. 
29 Maja Klun “Administrative Costs of Taxation in a Transition Country: The Case of Slovenia” (2003) 53 Finance 
a Uver 75; W Robert J Alexander, John D Bell and Simon Knowles “Quantifying Compliance Costs of Small 
Businesses in New Zealand” (University of Otago Economics Discussion Paper No. 0406, 2004). 
30 Robert Plamondon and David Zussman “The Compliance Costs of Canada’s Major Tax Systems and the Impact 
of Single Administration” (1998) 46 Canadian Tax Journal 761. 
31 Alexander, Bell and Knowles, above n 29.  
32 Binh Tran-Nam and John Glover “Estimating the Transitional Compliance Costs of the GST in Australia: A 
Case Study Approach” (2002) 17 Australian Tax Forum 499; Chris Evans, Binh Tran-Nam and Bev Jordan 




1.1.4 Overview of Empirical Findings on Tax Compliance Costs 
The first known study of tax compliance costs was performed by Haig33 and since then research 
into tax compliance costs has progressed a long way.34 There are currently a large number of 
empirical studies dedicated to tax compliance costs using the traditional conceptual approach 
to the measurement of tax compliance costs, which will be elaborated further in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. Initially tax compliance costs studies focused on “foundation” countries, such as 
the UK, the US, Canada and Germany.35 However, the research has spread to a number of other 
countries, including countries in Western Europe (Ireland, Netherland, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland), Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), Asia (Hong-Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and South Korea) and Africa (Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania).36 Research into 
tax compliance costs has also been carried out under the sponsorship of the World Bank in a 
number of developing countries, such as Burundi, Kenya, Laos and Vietnam, and in several 
former republics of the Soviet Union, including Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.37  
Despite the use of different research methodologies and data collection strategies, according to 
Evans,38 empirical studies have made a number of consistent and important findings.39 These 
findings can be summarised as follows:  
1. Tax compliance costs are large around the world whether in absolute monetary terms 
or in relation to collected tax revenue or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Tax 
compliance costs range from 2% to 10% of collected tax revenue and up to 2.5% of 
GDP;  
2. Tax compliance costs are regressive, which means that as the size of business taxpayer 
annual turnover becomes smaller, the burden of tax compliance costs increases. By 
                                                     
33 Robert Haig “The Cost to Business Concerns of Compliance with Tax Laws” (1935) 24 Management Review 
323. 
34 Tran-Nam, above n 1, at 80. 
35  At 80. 
36  At 80. 
37  At 80. 
38 Evans, above n 23. 
39 At 457. 
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contrast, tax compliance costs tend to decline with the increase in the size of business 
turnover due to economies of scale;  
3. Tax compliance costs are not declining relative to business income over time despite 
governments’ efforts on tax simplification.  
 
1.2 Research Gap 
The research gap in this study is primarily seen in the context of the three following aspects. 
These aspects are discussed further below in sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. They relate to the 
lack of studies on tax compliance costs in large enterprises, issues with the definition of large 
enterprises, and finally, the role that tax compliance administration plays in reducing tax 
compliance costs. 
 
1.2.1 Lack of Studies on Tax Compliance Costs in Large Enterprises  
As indicated in the previous subsection, the study of tax compliance costs has seen a significant 
development over the last 40 years. However, the focus of these studies has traditionally been 
on the measurement of tax compliance costs in SMEs. According to a working paper issued by 
the European Commission,40 which contains a comprehensive review of previous studies into 
tax compliance costs, there have been 35 studies on SMEs and only five studies covering large 
enterprises.  
There may be two main reasons why SMEs have received much greater attention than large 
enterprises in the literature: 
 
 First, the importance of SMEs, as a source of employment growth, innovation and a 
tool of poverty alleviation has been recognised around the world.41 According to a 
report by the OECD Working Party on SME’s and Entrepreneurship issued in 2010,42 
                                                     
40 European Commission, above n 18.   
41 OECD “Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Local Strength, Global Reach” (OECD Policy Brief, June 2000). 
42 OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship “Assessment of Government Support Programmes for 
SMEs’ and Entrepreneurs’ Access to Finance in the Global Crisis” (‘Bologna+10’ High-Level Meeting on 
Lessons from the Global Crisis and the Way Forward to Job Creation and Growth, Paris, 17-18 November 2010). 
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SMEs accounted for 99% of all business enterprises in OECD countries and constituted 
about two-thirds of employment .The importance of SMEs is also seen in their export 
and innovation capabilities and their effective exploitation of intellectual assets;43 
 
 Second, the literature has established that tax compliance costs have a regressive nature, 
which implies a higher burden from tax compliance on smaller enterprises and 
therefore, an impediment to their growth and development. By way of contrast, large 
enterprises, can enjoy the benefits of economies of scale when it comes to meeting their 
tax obligations.44  
 
Given these two reasons, the creation of the low tax compliance environment for SMEs has 
become a pivotal measure for promoting growth and innovation within the small business 
sector.45  In turn, this has presumably prompted academic researchers to concentrate their 
efforts on the study and measurement of the tax compliance costs of SMEs.   
In light of the fact that the literature on tax compliance costs is obviously skewed toward 
studying and measuring the tax compliance costs of SMEs, the issue of tax compliance costs 
in large enterprises remains largely understudied. This creates a significant gap in the literature, 
as current knowledge about the composition, size and drivers of tax compliance costs of large 
enterprises is limited to a handful of prior studies. The gap particularly concerns large 
multinational firms and their tax arrangements, as the area of tax laws and regulations applying 
to them is very complex and the costs and subsequent impact of this complexity have not been 
sufficiently analysed and measured.  
Moreover, the handful of studies on large enterprises to date46 indicate that in absolute value, 
the costs of tax compliance are indeed very high even for large enterprises, being estimated in 
billions of US$ or 2.5 – 3 % of the total tax revenue collected from large enterprises in the 
                                                     
43 OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship, above n 42.  
44 Gupta and Sawyer, above n 16, at 137. 
45 New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants “Simplifying the Taxation of Small Business in New Zealand” 
(2009).  
46 See Joel Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business” (1996) 24 
Public Finance Quarterly 411; Chris Evans, Philip Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large 
corporations: An Empirical Inquiry and Comparative Analysis“(2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751. 
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countries where these studies were undertaken. Considering such a high magnitude of cost of 
tax compliance of large enterprises, further research in this area can be justified.     
Furthermore, no study considering the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New 
Zealand has been undertaken (and published) in the last 20 years.47 Accordingly, conducting a 
study with a focus on New Zealand large enterprises would be a valuable contribution to the 
literature. 
 
 1.2.2 Issues with the Definition of Large Enterprises  
One of the most problematic aspects pertaining to large enterprises is how they should be 
defined. Although the term “large enterprise” is extensively used throughout this thesis as a 
key concept, it has not been defined conclusively or, at least given some clarification as to its 
meaning. Previous studies in the area of tax compliance costs have not given this aspect proper 
consideration, preferring to use official definitions, whether provided by tax authorities or 
statistical bureaus. Reliance on official sources for establishing what enterprise to consider as 
large appears to be an easy way to draw an imaginary line separating a class of large enterprises 
from SMEs. 
Due to the existence of an array of official criteria, even within a single jurisdiction, to classify 
large enterprises, the problem arises as to what definition to choose. For example, in the case 
of New Zealand, classifying an enterprise as a large depends on what definition one uses as a 
benchmark. The New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) 
considers an entity with over 100 employees48 as large, whereas an entity with an annual 
turnover of more than NZ$30 million or assets valued at over NZ$60 million would be 
considered as large in terms of the criteria established in the New Zealand Financial Reporting 
Act 2013 (FRA 2013).49 The New Zealand Inland Revenue (IR) no longer officially applies 
the term “large enterprise” for the tax compliance purposes. Instead it uses “significant 
                                                     
47 The last known in the literature study on large enterprises in New Zealand was conducted by John Prebble in 
1995. It was a qualitative study, which estimated costs incurred by large enterprises in New Zealand to comply 
with the CFCs regime. See John Prebble “Costs of compliance with the New Zealand controlled foreign company 
regime” in Cedric Sandford (ed) Tax Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1995). 
48 MBIE “The small business sector report” (2014). 
49 FAR 2013, s 45(1)(a). 
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enterprise” for its core compliance purposes. The category of significant enterprises includes 
enterprises with an annual turnover starting from NZ$30 million. However, among “significant 
enterprises”, the IR concurrently considers enterprises with an annual turnover greater than 
NZ$80 million to be large.50   
The availability of various official definitions, where each definition is adopted in accordance 
with economic, financial reporting or tax administration purposes, means that the same 
business entity can be simultaneously included in either the large or SME category, depending 
on which definition from the above three categories is used. The following statistics further 
illustrate this issue. According to the MBIE (which uses the number of employees to classify 
an entity’s size), large enterprises in New Zealand account for 0.4% of the total number of 
business entities.51 However, statistics provided by the IR, which uses annual turnover as its 
main criterion, provides a different percentage of the large enterprises in New Zealand (0.2% 
of all registered entities).52 Consequently, the estimation of the magnitude of the costs of tax 
compliance for the whole population of large enterprises in New Zealand might be affected by 
the choice of particular official definition, as the size of the population of large enterprises itself 
may fluctuate between 0.2% and 0.4%.     
As each of the definitions presented above interprets large enterprises in a different way, then 
the question arises: is it possible to come up with a single definition, which would reflect not 
only numerical criteria like turnover or assets value, but also the intrinsic characteristics of 
large entity? Large enterprises, due to the large scale of their businesses, typically: possess a 
complex organisational structure, feature a group of separate entities, have a diverse capital 
structure and operate internationally. In addition, large enterprises are present in those sectors 
of economy where large capital outlays are required: finance, insurance, resource exploration 
and energy sectors. All these factors indicate that in order to define large enterprise its intrinsic 
                                                     
50 More information on how the IR defines significant enterprises is provided in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
51 Statistics New Zealand “Business demography statistics” 
<http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE7604&_ga=2.263378116.9759411
72.1545634605-2096137522.1543898237#> (last accessed 26 December 2018).    
52 IR “Registered customers by groups 2008-2017” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-




features should be considered along with numerical criteria represented by turnover, value of 
assets and number of employees.   
 
1.2.3 Cost Efficient Tax Compliance Administration and Tax Compliance Costs 
Empirical estimations of the costs of tax compliance made in previous studies, including 
studies focused on large enterprises, have never considered the role that tax compliance 
administration plays in reducing costs of tax compliance. Tax compliance administration 
implies a set of various methods that a business taxpayer can use in order to deal with tax 
compliance obligation. Therefore, if a cost efficient method is chosen then the costs of tax 
compliance can be minimised through the use of this method. Previous studies of the costs of 
tax compliance operate only with those costs that could be observed in practice and therefore 
the effect of cost inefficient tax compliance administration has never been captured in the 
literature, as inefficiency costs cannot be observed. This applies to studies of the costs of tax 
compliance in both SMEs and large enterprises.   
By failing to measure inefficiency costs, the basis of the previous studies’ estimations of the 
costs of tax compliance means it is not possible to determine how much of the costs can be 
attributed to the complexity of tax system and how much are due to the cost inefficient tax 
compliance administration. Therefore, measurement of inefficiency costs can assist in a more 
accurate estimation of the costs of tax compliance and provide more insights into the level of 
efficiency of business taxpayers in terms of carrying out their tax compliance functions. These 
insights can be especially useful for large enterprises as they generally have more resources 
available for choosing various tax compliance strategies.       
Economics, especially neoclassical economics, has a theory based on which a model of cost 
efficient tax compliance administration can be built. The theory and the model are discussed in 
more detail in the conceptual frameworks outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Although, it is 
not a purpose of this study to empirically estimate the cost of tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand, the findings of the model can nevertheless provide insights into 
the cost efficient tax compliance administration in large enterprises and serve as a useful tool 
in the methodology of the study.  
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1.3 Identification of the Objectives of the Study and Research Questions 
In accordance with the research gap outlined above, this study intends to contribute to the 
literature by raising the discussion on the concept of a large enterprise. Further, motivated by 
the lack of studies considering large enterprises in New Zealand, this study aims to provide an 
exploratory analysis of the aspects related to the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in 
New Zealand.  
Therefore, the first objective is to analyse what criteria can be used in order to define a large 
enterprise in New Zealand. These criteria are important for understanding the concept of large 
enterprises and also for determining the population of large enterprises in New Zealand. Prior 
to starting to measure the magnitude of the costs of tax compliance, it is essential to know what 
we are measuring. The definition of large enterprises should help to draw a line separating 
SMEs from large enterprises in New Zealand, a line which seems to be blurred at the moment. 
Besides, establishing the definition of large enterprises in New Zealand would allow a 
comparison with prior studies, undertaken in in other jurisdictions, to be made in regard to the 
magnitude and composition of the costs of tax compliance.  
The second objective is to ascertain the magnitude, composition and the drivers of the tax 
compliance costs of large enterprises in New Zealand using information provided by external 
tax practitioners and tax managers of large enterprises. This information is considered useful 
as it anticipated to provide insight into what types of taxes are the most costly for large 
enterprises in New Zealand to comply with, what areas of taxation are viewed by large 
enterprises as the most complex and what are the main drivers of cost of tax compliance of 
large enterprises. The insights obtained are anticipated to form the basis for policy 
recommendations. It is also anticipated that the feedback received from the participants will 
also provide insights into whether large enterprises in New Zealand follow a cost efficient tax 
compliance strategy. 
The third objective is to analyse the differences between SMEs and large enterprises in New 
Zealand in terms of how they carry out their tax compliance functions and in terms of the 
composition of the costs of tax compliance. This analysis is considered to be useful in providing 
insights into how tax compliance functions and how the composition of the costs of tax 
compliance change as the size of an enterprise increases. A deeper understanding of these 
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differences should provide more insights into the drivers and composition of the cost of tax 
compliance of large enterprises.   
The objectives of the study are addressed through the following research questions:  
 
RQ1. How can we define a “large enterprise” in New Zealand, if we want to study and measure 
its tax compliance costs? 
 
RQ2. What are the magnitude, composition and drivers of tax compliance costs in large 
enterprises in New Zealand?  
 
   RQ3. How do large enterprises differ from SMEs in terms of the tax compliance activities and 
composition of tax compliance costs? 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study  
First, this study contributes to the literature by bridging the gap in the tax compliance costs 
literature on the small number of studies featuring large enterprises. Despite the well-
established view that large enterprises benefit from “economies of scale” and, therefore in 
comparison to SMEs, are presumed to bear less tax compliance costs relative to the size of their 
turnover, previous studies conducted in the US53 and Australia54 indicate that in absolute terms 
these costs are expected to be quite significant.  Furthermore, by focusing on New Zealand 
large enterprises, this study is considered to be the first attempt to analyse the aspects of the 
tax compliance costs and their driving factors among large enterprises in New Zealand. 
Therefore, this study contributes towards a better understanding of the magnitude, composition 
and factors driving costs of tax compliance in large enterprises in New Zealand.  
Second, this study can benefit future empirical research by providing criteria for the definition 
of large enterprises in New Zealand. Establishing criteria, which assist in identifying large 
enterprises on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics, is considered a useful contribution for 
determining the population of large enterprises in New Zealand. When conducting an empirical 
                                                     
53 Joel Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business” (1996) 24 Public 
Finance Quarterly 411. 
54 Chris Evans, Philip Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large corporations: An Empirical 
Inquiry and Comparative Analysis” (2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751. 
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study of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, determination of the 
population of large enterprises is critically important.   
Third, through exploring the idea that the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises can be 
affected by the efficiency of the tax compliance administration (which primarily depends on 
the way in which large enterprises choose and allocate the resources available to them for 
meeting tax compliance obligations), this study contributes in two ways. First, it provides 
insights into whether large enterprises in New Zealand follow cost efficient tax compliance 
administration. Second, it lays the foundation for future empirical studies on the effect of cost 
optimisation on the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises.   
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This chapter has set out the background to the topic, identified a gap in the literature, outlined 
the research questions and objectives, and finally explained why the research topic is important. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.  
Chapter 2 will present a review of the literature on earlier studies into the tax compliance costs 
of large enterprises conducted in different countries. Special emphasis is given to the discussion 
of the methodology which is applied in each study and the main findings regarding the 
composition and drivers of tax compliance costs in large enterprises in each of the countries 
where the studies were undertaken. Attention is also given to the limitations of these studies.   
Chapter 3 will be dedicated to an analysis of the concept of a large enterprise. Specifically it 
discusses what entity may be considered a large enterprise in New Zealand. Along with 
discussion of quantitative criteria and thresholds, several qualitative criteria, describing large 
enterprises on the basis of their intrinsic features, will be outlined and analysed for their 
appropriateness for classifying large enterprises.   
Chapter 4 will outline the tax compliance obligations that large enterprises face in New 
Zealand. This chapter will also provide information on the tax compliance of multinational 
enterprises, especially “large multinational groups of enterprises”. This information is 
considered important as the compliance of these enterprises is strongly affected by the recently 
adopted Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiatives in New Zealand (which will also 
be elaborated upon in this chapter).    
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Chapter 5 will present and discuss in more detail the conceptual framework for measurement 
of the costs of tax compliance and the methodology of the research. As part of the conceptual 
framework, a brief overview of the rational choice theory will be provided followed by the 
presentation of the model of cost efficient tax compliance administration.  As this research is 
primarily qualitative in nature, the essence of explorative analysis (adopted as the methodology 
for this study) will be elaborated upon. This will be followed by a description of the research 
method (semi-structured interviews) employed in this study for the collection of data.  
Chapter 6 will present the results gathered from the semi-structured interviews conducted with 
external tax practitioners and an IR official. The feedback provided by external tax practitioners 
regarding the magnitude, composition and drivers of the cost of tax compliance in large 
enterprises in New Zealand will also be discussed along with the implications of their feedback. 
The interview with the IR official will provide insights into the definition of large enterprises 
in New Zealand used by the IR for monitoring tax compliance purposes.  
Finally, Chapter 7 will provide an overview of main findings of this study and discuss the 
contribution that this study makes to the field of tax compliance costs in large enterprises. The 




Chapter 2:  Literature Review  
 
In the previous chapter a brief introduction to the area of tax compliance and the costs 
associated with tax compliance was presented. The principal aim of this chapter is to provide 
a review of the literature on tax compliance costs in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
and large enterprises. This chapter is organised as follows. An overview of the history of studies 
of the tax compliance costs is provided in section 2.1. Next, section 2.2 discusses the scope of 
prior studies in order to provide insights into what aspects of tax compliance costs were 
considered in prior studies and which entities these studies focused on. Section 2.3 briefly 
outlines studies measuring costs of tax compliance in SMEs, while section 2.4 is dedicated to 
a detailed review of studies focusing on tax compliance in large enterprises. Finally, section 
2.5 summarises main findings from the studies on large enterprises.     
 
2.1 Historical Context of Tax Compliance Costs Studies 
The idea that a tax system generates operating costs goes back to the times of Adam Smith, 
who developed the modern principle of tax simplicity which recognises the impact of tax 
operation costs on the tax system.1  However, the study into the costs of tax compliance, 
especially their assessment and measurement, did not start until the beginning of the 20th 
century2  partly because tax compliance costs have been considered as “hidden costs” of 
taxation and therefore insignificant. The first published attempt to measure tax compliance 
costs was made by Haig3 in 1935 who used postal survey of 1,500 large United States (US) 
firms to estimate their tax compliance costs.4  After Haig’s study there were a few more 
attempts among academics to estimate administrative costs of taxation. Most of these studies 
were conducted in US. 
                                                     
1 Chris Evans “Studying the Studies: An overview of recent research into taxation operating costs” (2003) 1 
eJournal of Tax Research 64.   
2  Evans, above n 1.   
3 Robert Haig “The Cost to Business Concerns of Compliance with Tax Laws” (1935) 24 Management Review 
323 
4 Evans, above n 1.   
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A renaissance in the studies on tax compliance costs began in 1970 following the early studies 
by Sandford 5 and Sandford, Godwin, Hardwick and Butterworth. 6 In the period from 1970 to 
1993, there were 41 separate studies on compliance costs,7 carried out in different countries 
and employing a variety of methods, including surveys, case studies and interviews. Starting 
from the early 1990s the literature on tax compliance costs has experienced another wave of 
growing interest, accompanied by an increased awareness of the issue of tax system operating 
costs by governments of many countries.8 Sandford 9 explained the reason for such a noticeable 
growth in  studies of tax compliance costs due to the presence of the following factors: 
 significant changes in computer technologies allowing researchers to conduct large 
scale surveys and improve the quality of their data; 
 introduction of value added tax in many countries which involved significant growth in 
recording activities resulting in increased costs of tax compliance associated with this 
tax; 
 growth of the small business sector and its importance in the economy. Tax compliance 
costs were found to be particularly burdensome for small businesses; and 
 increased complexity of the tax system and the increased emphasis of government on 
voluntary tax compliance. 
While in the 1980s the focus of studies was mainly on Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), the 
US and Ireland,10 in the 1990s and 2000s the geographical area of studies in tax compliance 
costs expanded into the countries of Africa, Australasia (including New Zealand) and South 
America. Increased interest towards studying costs of tax compliance among developing 
countries can be explained partly by the intensification of competition for foreign direct 
investment.11 Among the examples of studies performed during this period are studies of tax 
                                                     
5 Cedric Sandford Hidden Costs of Taxation (Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 1973). 
6 Cedric Sandford and others Costs and Benefits of VAT (Heinemann, London, 1981). 
7 Evans, above n 1. 
8 Above Evans, above n 1. 
9 Sandford, above n 4.  
10 European Commission “A Review and Evaluation of Methodologies to Calculate Tax Compliance Costs” 
(Taxation Papers Working Paper N.40, 2013). 
11 Binh Tran-Nam and others “Tax Compliance Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from 
Australia” (2000) 53 National Tax Journal 229. 
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compliance costs in Tanzania12, Hong Kong13 and India.14 More recent studies conducted 
include those conducted in South Africa15 and Indonesia.16   
 
2.2 Scope of Prior Studies 
As Evans17 mentions, and the 2013 report of the European Commission18 confirms, the focus 
of the majority of studies on tax compliance costs has been on business taxpayers rather than 
on individuals. Studies on tax compliance costs measurement can generally be divided into two 
main groups: 
 Studies that focus on measurement of costs of a particular tax. According to a review 
of the literature by the European Commission19 the number of studies that measure tax 
compliance costs of particular taxes include: Value Added Tax (VAT) (16 studies); 
GST (five studies) and corporate income tax (seven studies). Examples include studies 
of UK VAT by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 20  Hasseldine and Hansford. 21 
                                                     
12  Christine Shekidele “Measuring the Compliance Costs of Taxation Excise Duties 1995-96” (1999) 7 African 
Journal of Finance and Management 72. 
13 Samuel Chan and others “Compliance Costs of Corporate Taxation in Hong Kong” (1999) 25 International Tax 
Journal 42. 
14  Saumen Chattopadhyay and Arindan Das-Gupta “The Compliance Costs of the Personal Income Tax and its 
Determinants” (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 2002). 
15  Hasseldine John and others “A Comparative Analysis of Tax Compliance Costs and the Role of Special 
Concessions and Regimes for Small Businesses in Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom” 
(Paper presented to the National Tax Association Conference, Providence, 2012). 
16  Budi Susila and Jeff Pope “The Tax Compliance Costs of Large Corporate Taxpayer in Indonesia” (2012) 27 
Australian Tax Forum 719. 
17  Evans, above n 1. 
18  European Commission, above n 10, at 8. 
19  European Commission, above n 10, at 6.   
20 Cedric Sandford, Michael Godwin and Paul Hardwick Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation (Fiscal 
Publications, Bath, 1989). 
21 John Hasseldine and Ann Hansford “The Compliance Burden of the VAT: Further Evidence from the UK” 
(2002) 17 Australian Tax Forum 369. 
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Examples of studies on corporate income tax include companies’ income tax in 
Australia22 and corporate income tax in Singapore;23   
 
 Studies that cover compliance costs of variety of taxes or of a whole tax system. The 
number of such studies according to the 2013 European Commission report24 is 63. 
Further, most of the studies do not measure tax compliance costs separately for large and small 
entities or by the segment in which an entity operates, but rather include both large and small 
businesses from all segments in their analysis.25  However, there are a number of studies 
focusing specifically on either the tax compliance costs of SMEs or on the tax compliance costs 
of large enterprises. Examples of studies where tax compliance costs are measured for large 
enterprises are Slemrod and Blumenthal,26  Chan, Ariff and Loh,27  Susila and Pope28  and 
Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam.29 Studies on SMEs include Wallschutzsky and Gibson,30 Tran-
Nam and Glover,31 and Gupta and Sawyer.32 The European Commission’s report33 on the 
review of the tax compliance costs literature mentions that large enterprises are represented by 
                                                     
22 Jeff Pope, Ronald Fayle and Dong-Ling Chen “The Compliance Costs of Public Companies’ Income Taxation 
in Australia” (Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, 1991). 
23 Mohhamed Ariff, Zubaidah Ismail and Alfred Loh “Compliance Costs of Corporate Income Tax in Singapore” 
(1997) 24 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 1253. 
24 European Commission, above n 10, at 6. 
25 Evans, above n 1.  
26  Joel Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business” (1996) 24 Public 
Finance Quarterly 411. 
27 Samuel Chan, Mohhamed Ariff and Alfred Loh “Compliance Costs of Corporate Taxation in Hong Kong” 
(1999) 25 International Tax Journal 42. 
28 Susila and Pope, above n 16. 
29 Chris Evans, Philip Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large corporations: An Empirical 
Inquiry and Comparative Analysis“(2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751. 
30  Ian Wallschutzky and Brian Gibson “Small Business Cost of Compliance” (1993) 10 Australian Tax Forum 
527.  
31 Binh Tran-Nam and John Glover “Estimating the Transitional Compliance Costs of the GST in Australia: A 
Case Study Approach” (2002) 17 Australian Tax Forum 499. 
32 Ranjana Gupta and Adrian Sawyer “The Costs of Compliance and Associated Benefits for Small and Medium 
Enterprises in New Zealand: Some Recent Findings” (2015) 30 Australian Tax Forum 135.  
33 European Commission, above n 10, at 8. 
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only five studies, while SMEs are represented by 35 studies. Evans34 counts the number of 
studies that deals specifically with large enterprises to be eight. Notwithstanding this minor 
difference in the count of the number of studies on large enterprises between Evans and the 
European Commission Report, it is obvious that large enterprises are noticeably 
underrepresented in the literature in relation to existing studies on SMEs. The methods and 
results of the studies looking at tax compliance costs of SMEs and large enterprises will be 
presented in more detail further in this section.  
 
 2.3 Tax Compliance Costs of Small and Medium Enterprises   
Although, the focus of this study is on large enterprises, presenting the results of prior studies 
which measure costs of tax compliance of SMEs is nevertheless considered relevant as it 
demonstrates the type of data and data collection methods which were applied and the tax 
compliance activities that were examined.   
Among the early studies attempting to measure the tax compliance costs of SMEs is the study 
by Sandford and others35 conducted in the UK. The majority of data used in their study was 
collected through four different surveys, tailored for businesses of different sizes, in order to 
measure the costs of tax compliance activities associated with VAT, pay as you earn tax 
(PAYE) and company tax. The results of the study showed that for small businesses with 
turnover of less than £100,000,36 tax compliance costs were approximately 3.66% of turnover. 
In contrast, tax compliance costs incurred by large business with turnover over £1 million37 
were estimated to be 0.17% of the turnover volume.   
                                                     
34 Evans, above n 1. 
35 Sandford and others, above n 6.  
36 As the UK GDP deflator increased by 254% from 1981 to 2018, this equates to £255,000 in 2018. See Trading 
Economics “UK GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/gdp-deflator> (last accessed 15 
July 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$ 492,000 as at 15 November 2018. See the IRD “Currency rates – rolling 
average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-
2018.pdf> (last accessed 26 December 2018).  
37 £2.5 million (NZ$ 4.83 million) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 36 for the UK GDP deflator and 
IRD, above n 36 for the NZ$ exchange rate.  
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Another example of an earlier study of business tax compliance costs is the study performed 
by Sandford and Hasseldine,38 which was the first comprehensive study to be conducted in the 
New Zealand context. With respect to collecting the data on tax compliance, two separate 
surveys were used by the authors. One of the surveys was intended for gathering data on costs 
to comply with PAYE and Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT), while the other survey related to Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) and business income tax. The results revealed that total tax compliance 
costs were estimated to be NZ$1,182 million,39 which comprised the monetary value of 46.6 
million hours of time spent on compliance with all four types of taxes examined, and NZ$600 
million40 of outlays on external advisers’ fees and various other expenses. Also, the study 
estimated that in regard to small businesses with the turnover less than NZ$30,000, overall tax 
compliance costs were equivalent to 3.14% of small firms’ turnovers. For large businesses with 
turnover over NZ$50 million, the ratio of tax compliance costs to firm’s turnover was found to 
be 0.03%. Thus, the empirical results obtained in Sandford and Hasseldine41 confirmed the 
regressive nature of tax compliance costs both for each tax individually and for all taxes 
collectively.  
In 2004 Colmar Brunton42 measured the compliance burden of SMEs in New Zealand using a 
mail-out survey with a 44% response rate. In addition to the main survey, a smaller survey was 
conducted amongst tax advisers in order to apportion external tax adviser’s compliance costs 
to the different types of taxes.  The study found that that the average annual number of hours 
that SMEs spent on tax compliance activities was 76.7 hours, with GST taking up the largest 
amount of this time followed by business income tax, PAYE and FBT. The average total tax 
compliance costs (internal and external costs combined) was NZ$4,024.43 The ratio of the tax 
compliance costs to annual turnover was 21% for the smallest business (with turnover less than 
                                                     
38 Cedric Sandford and John Hasseldine “The Compliance Costs of Business Taxes in New Zealand” (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1992). 
39 As the New Zealand GDP deflator increased by 70% from 1992 to 2018, this equates to NZ$ 2 billion in 2018. 
See Trading Economics “New Zealand GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/new-zealand/gdp-deflator> 
(last accessed 26 December 2018). 
40 NZ$1.02 billion in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 39 for the New Zealand GDP deflator.  
41 Sandford and Hasseldine, above n 38. 
42 Colmar Brunton “Measuring the Tax Compliance Costs of Small and Medium Sized Businesses—A Benchmark 
Survey: Final Report” (2005).  
43 As New Zealand GDP deflator increased by 42% from 2004 to 2018, this equates to NZ$ 5,633 in 2018. See 
Trading Economics, above n 39. 
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NZ$20,000) and 0.2% for the largest business (with turnover up to NZ$ 1.3 million). This study 
again confirmed the fact that tax compliance costs are regressive.  
Gupta and Sawyer44 is the most recent study of the costs of tax compliance of New Zealand 
SMEs. The authors used an online survey administered among 4,400 New Zealand SMEs and 
the response rate they achieved was 2.7% (118 valid responses). One of the features of this 
study was an attempt to separate core accounting activities from tax compliance activities in 
order to measure tax compliance costs more precisely. The study also sought to find out if there 
were managerial benefits for New Zealand SMEs arising from tax compliance activities. The 
tax compliance costs estimation indicated that the gross costs of complying with all taxes were 
NZ$31,744 45  for the 2011-2012 year. The study established that compliance activities 
connected with GST accounted for the largest portion of internal tax compliance costs for 
SMEs (more than 50%), followed by income tax, PAYE, FBT and KiwiSaver. In regard to 
managerial benefits from tax compliance, it was found that a majority of SMEs saw significant 
managerial benefits in tax compliance, as improved record keeping assisted them in better 
understanding and controlling their financial affairs.  
 
2.4 Tax Compliance Costs of Large Enterprises      
A few studies that specifically targeted large enterprises have been already been introduced in 
this chapter. This section will provide a more detailed analysis of the findings of these studies. 
To date, the research that focuses specifically on the tax compliance costs of large businesses 
has been carried out on very few occasions, with the majority of studies undertaken in the 
1990s.46 Among the studies which were conducted in the 1990s, the studies by Slemrod and 
                                                     
44 Gupta and Sawyer, above n 32.  
45 As values in the study are quoted originally in Australian dollars, this New Zealand dollar amount has been 
obtained using the conversion rate between AU$ and NZ$ as at 31 December 2012. As the NZ GDP deflator 
increased by 12% from 2012 to 2018, this equates to NZ$ 35,553 in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 39.     
46  Budi Susila and Jeff Pope ”Why the Tax Compliance Costs of Large Companies in Indonesia are Low 
Compared to the Other Countries: Empirical Evidence” (2014) Australian Tax Forum 60 at 63. 
24 
 
Blumenthal,47 and Erard,48 were undertaken in the North America, namely US and Canada.  
Other research conducted in the 1990s which considers the tax compliance costs of large 
enterprises, is the study by Chan, Ariff and Loh.49  This study focused on publicly listed 
companies in Hong Kong.50 Interestingly, in the new millennium, only two studies have been 
undertaken to date. Susila and Pope51 examine tax compliance costs of large enterprises in 
Indonesia and Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam52 measure the costs of tax compliance among 
large enterprises in Australia.  The findings in each of these studies will be discussed below.  
 
   2.4.1 Studies Conducted in the 1990s  
   2.4.1.1 US Large Enterprises  
Slemrod and Blumenthal53 undertook a mail survey among 1,329 of the largest corporations in 
the US with a response rate of 27.5% (equivalent to 365 completed surveys). The “smallest” 
large entity in the population of surveyed large corporations (defined in terms of employee 
number and sales volume) was one with 2,500 employees and with US$268 million (NZ$ 412 
million)54 of annual sales volume. The survey results revealed that large entities in the US spent 
on average US$1.57 million55 per year to comply with Federal and State corporate income 
                                                     
47 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 26. 
48 Brian Erard “The Income Tax Compliance Burden on Canadian Big Business” (Working Paper 97-2 prepared 
for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1997). 
49 Chan, Ariff and Loh, above n 27. 
50 Although current official name of Hong Kong is Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (Hong Kong SAR), the study uses data for the period of 1995-1996, which is before the time 
when Hong Kong was transferred to China.    
51 Susila and Pope, above n 16. 
52 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 29. 
53 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 26. 
54 US$ - NZ$ 1995 average exchange rate (1US$= NZ$1.53). Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Exchange Rates 
and TWI –B1” <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/b1> (last accessed 26 December 2018). 
55 As the US GDP deflator increased by 49% from 1995 to 2018, this equates to US $ 2.35 million in 2018. See 
Trading Economics “US GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-deflator> (last 
accessed 27 December 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$3.38 million as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency 
rates–rolling average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-
month-nov-2018.pdf> (last accessed 27 December 2018). 
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taxes. This translates to US$2.080 billion56 of total tax compliance costs for the population of 
the 1,329 largest US corporations. This amount of tax compliance costs for the largest entities 
in the US constituted approximately 2.6% of the total tax revenue that the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) collected from these large enterprises at that time.  
The results also showed that about 80% of compliance costs are spent on in-house activities 
and 20% on external advisers. Among in-house compliance costs almost 30% were non-
personnel costs. Among the in-house personnel share of tax compliance costs, 70% of the costs 
were incurred by tax department personnel, with the remainder coming from non-tax 
departments.  
The breakdown of the cost associated with record keeping, tax research, tax filing, tax planning, 
audit, appeals and litigation shows that almost 50% of costs are related to basic compliance 
(record keeping and tax filing), while 35% of the costs are expended on tax planning, audit and 
litigation.   
Furthermore, the results demonstrate a clear division of compliance activities between in-house 
personnel and external tax advisers. Almost 90% of costs related to record keeping and tax 
filing are generated internally, while almost 40% of tax planning, audit and litigation costs are 
produced by the services from external tax advisers.      
The study further analysed the effect on the magnitude of tax compliance costs of factors such 
as the large entity’s size, the sector within which it operates and whether it has a multinational 
presence. It was established that a 10% increase in firm’s size (expressed either by the value of 
assets or sales) leads to increase in tax compliance costs between 4.1% and 6.1%, thus again 
confirming the effect of economies of scale for large enterprises. The fact that tax compliance 
costs tend to increase in magnitude with the firm’s size is one of the main findings in this study. 
The sector effect showed that depending on the type of sector within which a large enterprise 
operates tax compliance costs can be higher or lower. For example, for enterprises operating 
in the mining, oil or gas sectors, tax compliance costs were on average 71% higher compared 
to enterprises which do not operate in these sectors. Similarly, enterprises in wholesale or retail 
                                                     
56 US$3.12 billion (NZ$4.49 billion) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 55, for US GDP deflator and IRD, 
above n 55, for the US$-NZ$ exchange rate.  
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industries experience tax compliance costs which were 61% lower relative to enterprises from 
other sectors. 
The factor of enterprise worldwide presence (measured by the percentage of worldwide 
employees, worldwide assets value or worldwide sales) also adds to an increase in tax 
compliance costs although the impact is less than proportionate.    
 
2.4.1.2 Canadian Large Enterprises  
Erard’s 57 study was focused on large enterprises in Canada and it closely followed the study 
by Slemrod and Blumenthal58 in the method employed. The survey was mailed to all 250 
members of the Canadian Tax Executive Institute, most of whom ranked among the very largest 
corporations in Canada at that time. The number of responses received was 59, which is 
equivalent to a 24% response rate. Fourteen large enterprises out of the 59 respondents were 
operating in the financial sector. The average size of large enterprises from both the non-
financial and financial sectors was measured by number of employees, gross receipts and total 
value of assets. Thus, on average, large enterprises from the non-financial sector had 8,568 
employees, CA$2.88 billion (NZ$3.24 billion)59 of gross receipts and assets worth CA$3.45 
billion (NZ$3.87 billion)60 of book value.  The average number of employees for the large 
enterprises from the financial sector was 13,041, average gross receipts and average book value 
of assets were CA$5.25 billion (NZ$5.9 billion) and CA$58.4 billion (NZ$65.6 billion)61, 
respectively. 
The results of the study revealed that, on average, the costs of tax compliance incurred by large 
enterprises in the non-financial sector was CA$507,000,62 implying that the aggregate amount 
                                                     
57 Erard, above n 48.  
58 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 26. 
59 CA$ - NZ$ 1995 average exchange rate (1CA$=NZ$1.125). Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Exchange Rates 
and TWI – B1” <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/b1> (last accessed 26 December 2018).  
60 See above n 59. 
61 See above n 59. 
62 As the Canada GDP deflator increased by 41% from 1995 to 2018, this equates to CA$715,000 in 2018. See 
Trading Economics “Canada GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/gdp-deflator> (last accessed 
26 December 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$797,000 as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling 
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of tax compliance costs for the whole group of non-financial large enterprises (the 500 top 
largest non-financial enterprises) was around CA$250 million.63 Average tax compliance costs 
turned out to be even higher if large financial enterprises were included in the estimation. Thus, 
the average tax compliance costs were CA$925,000 64 after including large enterprises from 
financial sector in the estimation. In relation to the total tax revenue collected from the top non-
financial large enterprises, the results of the study suggested a compliance burden of almost 
5% of taxes paid. The ratio of tax compliance burden, including financial firms, to the amount 
of taxes paid was 2.7%.  
The composition of tax compliance costs showed that in-house personnel accounted for 56.9% 
of the total costs, in-house non-personnel expenditures and assistance of external experts 
accounted for 20.6% and 22.5 %, respectively. Furthermore, the breakdown of the costs 
structure revealed that about 46% of the total internal costs were spent on record keeping and 
filing returns, while only 9.5% of the total external costs related to record keeping and filing. 
Among external costs, 53% and 37% were associated with tax planning and audit, and appeals 
and litigation respectively.   
As for the determinants of the tax compliance costs of the largest Canadian enterprises,  
variables such as a number of filed T10 tax forms (required for reporting on tax matters 
associated with overseas transactions), amount of gross receipts and sector dummies were 
regressed on the total tax compliance costs. It was estimated that a 10% increase in the number 
of T10 forms (signifying 10% increase in the volume of overseas transactions) would result in 
2.6% increase in tax compliance costs, while a 10% increase in gross receipts would result in 
tax compliance costs increasing by 4.1%. These results were compatible with Slemrod and 
Blumenthal65 showing that tax compliance costs increase with the business size, although less 
than proportionately.  
                                                     
average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-
2018.pdf> (last accessed 27 December 2018). 
63 CA$352.5 million (NZ$393 million) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 62, for the Canada GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 62, for the CA$-NZ$ exchange rate. 
64 CA$1.3 million (NZ$1.45 million) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 62, for the Canada GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 62, for the CA$-NZ$ exchange rate.       
65 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 26. 
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 2.4.1.3 Hong Kong Public Enterprises  
Chan, Ariff and Loh66 investigated the magnitude and composition of tax compliance costs 
of publicly listed companies in Hong Kong using data on listed companies’ tax compliance 
costs incurred during the 1995-1996 tax year. The survey was mailed out to 496 listed 
companies with 75 companies responding (giving a total response rate of 15.1%). For 
facilitating the analysis, survey respondents were further categorised into three groups based 
on their size. Group 1 contained listed enterprises with sales volumes of less than HK$100 
million (NZ$18.3 million),67 Group 2 contained listed enterprises whose annual sales were 
between HK$100 million (NZ$18.3 million)68 and HK$550 million  (NZ$100.7 million)69 and 
Group 3 included the remaining listed enterprises with sales volumes above HK$550 million 
(NZ$103.7 million).   
The overall tax compliance costs for the listed Hong Kong enterprises was estimated to be on 
average HK$346,48370 per company. The average tax compliance costs, calculated separately 
for each group, were HK$85,950, 71  HK$272,410 72  and HK$465,339 73  for enterprises in 
Groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The estimations of the tax compliance costs obtained for each 
group of enterprises show that tax compliance costs tend to increase in absolute value as the 
size of enterprise increases. However, a further calculation of the magnitude of tax compliance 
costs per HK$1,000 of sales revealed that tax compliance costs tend to fall as sales volume 
                                                     
66 Chan, Ariff and Loh, above n 27. 
67 HK$ - NZ$ 1996 average exchange rate (1HK$=NZ$ 0.18). Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Exchange Rates 
and TWI – B1” <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/b1> (last accessed 27 December 2018).   
68 See above n 67.  
69 See above n 67.  
70 As the Hong Kong GDP deflator increased by 9% from 1996 to 2018, this equates to HK$ 377,670 in 2018. 
See Trading Economics “HK GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/hong-kong/gdp-deflator> (last 
accessed 26 December 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$69,297 as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates 
–rolling average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-
month-nov-2018.pdf > (last accessed 26 December 2018). 
71 HK$93,685 (NZ$17,189) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 70, for Hong Kong GDP deflator and IRD, 
above n 70, for the HK$-NZ$ exchange rate.   
72 HK$296,926 (NZ$54,481) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 70, for Hong Kong GDP deflator and IRD, 
above n 70, for the HK$-NZ$ exchange rate. 
73 HK$507,219 (NZ$93,067) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 70, for Hong Kong GDP deflator and IRD, 
above n 70, for the HK$-NZ$ exchange rate.  
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increases. For example, tax compliance costs per HK$1,000 of sales were HK$ 5.41, HK$1.17 
and HK$0.21 for enterprises in Groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively. This trend is the consequence 
of economies of scale.  
The composition of the tax compliance costs revealed that the smaller listed enterprises 
(Group 1) were using the assistance of external advisers in regard to tax computational 
activities more often compared to larger listed enterprises (Group 3). Furthermore, it was 
noted that tax planning costs were 39% of the overall tax compliance costs for the enterprises 
from Group 3, while Group 1 companies’ costs of tax planning were only 13% of the total 
costs.  This may imply that tax planning was more relevant for the larger listed companies 
and the costs associated with tax planning also grew with the size of turnover. Moreover, in 
the case of the enterprises included in Group 3, tax planning costs were almost 42% of the 
total external costs, with the remaining costs related to computational activities. In contrast, 
in the case of the enterprises from Group 1, tax planning costs were only 12% and 
computational costs were 88% of the total external costs of tax compliance. This finding 
indicates that the composition of the external tax compliance costs in smaller and large 
enterprises is different. The share of non-computational external services, for example, tax 
planning, is larger for large enterprises.    
In addition, simple regression analysis was employed in the study in order to ascertain the 
effect of sales volume on the costs of tax compliance activities. The regression results showed 
that, on average, a 10% increase in sales would translate into 0.363% increase in tax 
compliance costs. The fact that the value of the slope parameter (0.363) was less than 1 
suggested the effect of economies of scales and was consistent with the results obtained by 
Slemrod and Blumenthal74 and Erard.75   
The effect of the type of business activity on the magnitude of tax compliance costs was also 
examined in the study. All of the responding enterprises were divided into four categories 
according to their main activity. Group 1 enterprises were manufacturing firms; Group 2 were 
utility enterprises; Group 3 enterprises were from the commerce and trading sector; and Group 
4 contained enterprises engaged in finance, investment, real estate and transport activities. 
The results of the tax compliance costs obtained for each group revealed that the highest level 
                                                     
74 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 26. 
75 Erard, above n 48.  
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of tax compliance costs of HK$581,467 76 was incurred by the enterprises from Group 2 
(utility) followed by Group 4 enterprises (finance, investment, real estate and transport) with 
the costs of tax compliance of HK$464,594.77 However, the estimation of the tax compliance 
costs incurred per HK$1,000 of sales by enterprises in each group, showed that mean tax 
compliance costs were HK$0.58, HK$1.53, HK$0.78 and HK$2.19 per HK$1,000 of sales in 
each of four groups, respectively. 
 
   2.4.2 Studies conducted in the 2000s  
  2.4.2.1 Indonesian Large Enterprises  
The study by Susila and Pope78 examined the tax compliance costs among the population of 
28,681 large Indonesian enterprises registered in Large and Medium Taxpayer Offices. The 
sample consisting of 3,000 enterprises was taken by the way of random stratified sampling 
using the business sector as the strata. Following the creation of the sample, the questionnaires 
were mailed out to the potential respondents with 246 responses being received (8.2% 
response rate).  The composition of the large enterprises in the sample, measured by the 
amount of turnover was: 6 enterprises (2%) below the lowest established threshold of 
Indonesian Rupee (IDR) 3 billion (NZ$ 451,127)79 and 97 enterprises (39%) over the highest 
established threshold of IDR100 billion (NZ$ 15.27 million). 80  The remainder of the 
enterprises were between these two thresholds.  
The estimation of the tax compliance costs, based on the results of the survey, showed that in 
2010, the weighted average of the tax compliance costs per enterprise was IDR420.9 
                                                     
76 HK$633,799 (NZ$116,293) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 70, for Hong Kong GDP deflator and 
IRD, above n 70, for the HK$-NZ$ exchange rate.  
77 HK$506,407 (NZ$92,918) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 70, for Hong Kong GDP deflator and IRD, 
above n 70, for the HK$-NZ$ exchange rate. 
78 Susila and Pope, above n 16. 
79 IDR - NZ$ 2010 average exchange rate (1NZ$=IDR 6,550). Reserve Bank of New Zealand. “Exchange Rates 
and TWI – B1” <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/b1> (last accessed 27 December 2018). 
80 See above n 79.  
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million.81 The largest tax compliance costs of IDR506 million82 per enterprise was found in 
the retail and wholesale sector, followed by the manufacturing sector with the overall tax 
compliance burden per manufacturing enterprise of IDR488.8 million.83 The sector featuring 
the smallest tax compliance costs was the mining and extraction sector, where cost of tax 
compliance per enterprise was estimated to be of average IRD51.4 million.84  
Overall tax compliance costs were further broken down by components. Cost of routine tax 
compliance activities implemented internally accounted for 54% of the total tax compliance 
costs, while cost of routine compliance undertaken externally was only 9% of the total costs. 
Moreover, among external costs, which accounted for 27% of the total costs, almost 48% 
were costs associated with tax audit, litigation and tax appeal. The balance of external costs 
were associated with routine compliance and tax reviews. The above composition of internal 
and external costs of large Indonesian enterprises indicates that a large part of routine tax 
compliance activities are performed in-house, while most of the legal services are outsourced 
to external advisers.  
It was also established that tax compliance costs increased with the size of an enterprise 
measured in terms of turnover amount, although less proportionately due to the well-
established concept in the literature of the effect of economies of scale. Thus, total tax 
compliance costs per 1IDR were IDR0.112 for enterprises with annual turnover less than 
IRD3 billion and IDR 0.004 for enterprises with annual turnover above IRD100 billion.  
The authors further performed a calculation in order to demonstrate the percentage share of 
overall tax compliance costs relative to indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
                                                     
81 As the Indonesia GDP deflator increased by 37% from 2010 to 2018, this equates to IDR 576.6 million in 2018. 
See Trading Economics “Indonesia GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/gdp-deflator> (last 
accessed 27 December 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$58,663 as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates 
– rolling average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-
month-nov-2018.pdf> (last accessed 27 December 2018). 
82 IDR 693.22 million (NZ$70,528) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 81 for the Indonesia GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 81, for the IDR-NZ$ exchange rate.  
83 IDR 669.66 million (NZ$68,131) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 81 for the Indonesia GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 81, for the IDR-NZ$ exchange rate.  
84 IDR 70.4 million (NZ$7,162) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 81 for the Indonesia GDP deflator and 
IRD, above n 81, for the IDR-NZ$ exchange rate.  
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National Tax Revenue from large enterprises. The mean tax compliance costs estimated for 
each sector was multiplied by the number of large entities in the population of each sector. 
Overall tax compliance costs for the whole population of registered large enterprises turned 
out to equal IDR12.3 trillion,85  which in percentage terms was equivalent to 0.19% of 
Indonesian GDP in 2010 and 3.6% of the total tax revenue collected from large enterprises in 
2010. 
  
  2.4.2.2 Australian Large Enterprises  
Finally, in a study by Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam,86  the cost of tax compliance was 
measured in the large corporate sector in Australia for the 2011-2012 fiscal year. In this study 
a sample of large and very large enterprises consisting of 187 entities was drawn by 
disproportionate stratified random sampling from the population of 1,850 large businesses 
and international groups in Australia. Large enterprises were defined as entities with an annual 
turnover over AU$100 million (NZ$130 million),87  whereas very large enterprises were 
defined as entities with an annual turnover greater than AU$250 million (NZ$325 million).88 
An electronic survey was used as the primary method of data collection. 79 usable responses 
were received, giving a 42% response rate. Among the factors mentioned by the authors as 
contributing to the high response rate were: endorsement of the survey by the Australian 
Taxation Authority (ATO) and professional bodies; assistance from the ATO and professional 
bodies in development of the survey frame; and valuable input made by specific advisory 
groups into the development of the survey.89  
An estimation of the external costs of tax compliance revealed that the mean annual external 
costs of tax compliance incurred in 2011-2012 fiscal year by the large corporate sector in 
                                                     
85 IDR16.8 trillion (NZ$1.7 billion) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 80 for the Indonesia GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 80, for the IDR-NZ$ exchange rate.  
86 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 29. 
87 AU$-NZ$ 2012 average exchange rate (1 AU$ = 1.3 NZ$).  Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Exchange Rates 
and TWI – B1” <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/b1> (last accessed 28 December 2018). 
88 See above n 87. 




Australia was AU$1.029 million.90 Analysis of the costs breakdown indicated that 60% of the 
total external costs of tax compliance were related to income tax, while expenses on Goods 
and Service Tax (GST) were only 9%, which was in contrast to SMEs, who “relied heavily 
on external services for GST”.91 In relation to the type of external services, only 37% of 
external expenditures related to record keeping, preparation and lodgement of taxes, while 
another 27% were expenditures on tax planning and 23% related to tax review, audit and 
litigation. This finding suggested that the composition of cost of tax compliance in large 
enterprises in Australia was different from the composition of tax compliance costs in SMEs 
and that the type of external services provided for large enterprises was different from the 
type of external services provided for SMEs, where 80% of all external costs were related to 
record keeping, preparation and filing of tax returns.92      
Internal costs of tax compliance were estimated based on the monetary value of the time that 
internal staff in large Australian enterprises spend on tax compliance activities and on non-
labour costs, which comprised expenditures on office space, specialised tax software and staff 
training. For the costs of internal staff time, the mean value was estimated to be AU$1.37 
million93 for 2011-2012 fiscal year. As in the case of external costs of tax compliance, the 
largest part of internal costs of tax compliance was related to income tax, estimated as 53% 
of total internal costs of tax compliance. One interesting finding in relation to the composition 
of the internal costs of tax compliance is that, in contrast to SMEs, a large portion of internal 
costs was attributed to provision of professional advice on matters such as tax planning, and 
tax review and litigation. 
Non-labour internal tax compliance costs were estimated to be on average AU$603,000,94 
among which expenses on office space took up almost half, while software expenses were 
                                                     
90  As Australia GDP deflator increased by 7% from 2012 to 2018, this equates to AU$1.1 million in 2018. See 
Trading Economics “Australia GDP Deflator” <https://tradingeconomics.com/australia/gdp-deflator> (last 
accessed 28 December 2018). This is equivalent to NZ$1.2 million as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency 
rates – rolling average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-
month-nov-2018.pdf> (last accessed 28 December 2018). 
91 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 29, at 777.  
92 At 777. 
93 AU$1.47 million (NZ$1.9 million) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 90, for the Australia GDP deflator 
and IRD, above n 90, for the AU$-NZ$ exchange rate.   
94 AU$645,000 (NZ$838,773) in 2018. See Trading Economics, above n 90, for the Australia GDP deflator and 
IRD, above n 90, for the AU$-NZ$ exchange rate.      
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19%, with the rest attributable to staff training. Installation of specialised software in-house 
enables large Australian enterprises to undertake large amount of tax compliance activities 
internally.  
The percentage composition of internal and external costs of tax compliance indicated that 
internal costs were approximately 46.7% of the gross tax compliance costs, while external 
costs accounted for 34.2%. The remaining 20% of the tax compliance costs were associated 
with non-labour costs. It is worthwhile to note that of the total costs associated with record 
keeping and tax computational activities (basic tax compliance activities), 60% were 
generated in-house, while the other 40% of the cost of the basic tax compliance activities were 
generated externally. This result implies that, although large enterprises in Australia retain 
less record keeping and computational activities in-house in comparison to US and Canadian 
large enterprises, they nevertheless rely more on internal resources when it comes to 
implementation of the basic tax compliance functions.         
Estimation of the gross compliance costs, consisting of internal and external costs, revealed 
that in relation to AU$1,000 of turnover, the compliance costs of large Australian enterprises 
were AU$0.40. In comparison to Australian SMEs, where per AU$1,000 of turnover gross 
tax compliance costs were estimated to be AU$3.34, tax compliance burden is much less for 
large enterprises in Australia. Consequently, this study confirms regressive nature of tax 
compliance costs. 
The determinants of the tax compliance costs were further examined through a questionnaire 
and the use of statistical methods. Responses provided by the Australian large enterprises in 
the sample revealed that complexity of tax law, number of different tax laws which the group 
has to comply with, uncertainty of the wording of tax law and the frequency of changes in tax 
legislation were perceived as main drivers of the compliance costs. Statistical analysis was 
undertaken in line with Slemrod and Blumethal,95 estimating the effect of variables such as 
turnover size, number of entities in a group, number of taxes and risk classification of a large 
enterprises in the ATO on gross, external and internal costs of tax compliance. The results of 
the regression showed a strong effect of turnover size and number of entities in a group on all 
three categories of the tax compliance costs. The values of the coefficients obtained were less 
than 1, implying that although, costs of tax compliance were increasing with the increase in 
                                                     
95 Slemrod and Bluementhal, above n 26.  
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the business size, the increase in the costs of tax compliance was less than proportionate. The 
risk classification with the ATO had effect only on external costs of tax compliance, 
particularly on costs associated with review, audit and litigation. However, the study could 
not conclude whether risk classification itself was a cost driver or tax aggressiveness of a 
group was the reason of a group risk classification.      
 
  2.5 Summary of Findings from Studies on Large Enterprises 
  2.5.1 Main Findings  
In summary, all five studies presented above deal specifically with large enterprises and seek 
to measure their tax compliance costs. Although these studies were undertaken in different 
jurisdictions, they nevertheless produced fairly consistent results.  
First, tax compliance costs of large enterprises are substantially high in their absolute value, 
being estimated as 2.6% of tax revenue collected from US large enterprises in the case of US 
large enterprises, 5% of tax revenue in the case of Canadian large enterprises, and 3.6 % of 
the total tax revenue in the case of large enterprises in Indonesia. Although, no comparison of 
the estimated tax compliance costs of large enterprises in Australia with tax revenue was 
undertaken in Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam’s study, 96  the costs of tax compliance of 
Australian large enterprises was found to be even higher (in AU$ terms) than in the case of 
large enterprises in the US and Canada.97  
Second, all five studies demonstrated that, although tax compliance costs tend to increase with 
business size, they do so less than proportionately due to economies of scale. Third, the 
regression analysis undertaken by Slemrod and Blumenthal, 98  Erard, 99  Chan, Ariff and 
Loh,100 and Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam,101 showed that the factors such as worldwide 
presence, volume of overseas transactions, type of industries in which large enterprise 
                                                     
96  Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 29. 
97  At 781. 
98   Slemrod and Bluementhal, above n 26.  
99   Erard, above n 48. 
100 Chan, Ariff and Loh, above n 27. 
101 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 29. 
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operates, size of turnover and number of entities in a group, are drivers of tax compliance 
costs. 
Fourth, the composition of the tax compliance costs in large enterprises presented in all five 
studies showed that activities relating to record keeping, computation and filing of tax returns 
account for 37% to 60% of the total compliance costs. The remainder of the costs are 
predominately associated with tax planning, audit and litigation, with a small fraction of other 
compliance-related expenditures. This implies that the composition of the costs of tax 
compliance in large enterprises is different from the composition of tax compliance costs in 
SMEs, where the majority of the costs are associated with record keeping and the preparation 
of tax returns.102   
Most of the computational activities related to tax compliance are done in-house, except for 
smaller public enterprises in Hong Kong, where reliance on external advisors in this regard 
was found to be greater in comparison with large enterprises from the studies in the US, 
Canada, Indonesia and Australia. This finding points to the fact that large enterprises appear 
to be more efficient than SMEs in relation to computational activities and the preparation of 
tax returns.  Therefore their reliance on external tax advisers for computational activities is 
smaller. Based on the composition of tax compliance costs in each of the five studies, it 
appears that the outsourcing of tax compliance activities mostly related to tax audit, appeal 
and litigation to external parties is customary for large enterprises. Eichfelder and 
Vaillancourt103 provide some evidence that as the size of business increases, the costs relating 
to audit and litigation increase, while costs of record keeping and tax computational activities 
becomes less relevant. This implies that large enterprises are largely cost efficient in relation 
to record keeping and computational activities.  
In relation to the costs of tax planning activities, it is difficult to conclude from these studies 
if there is a strong connection between tax planning costs and business size, as none of the 
studies (except for the Hong Kong study) provides a breakdown of tax planning costs by the 
size of the respondent enterprises. Thus, the Hong Kong study demonstrates that the costs of 
tax planning activities are significantly higher for the enterprises with the highest turnover 
                                                     
102 At 777. 
103 Sebastian Eichfelder and Francois Vaillancourt “Tax Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost 
Structures” (Arqus Discussion Paper No. 178, 2014) at 21. 
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compared to enterprises with the lowest turnover. Eichfelder and Vaillancourt104 argue that 
tax planning costs tend to increase with the size of business.  Slemrod105 provides a theoretical 
explanation of how economies of scale affect tax avoidance. In line with his explanation, since 
large enterprises are cost efficient in record keeping and computational activities, which are 
implemented in-house, they also become cost efficient in tax planning.   
For a better illustration, a quick summary of the studies discussed above is provided below in 
Table 2.1.  
  Table 2. 1:  Overview of studies on the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises 
Authors Year Definition  Data 
Collection 
Method 
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104 Eichfelder and Vaillancourt, above n 103, at 23. 
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   2.5.2 Limitations of the Studies        
The studies discussed above have several limitations which are discussed below. First, despite 
focusing on “large enterprises”, none of the studies attempts to analyse what entity can be 
defined as large prior to determining their representative sample. As we have seen earlier in 
this chapter, each study draws a representative sample that consists of entities, defined as large 
according to criteria adopted by the tax revenue authority. Since the revenue authority designs 
the definition criteria for its own purposes, there is a risk that a sample of entities, defined as 
large according to these criteria might not be representative of an actual population of large 
enterprises. Moreover, use of only quantitative criteria, such as the number of employees, 
sales volume or value of assets, to define an enterprise as large, seems convenient for 
empirical estimation, but has an obvious deficiency which is related to uncertainty of where 
to draw the line that separates large enterprises from SMEs. Perhaps, one of the possible ways 
to define a large enterprise more accurately would be to include qualitative criteria that 
describe large enterprise in terms of its inherent characteristics.   
Second, more analysis of the determinants of tax compliance costs of large enterprises is 
required, particularly in regard to the overseas business operations. Given that most of the 
studies on large enterprises, except for the studies in Indonesia and Australia, were conducted 
at least 20 years ago, the expansion of business operations of large enterprises beyond the 
border of a single jurisdiction and increased complexity of cross-border transactions, merit a 
more thorough investigation into effect of cross-border transactions on tax compliance costs 
of large enterprises. 
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Third, none of the prior studies attempted to estimate whether large enterprises use cost 
efficient tax compliance administration. Large enterprises usually have a choice of resources 
to deal with their tax compliance obligations, which generally include in-house personnel, 
specialised software and services provided by external tax practitioners. Therefore, a cost 
efficient mix of these resources can also assist in reducing costs of tax compliance. In 
accordance with the rational choice theory, which will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 
5 of this thesis, firms are expected to choose a cost minimising mix of resources. Thus, 
empirical analysis in the framework of the rational choice theory could provide more insight 
into whether large enterprises in a particular jurisdiction use the cost-efficient tax compliance 
administration. If large enterprises do not use cost-efficient tax compliance administration, 
then this analysis can further assist in determining what resources are used inefficiently and 




Chapter 3:  Defining Large Enterprises in New Zealand 
 
3.1 Introduction  
As already mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, and further demonstrated in the 
Chapter 2, none of the prior studies of tax compliance costs has provided a clear definition of 
what a large enterprise is. Therefore, it appears that there is no unified definition of a large 
enterprise, either in New Zealand or in a number of other jurisdictions. The prior studies 
examined have shown that the government agencies in each jurisdiction characterises large 
enterprises differently, both in terms of the criteria and the thresholds applied. Interestingly, 
large enterprises may not even have an official definition – they logically follow from the 
official definitions established for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Thus, upon 
examination of the definition for SMEs adopted by the European Commission, it can be 
concluded that an enterprise with a number of employees above 250 and annual turnover or 
assets value over EURO50 million (NZ$84.7 million)1 is considered large by the European 
Commission.2 At the same time according to the criteria and thresholds adopted by the World 
Bank3 for classifying SMEs, a large enterprise is a business entity where the number of staff 
exceeds 300 and the value of total assets or the amount of total annual sales is above US$15 
million (NZ$21.7 million).4 
In the case of New Zealand, whether an entity can be classified as large, depends on which 
criteria, and their thresholds, are used. For example, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE) considers an entity that has over 100 employees5 as large. In contrast, an 
entity with an annual turnover of more than NZ$30 million or assets over NZ$60 million is 
                                                     
1  Euro-NZ$ exchange rate (1 NZ$ =0.59 EURO) as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling 
average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-
2018.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2018).  
2 Commission of the European Communities “Commission recommendation concerning the definitions of micro, 
small and medium sized enterprises” (2003) L 124 Official journal of the European Union 36. 
3  Independent Evaluation Group “Financing micro, small, and medium Enterprises: An Independent Evaluation 
of IFC’s experience with financial intermediaries in frontier countries” (International Finance Corporation, World 
Bank Group, 2008) at 5. 
4  US$ - NZ$ exchange rate (1NZ$ = 0.69 US$) as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling 
average” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-
2018.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2018).  
5  MBIE “The small business sector report” (2014). 
42 
 
considered large under the criteria established in the New Zealand Financial Reporting Act 
2013 (FRA 2013).6  
New Zealand’s Inland Revenue (IR) uses a NZ$100 million7 annual turnover threshold to 
define large enterprises. However, this definition is used in the context of the customer service 
function and includes tax exempt organisations like Crown entities8 which are not part of the 
IR’s tax compliance focus. For tax compliance purposes the IR applies the term “significant 
enterprise”, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. For the purpose 
of this chapter it is suffice to say that a significant enterprise with an annual Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) turnover greater than NZ$80 million will be considered as a “large enterprise” by 
the IR for tax compliance purposes.9  
The array of existing criteria and thresholds describing large enterprise create ambiguity 
regarding which enterprises should be considered as large in New Zealand. If the thresholds 
applied to define large enterprises across industries are also taken into account, the perception 
of a large enterprise becomes even more blurred. It follows that, taking any of the official 
definitions as a benchmark for measuring the size of an entity cannot produce a reliable 
representative sample of the “true” large enterprises simply because each of these definitions 
has different views on what entity to consider as “large”. As an example, the MBIE estimates 
according to its criteria, that large enterprises in New Zealand account for 0.4% of the total 
number of business entities.10  
However, statistics from the IR provides a different number of the large enterprises in New 
Zealand (0.2% of all registered entities).11  It should be noted that the large enterprises included 
in the IR’s statistics, are defined as enterprises with NZ$100 million turnover and include tax 
                                                     
6  Financial Reporting Act 2013 (FRA 2013), s 45(1)(a). 
7  IR “Tax statistics definitions” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-stats/tax-statistics-definitions.html> 
(last accessed 24 December 2018).   
8  Email from Stephen Casey (International Revenue Strategy team) to the researcher regarding the definition of 
large enterprises in New Zealand (25 September 2018).  See also above n 7.    
9  From the interview with an IR tax official (5 April 2018) transcript provided by the researcher. Significant 
enterprises and the interview with an IR official are elaborated upon in Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis, respectively.  
10 Statistics New Zealand “Business demography statistics” 
<http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE7604&_ga=2.263378116.9759411
72.1545634605-2096137522.1543898237#> (last accessed 26 December 2018).    
11 IR “Registered customers by groups 2008-2017” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-
stats/customers/reg-by-customer-group/customers-reg-cust-by-groups.html> (last accessed 23 December 2018). 
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exempt organisations. Therefore, depending upon which criteria are used as a reference, the 
population of large enterprises in New Zealand may fluctuate across a range of 0.2% and 0.4%. 
Moreover, considering that the IR statistics includes tax exempt organisations, the population 
of large enterprises, which are the focus of tax compliance costs study, should be even less than 
0.2%.   
When government officials discuss the important role (measured by the contribution to GDP 
growth, employment and tax revenue) that large enterprises play in the national economy, how 
can they be certain that these are indeed “large enterprises” that they are talking about given 
that the term “large enterprise” itself is not clearly defined? Where can the line that separates 
SMEs from large enterprises in New Zealand be drawn? Therefore, a question arises from the 
above discussion: is it possible to have a unified definition for the term “large enterprise” which 
would reflect the distinctive characteristics of large businesses and be operational for statistical 
purposes?    
In the light of the existing uncertainty with the term “large enterprise”, this chapter undertakes 
an explorative analysis of various types of criteria that can help to provide a definition of the 
large enterprise in New Zealand. This analysis is necessary in order to determine the population 
of large enterprises in New Zealand so that further research (predominately empirical) in the 
area of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises can be conducted.    
The remaining content of the chapter is as follows. First, a brief introduction to the past studies 
on the issue of large enterprise definitions will be provided. Second, discussion on the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to the definition of large enterprises, with a focus on 
the role that qualitative criteria play in defining large enterprises, will be presented. Finally, 
the last section summarises the information provided in this chapter.   
 
3.2 Review of the Literature on the Definition of Large Enterprises  
As is the case with the absence of a unified definition of large enterprises, the research literature 
does not have any notable academic publications relating to the study of the problem 
surrounding the definition of a large enterprise. Perhaps the only available study providing 
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some insights into the official definition of the large enterprises is the specialised report 
prepared by the Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations in 2008.12  
This report presented the results of a survey conducted among 39 European Union (EU) 
member and non-member countries for the purpose of establishing whether the term “large 
taxpayer” had a legal definition, and what criteria were applied to classify large taxpayer in 
each participating country. According to the results, 45% of the countries had a legal definition 
and another 45% used other definitions and guidance to define the term “large taxpayer”. Ten 
percent of the countries participating in the survey had no definition or other description of a 
large taxpayer.13 The report further revealed that the most common criteria used to describe 
large taxpayers were the value of turnover (79%), number of employees (29%), amount of 
taxes paid (29%), and assets value (18%).14 Although this report serves as a useful source of 
information about the various definitions classifying large taxpayers by the tax authorities in 
different jurisdictions, it does not provide any analysis of what entity can be considered as a 
large enterprise based on the features that characterise large enterprises.  
In contrast to the lack of attention to the definitional issue of large enterprises, research has 
shown a greater interest towards finding a better way to define a SME. This is not surprising 
given the heightened interest that governments and economists have in the growth and 
development of SMEs, which they consider to be the “backbone of the economy”. 15 
Consequently, establishment of a unified definition of what constitutes a “true” SME could 
assist in identifying the groups of business entities that would match the criteria of that “true” 
SME, ensuring that government’s support of SMEs is delivered to the right recipient. However, 
according to Berisha and Pula, this issue is far from being resolved.16 
Berisha and Pula,17 in their critical review of the problem of defining SMEs, note that the SME 
definition issue is not only far from being resolved, but is also not widely acknowledged. They 
                                                     
12 Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations “Definition of ‘Large Taxpayer’: IOTA Report for Tax 
Administrations” (2008). 
13 At 5.  
14 At 8.  
15  Gentrit Berisha and Jastina Pula “Defining Small and Medium Enterprises: a critical review” (2015) 1   
Academic Journal of Business, Administration, Law and Social Science 17 at 17. 
16 Berisha and Pula, above n 15. 
17 Berisha and Pula, above n 15. 
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state that the strong heterogeneity and inconsistencies in the available SME definitions have 
resulted in “considerable ambiguity in the terminology used”.18 They further discuss the use of 
qualitative criteria and argue that although the qualitative characteristics of SMEs make them 
easily distinguishable from large enterprises, quantitative criteria are mainly used for the 
dimensional classification of SMEs. 
Another notable study which focuses on the problem around the definition of SMEs was by 
Gibson and van der Vaart.19 They argued that due to the inconsistencies amongst official 
definitions of SMEs, the allocation of government spending for SME development could result 
in serious distortions and thus a new method to define SMEs was required. A quantitative 
formula for defining SMEs was proposed as this new method. The formula defines a SME as 
an entity whose annual turnover, expressed in US$ terms, is between 10 and 1000 times the 
mean per capita Gross National Product (GNP) adjusted for the purchasing power parity of the 
country in which the entity operates. 
Gibson and van der Vaart’s formula is based on the following three principles. The first 
principle is that the use of annual turnover “most closely reflects functional and behavioural 
attributes”20 of an entity and therefore generally serves as a more appropriate measure of the 
relative size of the entity. The second principle concerns consideration of the country-specific 
economic context which is expressed through the level of GNP adjusted for the purchasing 
power parity. Finally, the use of the 10 and 1000 multiples for the lower and upper cut-offs 
reflects the idea of the “dynamic growth” of SMEs. Therefore, scaling the size parameters of 
SMEs in relation to their home base should help to improve consistencies among multi-country 
definitions of SMEs. This study perhaps is the first attempt to analyse what the definition of 
SME should be in the context of the level of economic development, and the formula proposed 
in this study can be viewed as a convenient universal definition of SMEs.  
Although the studies introduced above deal with the problems associated with the ambiguous 
definitions of SMEs, the ideas presented in them could potentially offer some insights for the 
current analysis of the problem with the definitions of large enterprises. For example, the idea 
of using qualitative characteristics and scaling an entity’s annual turnover in relation to the 
                                                     
18 At 18. 
19 Tom Gibson and HJ van der Vaart “Defining SMEs: a less Imperfect Way of Defining Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Developing Countries” (Brookings Global Economy and Development, 2008).  
20 At 14. 
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country’s economic development indexes could be useful in establishing what constitutes a 
large enterprise in a certain jurisdiction.  
 
3.3 Common Criteria Used to Define Large Enterprises 
Before moving to a more detailed discussion of the common criteria which may be used to 
define a large enterprise, it is worth noting that a population of large enterprises appears to be 
non-homogeneous in respect to many factors: form and size of organisation; type and scale of 
activity; and existence of industry/activity specific taxes. Thus, a population of large 
enterprises includes organisations engaged in a wide range of activities: finance, insurance, 
resource exploration and energy supply. The concept of a large enterprise becomes even more 
complicated by the fact that not only a single enterprise but also a group of such single 
enterprises may fall under the definition of a “large enterprise”. A group of enterprises may 
operate only within New Zealand or across various jurisdictions, have a parent enterprise based 
in New Zealand or be headquartered offshore. A group of multinational enterprises serve as a 
prime example of such a group of entities, requiring further consideration as to how to classify 
them in terms of their size. For instance, if a parent of a multinational group is a New Zealand-
based enterprise, then perhaps the size of this multinational group can be measured by the size 
of its New Zealand parent. However, if a multinational group’s parent is headquartered offshore 
and this multinational group has a presence in New Zealand through a subsidiary, then how do 
we ascertain the size of this multinational group? Should we measure the size of this 
multinational group using only the New Zealand subsidiary or should we apply the available 
criteria to measure the rest of a group?  
The heterogeneity observed in the population of large enterprises makes arriving at a unified 
definition of large enterprises a very difficult task. This heterogeneity requires using different 
criteria and thresholds for determining if a particular organisation belongs to category of large 
enterprises. Factors used to describe a large enterprise vary greatly across jurisdictions due to 
differences in the size of economies, existence of specific industries and the types of taxes 
levied in particular jurisdictions.  These factors, criteria and thresholds also in turn depend upon 
the purposes for which the definition of large enterprise is required, whether it is for tax, audit 
or economic policy purposes.  Thus, the same organisation might be considered as a large for 
financial reporting purposes as prescribed by financial reporting regulations but at the same 
time, will fall short of the threshold established by a tax authority for large enterprises. For the 
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purpose of economic policy, an organisation might be classified as large, but it may fail to 
satisfy the criteria of the large organisation established for both audit and tax purposes.  
Therefore, the greatest difficulty connected with defining a large enterprise is seen in the 
unification of the diverse criteria and thresholds adopted to describe this category of enterprises. 
While the established numerical thresholds are subject to variation due to the various factors 
mentioned above, criteria based on the intrinsic characteristics of large enterprises could assist 
in the adoption of the unified definition.  
 
3.3.1 Criteria Based on Numerical Values  
An approach, which uses numerical values in order to classify large enterprise is referred as a 
“quantitative approach”. It enables large enterprises to be identified relatively easily and 
quickly by measuring the size of an entity in terms of indicators such as number of staff, amount 
of annual turnover or sales and value of assets. Either some or all of the indicators may be 
sufficient for measuring the size of an entity. The most common criterion used to distinguish 
large enterprises from SMEs is the number of employees.21 As an example, the European 
Commission defines the size of an entity through three parameters: number of employees, 
annual turnover or the value of assets (which are both expressed in EURO).22 Although the 
European Commission applies these parameters for the official definition of a SME, we can 
logically extend them in order to define large enterprises. Table 3.1 below presents how the 
European Commission would define large enterprises on a basis of the definition of SMEs. The 







                                                     
21 Timothy S Hatten Small Business Management: Entrepreneurship and Beyond (5th ed, South-Western Cengage 
Learning, Mason, 2011). 
22 Commission of European Communities, above n 2.  
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Table 3.1: Definition of large enterprise in accordance with European Union standards 
Enterprise category  Annual Number of 
Employees 
Annual turnover Value of assets 
Large >250 > EURO50 million  
(NZ$85 million)23 
>EURO50 million   
(NZ$85 million) 
Medium-sized <250 < EURO50 million 
(NZ$85 million) 
< EURO50 million 
(NZ$85 million)  
   Source: European Commission24  
Another authoritative international institution, the World Bank, also uses three quantitative 
criteria to define SMEs: number of employees; total assets; and total annual sales. An entity 
must meet the criterion of the number of employees and at least one of the other two criteria in 
order to be classified as SME. Since the World Bank applies these criteria in order to provide 
an official definition of SMEs, the definition of large enterprise can be similarly derived as in 
the above example with the European Commission.  
 
Table 3.2:  Definition of large enterprise in accordance with World Bank standards 
Enterprise category  Number of 
employees 
Total assets Total annual sales 
Large >300 > US$15 million  
(NZ$21.6 million)25 
> US$15 million  
(NZ$21.6 million) 
Medium-sized < 300 < US$15 million  
(NZ$21.6 million) 
< US$15 million  
(NZ$21.6 million)  
       Source: Independent Evaluation Group26 
                                                     
23 EURO–NZ$ exchange rate as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
24 Commission of European Communities, above n 2.   
25 US$ – NZ$ exchange rate as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
26 Independent Evaluation Group, above n 3. 
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The comparison of the criteria and their numerical values applied by the European Commission 
and the World Bank reveals that despite the application of the same criteria, the threshold 
values established by both institutions differ significantly. Inconsistencies are most pronounced 
in the financial criteria. Consequently, depending upon whether the thresholds established by 
the European Commission or by the World Bank are used, the same entity might 
simultaneously be classified as large enterprises and as SME.    
Furthermore, if we take a look at the thresholds established in different countries, the thresholds 
that apply to each criterion tend to differ between jurisdictions. The following table shows how 
the number of employees, being the most common criterion,27 varies across jurisdictions. 
Jurisdiction SME Large Enterprise 
EU countries, Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland 
1-249 >250 
Australia 0-199 >200 
Canada 0-499 >500 
Japan 1-249 >250 
Korea 5-199 >200 
New Zealand 0-99 >100 
United States 1-499 >500 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)28  
It is clear that the thresholds determining where SMEs end and large enterprises commence 
will differ from country to country due to the relative size of national economies. For instance, 
according to Table 3.3, an enterprise with a number of employees greater than 100 is considered 
to be large in New Zealand, while in Japan it is still an SME. Inconsistencies in the thresholds 
defining SMEs and large enterprises, as indicated in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, once again 
                                                     
27 Berisha and Pula, above n 15, at 20. 
28 OECD “SMEs, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation” (Paris, 2010). 
   
Table 3.3:  Differences in the number of employees used to measure the size of an entity 
across jurisdictions  
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emphasise that numerical criteria are very subjective and classification of an entity as a large 
enterprise or as a SME depends to a great extent on the interests of the stakeholders. In addition, 
as all the measurements for large enterprises shown in the tables above are based on the 
numerical criteria established for SMEs, the definition of large enterprises is therefore solely 
dependent on these numerical values. As Gibson and Van der Vaart29 note, existing SME 
definitions based on numerical parameters are not the result of a scientific division based on 
microeconomic indicators, but rather are of statistical arbitrariness.  
The volatility of the thresholds increases even more when entities are analysed in relation to 
the sectors within which they operate. Thus, an entity with the same quantitative parameters 
can be considered as large or small as it moves from one sector to another. The quantitative 
criteria discussed above define an entity as large in absolute terms but industry-specific 
characteristics are not taken into account. For example, if we use the number of employees to 
determine if an entity is large, this criterion has obvious limitations, mainly because the number 
of staff employed is dependent on the sector in which an entity operates. Therefore, in order to 
measure the size of entities across sectors in terms of the number of employees it is necessary 
to use different thresholds, each reflecting the specificity of the sector. If we look at the 
quantitative definitions used by the United States Small Business Administration30 we can see 
that the main criterion defining the size of an entity engaged in agricultural sector as large is 
turnover over US$750, 000 (NZ$1.08 million),31 while in the mining industry the criterion is 
the number of employees above 500, and in the wholesale sector the criterion is based on the 
number of employees over 100.32  
Despite being a relatively simple and convenient way to identify large enterprises in terms of 
numerical parameters, the quantitative approach has several drawbacks. First, the choice of the 
thresholds that apply to criteria used to define a large enterprise largely depend on the interests 
of the stakeholders – researchers, politicians, international institutions and public authorities. 
Consequently, the answer to the question “what is a large enterprise?” will depend on who 
                                                     
29 Gibson and van der Vaart, above n 19, at 3. 
30 United States Small Business Administration “U.S. Small Business Administration: Table of Small Business 
Size Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification System Codes” (2017). 
31  US$ – NZ$ exchange rate as at 15 November 2018. See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018). 
32 United States Small Business Administration, above n 30. 
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answers this question. Second, even unified numerical criteria and the thresholds adopted 
within certain jurisdiction may not be suitable for measuring the size of an entity across 
different sectors of economy due to the industry-specific factors. Thus, the market forces of the 
sector in which an entity is engaged might determine criteria such as sales turnover and number 
of employees. Therefore, benchmarking the size of entities from different industry sectors 
against unified criteria and thresholds does not appear to be very meaningful. Finally, due to 
the differences in the size of national economies it is difficult to apply one measurement 
standard across many countries in order to define large enterprises in those countries.   
  
3.3.2 Criteria Based on Qualitative Features  
As the word “qualitative” suggests, qualitative criteria should describe characteristic features 
that large enterprises tend to have. Logically, large enterprises differ from SMEs not only by 
the sheer volume of their operations, but also by criteria such as organisational structure, capital 
structure and geographical span of operations. The presence of such characteristics might be 
indicative of the fact that not only is an enterprises large in terms of a size, but also that this 
enterprise is not an SME.  
 
3.3.2.1. Organisational Structure  
A large enterprise (one that is not SME) is so-called, primarily due to the large scope of its 
operations. To manage large scale operations successfully it is essential to have an efficient 
and well-functioning organisational structure. This organisational structure usually delineates 
the duties and responsibilities of employees and creates hierarchical subordination which links 
the lowest level employee with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a large enterprise. As 
large-scale operations require expertise, the hierarchical structure of large enterprises ensure 
that instructions and commands pass quickly from the top manager (CEO) to departmental 
managers who have an abundance of expertise in regard to their main functions.33 Unlike SMEs, 
where the main management functions are divided between several employees, the 
organisational structure of a large enterprise usually includes departments, each of which is 
                                                     
33 Patrick Gleeson “Organizational and Structural Differences Between Small and Large Businesses” (29 June 
2018) Chron <http://smallbusiness.chron.com/organizational-structural-differences-between-small-large-
businesses-10678.html> (last accessed 25 December 2018). 
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charged with certain duties and responsibilities. Thus, a large enterprise might have a human 
resource department, finance and accounting department, logistics department, purchase 
department, marketing department, each comprising a number of employees.    
There are five common types of organisational structures, which are usually adopted by large 
enterprises. These are as follows:34 
1. Matrix Organisational Structure  
2. Functional Organisational Structure  
3. Product Organisational Structure  
4. Customer Organisational Structure  
5. Geographic Organisational Structure 
There is a great deal of debate in the academic literature regarding the link between the size of 
an enterprise and its organisational structure. Broadly speaking, organisational structures 
concern two things: 1) work division and 2) coordination mechanisms, which include the 
standardisation and formalisation of tasks.35 A higher level of work division, which presumes 
specialisation and differentiation, leads to greater complexity of an organisation, or 
“departmentalisation”.36 The existence of coordination mechanisms in an organisation lead to 
greater bureaucracy within the organisation.  
Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman argue that due to transaction costs and coordination, 
hierarchical structures are absent or very rare in small enterprises.37 Based on data from 2000 
Dutch firms with less than 100 employees they attempted to test the hypotheses that the larger 
the firm, the more complex its structure.  The results of their study shows that small firms may 
have a wide variety of organisational structures too. However, the study established a strong 
positive correlation between firm size and departmentalisation. The study found firms with 
                                                     
34 Patricial Lotich “Types of Business Organizational Structures” (24 July 2013) Pingboard 
<https://pingboard.com/blog/types-business-organizational-structures/?rel=author> (last accessed 25 December 
2018).  
35  Joris Meijaard, Maryse Brand and Marco Mosselman “Organizational Structure and Performance in Small 
Dutch Firms” (2005) 25 Small Business Economics 83 at 85.   
36  Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman, above n 35, at 85. 
37  Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman, above n 35, at 84.  
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substantial departmentalisation to be larger. These findings emphasise that the degree of 
complexity of organisational structure can be an important determinant of a large enterprise.          
The existence of a strong positive correlation between a firm’s size and the degree of its 
departmentalisation, as established by Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman,38 perhaps indicates 
(with a high degree of caution), that organisational structure can be used as a qualitative 
criterion for large enterprises in New Zealand. This is, taking into account that the percentage 
of enterprises with more than 100 employees is merely 0.4% of the total number of enterprises 
in the country.39   
 
3.3.2.2 Capital Structure  
Capital structure might serve as another criterion for describing a large enterprise. By the scale 
of their business operations large enterprises normally require a much larger capital to finance 
their ongoing operations, expansion and development. As we saw in section 3.2.2.1, large 
enterprises generally have a more complex and more developed organisational structure along 
with more employees. It would therefore be natural to assume that large enterprises possess not 
only a greater volume of capital, but also resort to more complex ways to finance their capital. 
However, is there evidence demonstrating that large enterprises have financial structures that 
are different from those of smaller firms? In other words, can capital structure be used as a 
characteristic of a large enterprise?  
Prior studies in the area of capital structure indeed show that there are significant differences 
between the capital structure of large and small firms.40 These differences can be attributed to 
factors such as barriers that small firms typically face in accessing external capital and the 
managerial ownership structure prevalent in small firms.41  
                                                     
38 Meijaard, Brand and Mosselman, above n 35, at 90 and 93.  
39 Statistics New Zealand, above n 10. 
40 Nirosha Wellalage and Stuart Locke “Capital Structure and Its Determinants in New Zealand Firms” (2013) 14 
Journal of Business Economics and Management 852.  
41 Wellalage and Locke, above n 40.   
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A study undertaken by Cassar and Holmes42 found positive results between a firm’s size and 
level of debt. The greater level of debt in larger firms can be explained by their higher credit 
ratings which makes access to capital much easier for large enterprises. Large enterprises are 
more likely to have a higher level of debt in order to maximise tax benefits from debt.43 In 
addition, according to Cassar,44 small firms take on a lower level of borrowing compared to 
large firms due to the high transaction costs. Small firms tend to have managerial share 
ownership45 and are more likely to use internal retained earnings to finance their investments 
rather than use debt or issue shares as equity.46 In a study by Bhaird and Lucey47 it was found 
that Irish SMEs have a lower level of external debt compared to larger firms. Furthermore, a 
negative relationship has been found between total level of debt and managerial ownership in 
small firms, implying that manager-owned firms tend to have a lower level of debt, as owner-
managers are generally risk averse due to the “non-diversifiable employment risk”.48   
In a study of the top 50 listed companies in New Zealand, Wellalage and Locke49 used time 
series data for the period from 2003 to 2009 to obtain 40 observations. The data set of the study 
revealed that the mean value of debt to assets ratio among listed New Zealand companies is 
0.4, indicating a “high use of the corporate debt” in relation to equity by New Zealand listed 
companies.50 Their study establishes that firm size is the most significant determinant of capital 
structure in New Zealand firms. The effect of firm size was found to be the most pronounced 
for firms with the smallest level of debt, and least pronounced for firms with the highest level 
                                                     
42 Gavin Cassar and Scott Holmes “Capital structure and financing of SMEs: Australian evidence” (2003) 43 
Accounting and Finance 123. 
43 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales “What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from 
International Data” (1995) 50 Journal of Finance 1421.   
44 Gavin Cassar “The financing of business start-up” (2004) 19 Journal of Business Venturing 261. 
45 Timothy Brailsford, Barry Oliver and Sandra Pua “On the Relation between Ownership Structure and Capital 
Structure” (2002) 42 Accounting and Finance 1. 
46 Robert Watson and Nick Wilson “Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing: A Note on Some of the 
Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order” (2002) 29 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 557. 
47 Ciaran Bhaird and Brian Lucey “Determinants of Capital Structure in Irish SMEs” (2010) 35 Small Business 
Economics 1. 
48 Nirosha Wellalage and Stuart Locke “Impact of ownership structure on capital structure of New Zealand 
unlisted firms” (2015) 22 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 127 at 135. 
49 Wellalage and Locke, above n 48. 
50 At 858.  
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of debt, implying that small firms in New Zealand rely more on the capital introduced by the 
owners. As the size of a firm grows, the ratio of the debt in its capital structure also increases.51   
The findings of the studies outlined above indicate that the capital structure of large firms is 
different from that of smaller firms. Large enterprises in New Zealand might have higher level 
of debts, as SMEs are usually debt averse due to their managerial ownership. In addition, New 
Zealand SMEs finance their growth more with equity than with long-term borrowing. That is, 
small firms in New Zealand rely more on the initial capital introduced by manager-owners and 
retained earnings, rather than on the other sources of external finance. Due to the obvious 
differences in capital structure between small and large firms in New Zealand, as described 
above, it is perhaps possible to use capital structure as another criterion for defining large 
enterprises.  
 
3.3.2.3 Geographical Span of Operations  
Do large enterprises generally operate in a wider market compared to SMEs? Do large 
enterprises tend to be more internationalised then SMEs?  In other words, if an enterprise 
engages in export operations or carries out business activities internationally through branches 
or subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions, is it more likely that this enterprise is large?  The 
literature investigating the relationship between a firm’s size and its propensity to export52 finds 
that there is a significant positive relationship between a firm’s size and its propensity to export. 
Thus, the larger the firm, the higher the likelihood that it will choose to engage in exporting. 
However, the fact that a particular enterprise engages in exporting does not automatically mean 
that this enterprise is large. Mittelstaedt, Harben and Ward estimated the export potential 
among US small, medium and large firms and found that the minimum size of US firms to have 
a potential for engaging in export activities is 20 employees.53  This study showed that the 
probability of engaging in export operations generally increases with the increase in the size of 
                                                     
51 At 860.  
52 See, for example, John Mittelstaedt and William Ward “Location, Competition and Globalization: Increasing 
Returns and International Trade” (Centre for International Trade Working Paper 2-2003, 2003). 
53 John Mittelstaedt, George Harben and William Ward “How Small is Too Small? Firm Size as a Barrier to 
Exporting from the United States” (2003) 41 Journal of Small Business Management 68 at 72. 
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a firm measured by the number of employees.54 The difference between the predicted and 
actual export activity was found to be the smallest for the category of large firms, implying that 
large US firms were indeed effectively exploiting their export potential.  
There are a number of reasons why large firms are more likely to engage in export activities. 
First, integration into the global market requires exporters to meet standards of industrial 
certification, the costs of which might be prohibitive for small firms.55 Second, non-tariff 
barriers (fixed transaction costs) affect both small and large firms to the same degree. However, 
these fixed costs impact on large firms in a smaller proportion then they impact on small firms. 
Large firms can more easily address these fixed transaction costs as they have sufficient 
resources for them. Third, large firms are more effectively organised for large scale export 
operations. Hodge and Anthony argue that as the size of a firm increases, the firm becomes 
more formalised and its task differentiation and specialisation also increases.56 More developed 
organisational structures significantly help large firms to efficiently organise their export 
operations.57 
The evidence in the literature that larger enterprises have a greater propensity to engage in 
export operations, does not, however, suggest that if a particular enterprise carries out export 
operations, then that enterprise is large. For example, among SMEs in New Zealand 58  
approximately 33% were conducting export activities in 2011 according to a 2014 MBIE 
report.59 While the number of enterprises engaged in export activities grew with an increase in 
the size of the organisation,60 the report also indicated that a significant number of SMEs in 
New Zealand engage in export activities. Accordingly, if engagement in export activity cannot 
                                                     
54 Large firms were defined as firms with more than 500 employees, small-to-medium firms as firms with 100- 
499 employees and micro firms as firms with fewer than 20 employees. Mittelstaedt, Harben and Ward, above n 
53, at 71.  
55 Mittelstaedt, Harben and Ward, above n 53, at 77.   
56 Billy Hodge and William Anthony Organization theory: a strategic approach (4th ed, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 
1991) at 26.  
57Mittelstaedt, Harben and Ward, above n 53, at 80.  
58 Defined by MBIE as enterprises with a number of employees from 20-99. See MBIE, above n 5, at 10. 
59 MBIE, above n 5, at 46. 
60 38% of enterprises with a number of employees equal or greater than 100 were conducting export activities. 
MBIE, above n 5, at 46. 
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serve as an indicator of a large enterprise activity, other features of a firm’s internationalisation 
may serve as more reliable criteria. 
One of the ways for a particular enterprise to operate globally is foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which can be implemented either through a wholly owned subsidiary, joint venture or contract 
manufacturing and distribution. In regard to the size of an enterprise which is more likely to 
implement its global operations through FDI, Skott-Kennel61 finds that large enterprises62 are 
more likely to enter global markets through FDI, while SMEs63 in New Zealand rely more on 
networking and cooperation with foreign partners.64  
Another study by Kinoshita65 argues that small firms in Japan also invest in foreign markets 
through FDI. However, the pattern of their investment is different from that followed by large 
Japanese firms. While small Japanese firms are more likely to invest in markets with a cheap 
labour force and located in a close proximity to Japan, large firms prefer to invest in large 
markets.   
The analysis of the literature in various jurisdictions on the relationship between a firm’s size 
and its propensity to engage in export operations or invest in overseas markets through FDI, 
suggests that although there is a positive correlation, SMEs also engage in export activities and 
invest in foreign markets. This also seems to be true for New Zealand SMEs. However, the 
scale and pattern of both export operations and FDI is different for SMEs and large enterprises. 
Therefore, qualitative criterion, such as engagement in export operations and investing in 
overseas markets alone, are not effective in distinguishing between large enterprises and SMEs. 
Perhaps, with a help of numerical criteria such as an amount of export sales, value of worldwide 
assets and worldwide number of employees, it might be easier to separate large enterprises 
from SMEs.  
                                                     
61 Joanna Scott-Kennel “Models of internationalisation: the New Zealand experience” (2013) 10 International 
Journal of Business and Globalisation 105.  
62 Defined as enterprises which have over 300 employees worldwide. See Scott-Kennel, above n 61, at 115. 
63 Defined as enterprises which have up to 300 employees worldwide. See Scott-Kennel, above n 61, at 115. 
64 Scott-Kennel, above n 61, at 119. 





3.4. Conclusion  
As this chapter has demonstrated, defining large enterprises is a difficult task. The difficulty in 
arriving at a common definition is primarily due to the existence of many criteria and thresholds 
used to classify business entities in terms of their size. Types of criteria used to describe large 
enterprises in New Zealand were discussed. There are usually two types of criteria used to 
describe large enterprise: quantitative and qualitative.  
Numerical criteria (quantitative criteria) usually operate with values such as the number of 
employees, turnover or assets value. Data on these variables can be easily obtained, are easy to 
understand and therefore convenient to use for comparing entities to determine, for example, 
their relative size. However, numerical criteria are established by various stakeholders (the tax 
authority, a government agency and other organisations which set rules for public entities’ 
financial reporting), who have different objectives. Therefore these numerical criteria can differ 
significantly. This makes relying on a particular threshold as a benchmark in order to determine 
the size of an entity quite problematic. As noted earlier, the same entity might be considered 
large using the criteria set out in the FRA 2013, but at the same time this entity may fail to meet 
the threshold established by New Zealand’s IR for determining large enterprises. Hence, when 
a particular enterprise is said to be large, the question arises as to by what standard is it large?   
Since different benchmarks are used for quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria, which 
describe large enterprises on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics, might be helpful in 
setting large enterprises apart from SMEs and defining the true population of large enterprises 
in New Zealand. In this chapter three qualitative characteristics have been discussed: 
organisational structure, capital structure and geographical span of activity of business entity. 
As indicated by previous studies, large enterprises tend to have more complex and more 
developed organisational structures compared to small firms. It has been shown that a firm’s 
size is positively correlated with the degree of departmentalisation of the entity, implying that 
large enterprises need more employees possessing more narrow skills in order to manage such 
a complex structure efficiently. In regard to the second qualitative criterion examined in this 
chapter, capital structure, it was also shown that large entities, including New Zealand entities, 
tend to have more sources of external finance – either debt or equity – in their capital structure. 
Prior studies into the relationship between a firm’s size and its propensity to export or engage 
in the worldwide business activity through FDI have shown to have a positive correlation, 
implying that larger firms are more likely to engage in export operations or invest in the 
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overseas markets through FDI. However, as evidenced in the literature and in a report by MBIE, 
SMEs in New Zealand also participate in export activities. SMEs in New Zealand also enter 
foreign markets, however unlike large enterprises they do so through cooperation with foreign 
partners.  
The qualitative criteria discussed in this chapter might be helpful in determining the population 
of large enterprises in New Zealand in the following way. A minimum threshold of a business 
turnover66 can be determined in each industry in accordance with industry benchmarks. A 
group of enterprises whose turnover meets this threshold can have its qualitative criteria (for 
example, organisational structure or capital structure) examined to see if the enterprises in this 
group exhibits the features of a large enterprise. These enterprises may have a matrix 
organisational structure and the prevalence of debt or equity in their financial structure. The 
presence of these qualitative criteria will imply that these enterprises are more likely to be large 
enterprises and not SMEs within this industry. As the turnover threshold increases the group 
of enterprises will become more homogenised in terms of these qualitative criteria. Empirical 
findings in the literature discussed in this chapter confirm this fact. Thus, examining enterprises 
in terms of their turnover and qualitative characterises can assist in determining a group of 
enterprises with features that very closely resemble large enterprises. 
                                                     
66 Gibson and van der Vaart, above n 19, at 14.   
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Chapter 4:  Tax Compliance of Large Enterprises in New Zealand      
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will present an outline of the tax compliance activities of large enterprises in New 
Zealand in order to provide an insight into the scope of the taxation matters that large 
enterprises operating in New Zealand have to deal with. It should be noted that the term 
enterprise in this chapter refers to an incorporated entity under the law of New Zealand or 
another jurisdiction and excludes general partnerships and trusts.1 As discussed in Chapter 3 
of this thesis, the concept of a large enterprise can be very complex as large enterprises may 
very often be not just a single enterprise, but a group of enterprises consolidated by a common 
parent. The situation becomes even more complicated in the case of a multinational group, 
where the ultimate parent is located offshore and the group is carrying on business activity in 
New Zealand through a permanent establishment (PE). In the case of a multinational group 
with a New Zealand or offshore parent, tax compliance in New Zealand may affect the whole 
group only partially. However, as discussed in this chapter, the New Zealand tax authority is 
becoming increasingly empowered with new legislation which allows it to impose additional 
compliance obligations on a multinational group which has a presence in New Zealand, either 
through a resident parent or PE.   
A very crucial question arises as to what criterion should be applied in order to determine if a 
group of enterprises, especially a multinational group, is a large enterprise. In this chapter two 
criterion will be used. One is the NZ$80 million Goods and Services Tax (GST) annual 
turnover threshold, which the Inland Revenue (IR) applies to define large enterprises. 2 
Enterprises meeting this threshold are subject to a stricter compliance focus from the IR 
because in addition to being labelled “large” they are also classified as “significant enterprises”. 
Until recently, only enterprises with an annual GST turnover of greater than NZ$80 million 
                                                     
1 Although a large enterprise can be formed as a general partnership of several groups of enterprises, for simplicity 
large enterprises are presented in this chapter either as a single entity or a group of incorporated entities with a 
common parent.  
2 As was mentioned in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the IR does not have an official definition of a “large enterprise” 
for the tax compliance purposes, but instead uses the term “significant enterprise”.  From an interview with an IR 
tax official it was revealed that significant enterprises with a GST turnover greater than NZ$80 million are 
considered as “large enterprises”. (Interview with an IR official, Tax Specialist, 10 April 2018, transcript provided 
by the researcher). Therefore, the NZ$80 million threshold is used for purpose of this chapter to define large 
enterprise. A more detailed classification of “significant enterprises” will be provided in Chapter 6 of this thesis.   
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were classified as “significant enterprises”.3 However, commencing from 2017, the IR has 
included foreign-owned enterprises with a greater than NZ$30 million turnover in the category 
of significant.4 Therefore, once a New Zealand enterprise’s annual turnover surpasses NZ$80 
million (NZ$30 million for foreign-owned enterprise), such an enterprise comes under the IR’s 
“radar” and becomes classified as “significant”. Enterprises with this classification are likely 
to face greater tax compliance obligations as the IR focuses more closely on their business 
activity especially when significant enterprises engage in cross–border transactions. Thus, a 
single enterprise or a group of enterprises with an annual turnover of greater than NZ$80 
million is considered to be a large enterprise and a significant enterprise simultaneously.  
Another criterion which will be used in this chapter is the criteria adopted from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines5 on transfer 
pricing, which uses annual consolidated EURO750 million (NZ$1.3 billion)6 turnover as a 
threshold to define a multinational group of enterprises as a large multinational group. The 
OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines make it compulsory for such groups to provide additional 
information about their business activities worldwide and to file a country-by-country report 
(CbCR).7  
Specifically, there are four types of large enterprises whose tax compliance obligations in New 
Zealand are discussed in this chapter. They are as follows: 
1. An enterprise with an annual turnover over NZ$80 million, which is a tax resident in 
New Zealand under one of the four tests provided in s YD 2 of the Income Tax Act 
2007 (ITA 2007);      
2. A group of enterprises with a consolidated annual turnover over NZ$80 million, but up 
to NZ$1.3 billion,8 and a common parent, which is a tax resident in New Zealand under 
one of four tests provided in s YD 2 of Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007;    
                                                     
3 IR “Multinational Enterprises – compliance focus” (2016). 
4 IR, above n 3.  
5 OECD “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (Paris, 2017). 
6  EURO-NZ$ exchange rate (1 NZ$ = 0.58 EURO). See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
7 OECD, above n 5, at 242, [5.52]. 
8 The IR threshold for large multinational groups.  
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3. A group of enterprises with a consolidated annual turnover over NZ$80 million, but up 
to NZ$1.3 billion,9 whose ultimate parent is located outside New Zealand, but where at 
least one member of the group is a tax resident in New Zealand under one of four tests 
provided in s YD 2 of Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007.  An annual turnover of this New 
Zealand resident–member must be above NZ$80 million; 
4. A large multinational group of enterprises, defined in s YA 1 of ITA 2007, whose 
ultimate parent is located either within or outside New Zealand.  
 
The reason for using the above detailed definitions, as will be discussed further in this chapter, 
is that enterprises and groups of enterprises, which meet the above thresholds, are subject to a 
stricter compliance focus from the IR due to IR’s adoption of the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan.10  
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview 
of the topic of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, covering business income 
tax, pay as you earn (PAYE) tax, GST and Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT). In addition, aspects of 
cross border taxation including the taxation of controlled foreign companies (CFCs), foreign 
investment funds (FIFs) and thin capitalisation, are discussed. Section 4.3 further focuses on 
the tax compliance obligations of large multinational group enterprises undertaking business 
in New Zealand. Due to a stricter screening from the IR of large multinational groups, and the 
growing presence of large multinational groups in New Zealand, an understanding of the 
features of tax compliance for multinationals in New Zealand is considered both important and 
relevant. Lastly, section 4.4 provides a chapter summary. 
 
4.2 Overview of Tax Compliance of Large Enterprises in New Zealand  
New Zealand features a relatively simple, broad base low rate (BBLR) tax system.11 A BBLR 
system improves economic efficiency by “reducing the distortions to economic decision-
                                                     
9  The IR threshold for large multinational groups.   
10 The BEPS Action Plan has been devised by the OECD in order to combat tax evasion by large multinational 
enterprises and is currently being adopted in New Zealand. See IR "Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) – 
update on the New Zealand work programme” (May 2016). 
11  IR “The New Zealand tax system and how it compares internationally” (2017). 
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making caused by taxes”.12 The main feature of a BBLR system lies in the introduction of a 
broad base of taxation while keeping tax rates low.13 Thus, personal tax, income tax and 
consumption tax form three broad bases which provide for the majority of tax revenue in New 
Zealand.14 By implementing a BBLR system, New Zealand aims at maintaining a “simple, 
easily understandable and coherent framework”, which results in the consistent taxation of 
different areas of economy, thereby reducing economic distortions.15    
As result, the country’s tax system ranks very highly according to the 2017 International Tax 
Competitiveness Index Rankings. With an overall score of 88.7, New Zealand ranks second in 
the world by the simplicity of its tax system.16  The simplicity of the New Zealand tax system 
can be explained by the existence of a relatively small number of taxes17and a small number of 
tax payments and exemptions used when calculating income tax. This makes tax compliance 
in New Zealand relatively simple and less burdensome. New Zealand corporate tax complexity 
ranks second in the International Tax Competitiveness Index 2017.18 
In this subsection an outline of the major business taxes that all incorporated entities, including 
large enterprises, deal with, will be provided along with information on compliance associated 
with these taxes. It should be noted that the tax compliance procedures presented below apply 
to large enterprises incorporated in New Zealand and to large multinational enterprises which 
have a presence in New Zealand through a PE, such as a branch, or have a subsidiary in New 
Zealand.    
   
                                                     
12 Adrian Sawyer “Reflections on the contributions of lawyers to tax policy-making in New Zealand”, (2017) 
27(4A) New Zealand Universities Law Review, 995-1022.  
13 At 9.  
14 At 9. 
15 At 10. 
16  Kyle Pomerleau, Scott Hodge and Jared Walczak “International Tax Competitiveness Index 2017” (Tax 
Foundation, 2017) at 3. 
17  New Zealand does not have capital gain tax, social security taxes, inheritance tax and local taxes.  
18  Pomerleau, Hodge and Walczak, above n 16, at 3.  
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4.2.1 Business Income Tax 
All New Zealand incorporated enterprises and overseas enterprises operating in New Zealand 
through a PE must pay tax on their profits, known as business income tax.  The corporate tax 
rate in New Zealand is a flat rate of 28%. The tax rate is the same for small businesses as for 
large multinational enterprises operating in New Zealand. Taxable profit is derived by 
deducting expenses from revenue in accordance with the ITA 2007. While most types of 
revenue are taxable (except those of capital nature), the ITA 2007 qualifies business 
expenditures as deductible if one of the following two premises is satisfied: 
1. There must be a nexus between the expenditure or loss and the derivation of business 
income;19 
2. The expenditure arises in the course of carrying on a business. 20 
The timing of the expenditure deduction is determined based on when the particular 
expenditure is incurred.21 Therefore, an accrual basis approach is generally used to determine 
the timing of a deduction. Expenditures which remain unexpired at the end of tax year must be 
included as income22 which means they are not deductible until consumed. Expenditure of 
capital nature must be capitalised first and then expensed over a certain period of time through 
depreciation at the rates established by the IR. One exception to the capital expenditure 
depreciation rule is that the depreciation rate for buildings in New Zealand with an estimated 
useful life over 50 years is 0%.23     
Tax compliance for enterprises in relation to business income tax begins with the collection 
and recording of information about business transactions, as the derivation of taxable income 
requires the preparation of financial statements. In this regard, the IR prescribes that large 
enterprises in New Zealand must prepare financial statements in accordance with higher 
standards of accounting mandated by the External Reporting board (XRB).24 Large enterprises 
                                                     
19 Income Tax Act 2017 [ITA 2007], s DA 1(1)(a).  
20 ITA 2007, s DA 1(1)(b). 
21 ITA 2007, s BD 4.  
22 James Coleman and others New Zealand Taxation 2018: Principles, Cases and Questions (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2017) at 314.  
23 ITA 2007, s EE 31(2)(d).  
24 IR “Financial reporting for companies” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/yoursituation-
bus/running/recordkeeping/financial-reports.html> (last accessed 24 January 2019).    
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that have public accountability (also referred to as “reporting entities”)25 must prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP).26 The 
XRB prescribes the application of the New Zealand equivalents to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS) as GAAP for large enterprises with public accountability.27 
Large enterprises which are not reporting entities in accordance with the requirements of 
Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 must still prepare GAAP financial statements as required 
by the Financial Reporting Act 2013 (FRA 2013). 28  In the case of non-reporting large 
enterprises, the XRB prescribes the use of NZ IFRS with reduced disclosure requirements.29 It 
should be noted that the status of a large enterprise is determined in this case not by IR criteria, 
but by the large enterprises criteria established in the FRA 2013.30 An enterprise is considered 
to be large under the FRA 2013 if:  
(a) as at the balance date of each of the 2 preceding accounting periods, the total assets 
of the entity and its subsidiaries (if any) exceed $60 million, 31 
(b) in each of the 2 preceding accounting periods, the total revenue of the entity and its 
subsidiaries (if any) exceeds $30 million.32 
As indicated above, the thresholds used in the FRA 2013 to define large enterprises are well 
below NZ$80 million turnover established by the IR. Therefore, those enterprises that fail to 
reach the IR threshold (and thus, be classified as large) nevertheless will have to prepare IFRS-
based financial statements which are also provided to the IR.  
Because of the requirement to prepare IFRS-based financial statements, enterprises (both large 
by the IR definition and by the definition provided in the FRA 2013) are likely to be subject to 
more compliance as they will have to consider temporary and permanent differences in their 
financial statements. A temporary difference can be, for example, the differences between the 
                                                     
25 Defined in s 7 of XRB Standard A1: “Application of the Accounting Standards Framework”.   
26 Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, s 460(1).  
27 XRB A1: “Application of the Accounting Standards Framework”, paras 17(a)(i) and 22. 
28 Financial Reporting (Amendments to Other Enactments) Act 2013, ss 200 and 201.  
29 XRB Standard A1: “Application of the Accounting Standards Framework”, paras 20(a) and s 23. 
30 Financial Reporting Act 2013 [FRA 2013], s 45(1)(a).  
31 FRA 2013, s 45(1)(a). 
32 FRA 2013, s 45(1)(b). 
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depreciation rates utilised by a large enterprise in financial reporting, which are determined by 
a useful period of an asset, and the depreciation rates established by the IR. The deductibility 
of only 50% of entertainment expenses for income tax purposes33 and the full deduction of 
these for financial reporting creates a permanent difference.       
For business income tax, all resident enterprises, large and small, need to file a tax form, IR4, 
and attach either financial statements with adjustments required for the derivation of taxable 
income, or special a form, IR10 (Accounts Information Form), which includes balances of 
accounts. When an enterprise is a resident company,34 worldwide income must be returned on 
the form IR4,35 whereas non-resident enterprises would include only New Zealand-sourced 
income in IR4. 36  Filing an IR4 should not be a difficult task provided all the necessary 
information is collected and available as the format of an IR4 form is relatively straightforward. 
The most difficult task in filing an IR4 is to collect and process the necessary information so 
that all questions in the IR4 relevant to an enterprise’s business activity can be accurately filled 
out. For example, Question 18 “Overseas Income” in the IR4 requires entering information 
related to the overseas income of an enterprise. Overseas income may include attributed income 
from a Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) and income from a Foreign Investment Fund (FIF). 
The calculation of income from both CFC and FIF is rather complex and requires special 
knowledge of cross border tax regulation. This illustrates that it is not the preparation of the 
tax form (IR4) that increases the compliance burden, but rather the collection and processing 
of the information required for filling out the IR4.       
The package of tax information that an enterprise is required to submit also includes 
information about the balance of imputation credit account. Form IR4J is used for reporting 
information on the imputation credit account (ICA). The ICA represents the balance of income 
taxes paid by an enterprise during an imputation year (a year which runs from 1 April to 31 
March) and imputation credits attached to dividends received from other enterprises. The IR 
uses this form to monitor the balance of the ICA. If the ICA shows debit balance at the tax 
                                                     
33 ITA 2007, s DD 1(2). 
34 Defined in ITA 2007, s YD2. 
35 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 604.  




year-end, the enterprise will have to pay the debit balance along with 10% of the so-called 
additional tax on the debit balance by 20 June of the relevant year.37  
The Tax Administration Order 2014 requires tax-filing entities to disclose information related 
to transactions with associated persons, the meaning of which is defined in ITA 2007. 
Specifically, entities are required to provide information regarding the following matters:38 
 
(a) interest expense incurred by the company in respect of any loan made to the company 
by the associated person; and 
(b) amounts paid by the company to the associated person in the nature of outbound loans 
or other advances; and 
(c) expenses incurred by the company for services provided by the associated person 
(including wages, salaries, management fees, and payments for other services provided 
to the company); and 
(d) expenses incurred by the company to the associated person in respect of rentals or leases 
of land or other assets; and 
(e) expenses incurred by the company to the associated person for acquiring or using 
intangible property, including royalty payments; and 
(f) a reconciliation of movements in shareholders’ equity and loans or current accounts to, 
and from, the shareholders or other owners of the company and associated persons of 
the company. 
 
If an enterprise incurs tax losses, then there can be two ways to utilise these losses. The first is 
to carry forward the tax loss in order to offset it against taxable income in the next period or 
periods. To be able to carry forward losses a company must maintain at least 49% of ownership 
(shareholder continuity). Shareholder continuity must be maintained from the time the tax 
losses were derived until when they are utilised.39 The second way to utilise tax losses is to 
offset them against taxable income within a group of enterprises. Two or more enterprises can 
form a group for the purpose of utilising the tax losses of one or more enterprises in the group 
                                                     
37 ITA 2007, s OB 65. 
38 Tax Administration (Financial Statements) Order 2014, sch. 3. 
39 ITA 2007, s IA 5(6).  
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if there is at least a 66% common shareholding between enterprises in a group40 This 66% 
commonality of ownership must be in existence when the loss occurred and continue to exist 
until the tax loss is offset.41  
The percentage of shareholder continuity is measured by taking the lowest voting or market 
value interest held by each shareholder during the continuity period. If the sum of the lowest 
voting percentages is below 49% then there is a breach of shareholder continuity and the 
enterprise’s losses cannot be carried over.42  The same principle of calculating the lowest 
common voting or market value interest applies to company grouping losses.43     
Considering that large enterprises generally have a complex structure and therefore, have more 
transactions with associated persons, large enterprises may need to provide additional 
information regarding transactions with those associated persons. This is especially true in the 
case of cross-border transactions with associated persons. In such cases, large enterprises have 
to deal with the transfer pricing regime and prepare documentation in order to prove the 
existence and use of an arm’s length price. Preparation of additional documentation is likely to 
increase compliance.      
As mentioned in section 4.1, large enterprises might have a complex structure where a number 
of smaller entities form a large group. In the case of 100% common ownership, a number of 
entities can form a tax group for tax filing and therefore file tax returns as if this group of 
entities were a single company. Consolidation allows the offsetting of tax losses incurred by 
entities in a group against the taxable income of other entities in the same group. However, 
only “eligible” companies, defined in s FM 31(1) of the ITA 2007 can form a consolidated 
group and appoint a nominated company or agent for filing tax returns on behalf of the group. 
Election to form a consolidated group is done by submitting form IR 494.  All dividends are 
distributed tax-free within a consolidated tax group (also known as the intercorporate dividend 
exemption).44 Such an exemption relieves companies inside the group from the obligation to 
                                                     
40 ITA 2007, s IC 3(1).  
41 ITA 2007, s IC 2(2).  
42 See Example 12.2 in Coleman and others, above n 22, at 441.  
43 At 443.  
44 See IR “Loss grouping and imputation credits: An officials’ issues paper” (2015) at ch 2. 
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file information related to the ICA. Although as a whole, the group may need to provide the 
balances in the group’s ICA.45    
In addition to the obligation of calculating and filing business income tax returns, another 
obligation of an enterprise in regard to business income tax is to estimate and pay provisional 
tax during the tax year. An enterprise is required to pay provisional tax if it meets the 
requirements set out in s RC 3 of the ITA 2007,46 and is referred to as a “provisional taxpayer”. 
An enterprise must pay its provisional tax usually in three instalments during the tax year 
according to the rules set out in subpart RC of the ITA 2007. Provisional tax is an estimation 
of the amount of actual tax that will be payable by an enterprise for a particular tax year and is 
credited against the tax liability for that year.47 An enterprise is required to pay provisional tax 
when residual income tax (defined in s YA 1 of the ITA 2007), of that enterprise is more than 
NZ$2,500.  
Provisional tax payments must be aligned with payments of GST if an enterprise is registered 
for GST. Every large enterprise is most likely to be registered for GST as (by definition) its 
turnover will surpass the threshold of NZ$60,000, which makes filing and payment of GST 
obligatory. As discussed in section 4.2.3 below, enterprises with an annual turnover greater 
than NZ$24 million must file GST returns on a monthly basis. Enterprises which are required 
to file monthly GST returns must pay their provisional tax in three instalments.  
The failure to pay provisional tax on time will entail late payment penalty under the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994)48 and the use-of–money interest which is levied on the 
underpaid amount of provisional tax due.49  
 
                                                     
45 Despite the ITA 2007 allowing enterprises with 100% common ownership consolidating for tax purposes, in 
practice consolidation of enterprises for tax purposes is a rare phenomenon in New Zealand.   
46 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 551. 
47 At 551. 
48 Tax Administration Act 1994 [TAA 1994], s 139B(2). 
49 TAA 1994, ss 120A-120V.  
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4.2.2 Pay as You Earn Tax and Resident Withholding Tax 
Another important aspect of tax compliance for every entity, including large enterprises, which 
conducts business operations in New Zealand, is an obligation to withhold tax from other 
persons on their behalf with subsequent reporting and payment of the withheld tax to IR.50 The 
main types of income, which require the withholding of tax, are: 
 
 Employment income (salary and wages); 
 Scheduler payments (payments made to self-employed taxpayers); 
 Superannuation contributions made by an employer;  
 Interest; and 
 Dividends.  
 
An enterprise, large or small, must deduct “pay as you earn” (PAYE) tax from salaries and 
wages that it pays to its employees. PAYE is also deducted from payments made by an 
enterprise to self-employed taxpayers who provide certain services for the enterprise during a 
contractually agreed period. The difference between PAYE deducted from the salaries of 
employees and PAYE withheld from payments (schedular payments) 51  to self-employed 
individuals is the percentage of tax being deducted. PAYE tax constitutes an important source 
of revenue for the IR as PAYE constitutes almost 44.5% of the IR’s revenue.52 Due to its 
importance as a source of revenue, the IR requires enterprises to comply with their duties as 
tax agents for their employees. One of the duties of an enterprise as a tax agent is to collect 
deducted tax and make a payment to IR. Each payment must be accompanied by a PAYE 
payment form which is completed on special form called an Employer Deductions Form (Form 
IR345).53  Information about gross salaries and wages and the corresponding tax deducted is 
submitted on the Form IR348 (employer monthly schedule).  
                                                     
50 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 522. 
51 The list of scheduler income types is provided in Schedule 4 of the ITA 2007. 
52  IR “Revenue collected 2008 to 2017” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-stats/revenue-
refunds/revenue-collected/revenue-collected.html> (last accessed 1 January 2019). Average percentage is the 
researcher’s own calculations.  
53 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 535. 
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In order to reduce the amount of tax compliance, the IR designates two types of employers - 
large and small. Large employers are defined as those employers whose gross PAYE deduction 
exceeds NZ$500,000 for the preceding tax year54 and therefore are required to account for 
PAYE deductions twice a month. In addition, large employers are required to file their 
employer monthly schedule in electronic format.55    
As a part of the Business Transformation Programme, a multi-stage programme aimed at 
modernising New Zealand’s tax system by 2021,56 for the tax years commencing from 1 April 
2019 under proposed changes by Parliament,57 PAYE filing will be integrated with the payroll-
system which enterprises use to calculate and pay salaries to their employees. Therefore PAYE 
information will be filled to the IR on each payday directly from the payroll system. Large 
enterprises, for which electronic filing of PAYE information is obligatory,58 will be required 
to send PAYE information by the second working day after payday. As a result, the previously 
filed IR345 and IR348 forms will no longer be required.  
As a payer of certain kinds of passive income to New Zealand tax residents (such as interest 
and dividends) every enterprise, include a large enterprise, must withhold tax under the 
Resident Withholding Tax (RWT) rules.59 It should be noted that only those enterprises which 
are resident 60 in New Zealand or if non-resident and carry on their taxable activity in New 
Zealand through a PE, are liable to deduct RWT.61 However, there are two exceptions. First, 
there is no need to deduct RWT if the recipient of interest or dividends has an exemption 
certificate which is issued by IR to persons who are not liable for income tax (for example, 
                                                     
54 ITA 2007, ss RD 4(1) and RD 22.  
55 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 537. 
56 For further information, see IR “Transforming Inland Revenue” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/transformation/bt-
programme/stages/bt-programme-stages.html> (last accessed 25 January 2019).  
57 See Taxation (Annual Rates for 2017-18, Employment and Investment Income, and Remedial Matters) Bill 
2017. 
58 Enterprises with an annual PAYE of NZ$50,000 and above. See IRD “PAYE reporting - Better administration 
of PAYE” (2016). 
59 ITA 2007, s BE 1(2). 
60 Defined in s YD 2 of the ITA 2007.  
61 ITA 2007, s RE 4. 
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charities). Second, if the amount of the interest payments made by an enterprise during the year 
is less than NZ$5,000 then the enterprise is not required to withhold RWT.62  
Apart from the obligation, if it arises, to deduct RWT when an enterprise (including a large 
enterprise) pays interest or dividends, it is also necessary to report and pay the withheld RWT 
to the IR. Large enterprises must remit the deducted RWT to the IR on a monthly basis by the 
20th day of the following month.63 As for reporting on amounts of withheld RWT (on either 
interest or dividends), a large enterprise must prepare RWT deduction certificates for persons 
whom the large enterprise has made payments of interest or dividends during tax year. This 
certificate must show the gross amounts of interest or dividend payments made, dates on which 
payments were made and the rate at which RWT was deducted.64 Another type of compliance 
concerning RWT is the requirement to complete a reconciliation statement (IR 15S), which 
must be furnished to IR by 31 March. This form must be submitted by every enterprise which 
is required to deduct RWT.65 This form contains information on each recipient (of interest or 
dividends), including the recipient’s tax number, address and the date the deduction was 
made.66   
 
4.2.3 Goods and Services Tax  
Goods and Services Tax (GST) is an indirect consumption tax which is charged on all taxable 
supplies of goods and services made by an enterprise. A very important aspect here is that GST 
is levied only on those goods and services which are supplied in New Zealand or are exported. 
GST can be levied on imported goods too. GST is levied on the value of imported goods which 
includes the cost of insurance and freight, custom value for duty purposes, amount of custom 
duty and taxes other than GST.67 In addition, from 1 October 2016 GST applies to remote 
                                                     
62 ITA 2007, s RE 10. 
63 ITA 2007, ss RE 21(2) and RA 15(2).  
64 TAA 1994, s 25. 
65 TAA 1994, s 51. 
66 IR IR15S: RWT on interest reconciliation statement (March 2017). 
67 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 [GSTA 1985], s 12.   
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services68 supplied by non-residents from overseas to New Zealand consumers. Furthermore, 
from 1 October 2019 GST will be levied on the low value imported goods (valued at or below 
NZ$1,000) which are purchased by New Zealand consumers through an electronic 
marketplace.69 Newly enacted rules will make it compulsory for overseas suppliers of low 
valued goods to register with the IR and pay GST on their supplies if their turnover exceeds 
NZ$60,000 and goods are supplied to New Zealand consumers who are not GST registered.70  
The GST system in New Zealand permits few exceptions, it is widely recognised for its 
simplicity and relative easiness to comprehend.71 To explain briefly, GST operates in the 
following way. When good and services are sold in New Zealand their sale price includes GST 
at the rate of 15%. Only those entities which are registered for GST charge GST on the sale 
price of their goods and services. An entity which charges GST must account for it to the IR 
but at the same time can offset the GST charged on the sales price with the GST included in 
the price of expenditures that this entity incurred in the course of undertaking a supply of goods 
and services.   
Some supplies are exempted from GST, while others are zero-rated.  Examples of GST exempt 
supplies listed under s 14 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (GSTA 1985) include: 
 Financial services;  
 Donated goods and services by non-profit bodies;  
 Supply of residential accommodation; and  
 Fine metals, which are not zero-rated.  
Examples of zero rated supplies under s 11 of the GSTA 1985 include: 
 Exported goods; 
 Duty-free goods; 
 Boats and aircrafts exported under their own power; 
                                                     
68 The definition of remote services includes digital services such as e-books, music, video and software. Non-
digital services include consulting, legal and accounting services. See IR “GST on cross-border supplies of remote 
service” (May 2016).  
69 See s 2(1) of the GSTA 1985 for the definition of “electronic marketplace”. See also Taxation (Annual Rates 
for 2019–20, GST Offshore Supplier Registration, and Remedial Matters) Bill 2018 (explanatory note). 
70 See Taxation (Annual Rates for 2019–20, GST Offshore Supplier Registration, and Remedial Matters) Bill 
2018 (explanatory note).   
71 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 872. 
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 Taxable activities sold as going concerns to GST registered persons;  
 Supply of land by one registered person to another registered person who intends to use 
the land for making taxable supplies;  and 
 International transportation of passengers, goods and associated services.  
The difference between exempt and zero-rated supplies is that for exempt supplies, no GST 
can be claimed on expenditures incurred, whereas in the case of zero-rated supplies, GST can 
be claimed on expenditures associated with these supplies and is charged at zero percent on 
supplies made.   
An obligation to register for GST applies equally to resident and non-resident entities.72 The 
requirement for an entity to register for GST arises when the value of taxable supplies of that 
particular entity exceeds NZ$60,000 for any 12 month period.73 If an entity which is liable to 
register for GST fails to do so by the required date it will be automatically deemed to be 
registered with effect that it cannot avoid its obligation to collect and pay GST on its supplies.74 
Entities liable to register for GST must do so within 21 days after the end of the 12 month 
period in which the NZ$ 60,000 threshold was exceeded, or at the start of the 12 month period 
in which this threshold is expected to be surpassed.75 Needless to say, large enterprises, which 
supply goods and services in New Zealand or remote services from overseas to New Zealand 
consumers, must be registered for GST as their turnover threshold surpasses the GST 
registration threshold.     
If an enterprise, including a large enterprise, is registered for GST and carries on its business 
operations in New Zealand through branches, this enterprise may have some or all of the 
branches registered for GST if those branches have own accounting system and have different 
locations within New Zealand.76 The NZ$60,000 threshold applies to all the branches and not 
to a single branch.77 Separate registration allows each registered branch to be accountable for 
its GST on supplies of goods and services. Goods and services supplied between the parent and 
                                                     
72 GSTA 1985, s 51(3). 
73 GSTA 1985, s 51(1).  
74 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 877. 
75 GSTA 1985, s 51 (2).   
76 GSTA 1985, s 56. 
77 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 880. 
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branches are GST taxable also. If a branch fails to furnish its GST report or pay GST, then the 
parent will be responsible for the submission of the GST return and the payment of GST due.  
Large enterprises often represent not just a single entity, but also a group of entities which have 
a common parent-entity. If this group of entities can form a group for filing a consolidated tax 
return78  (discussed earlier in this chapter), then these entities can apply for GST registration 
as a single group.79  However, in addition to meeting the conditions required for filing a 
consolidated income tax return, one of the following conditions must also be satisfied: 
 Each of the entities in the group must be registered for GST; or  
 At least 75% of total supplies made by the entities in the group to a third party are 
taxable supplies.80 
 
Group registration allows all entities to be treated as a single entity for GST purposes and file 
one GST return. Accordingly, all transactions within the group are ignored for GST purposes.81 
Large enterprises must account for GST on a monthly basis. This requirement is stipulated in 
s 15(3) of the GSTA 1985 which prescribes that entities whose turnover has been greater than 
NZ$24 million in the past 12 months or is expected to exceed NZ$24 million in the next 12 
months, must file a GST tax return every month.82 If a large enterprise has branches and these 
branches file separate GST returns, then they also must file on a monthly basis if the parent 
enterprise is required to file on a monthly period.  
There are three methods used to account for GST:83 
 Invoice basis; 
 Payment basis; and 
 Hybrid basis.  
                                                     
78 ITA 2007, s FM 31(1). 
79 GSTA 1985, s 55 (1)(a). 
80 Taxable supplies are supplies to which GST applies and are carried on continuously by GST registered entity. 
See GSTA 1985, s 55 (1)(b). 
81 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 881. 
82 GSTA 1985, s 15(3). 
83 GSTA 1985, s 19.  
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Large enterprises must use the invoice basis to account for GST as the other two methods can 
be used by enterprises whose taxable supplies during last 12 months have not exceeded NZ$2 
million.84 For large enterprises, the requirement to account for GST on an invoice basis means 
that the GST amounts indicated on invoices issued by large enterprise must be paid prior to the 
collection of cash. Likewise, GST on expenses incurred during GST filing period (a month) 
can be claimed as a deduction prior to cash disbursement.  
The basic approach to the calculation of GST payable or refundable is to deduct from the GST 
collected on supplies (output GST), the GST paid on expenditures (input GST). A positive 
result means that GST is payable, otherwise GST is refundable. It is necessary to hold tax 
invoices for the deduction of input GST, except for low value supplies of less than NZ$50.85 
However, the amount of input GST that can be claimed as a deduction depends on the 
percentage of expenditures used for making taxable supplies. Since some supplies may be GST 
exempt, GST on expenditures used in making exempt supplies cannot be deducted and 
therefore must be apportioned between GST taxable supplies and GST exempt supplies 
according to the formula provided in the GSTA 1985.86 Due to the large scale of operations 
and substantial expenditures of head offices, large enterprises may incur significant compliance 
costs in regard to apportionment of input GST between taxable and exempt supplies.  
The difficulty which large enterprises in New Zealand have to deal with when complying with 
the requirements of the GSTA 1985 to apportion input GST can be further illustrated with an 
example on retirement villages.87 Retirement villages provide a range of services such as 
accommodation, cleaning, nursing or medical services. Part of the accommodation that 
retirement villages provide to their clients falls under the definition of a “residential dwelling” 
and is therefore a GST exempt supply.88 However, another part of the accommodation supplied 
might be provided along with cleaning and medical services and accordingly pertains to a 
“commercial dwelling”, 89 the supply of which is GST taxable. As a retirement village incurs 
a number of expenses to operate village facilities, it is necessary to apportion these expenses 
                                                     
84 GSTA 1985, s 19A(1)(b)(i).   
85 GSTA 1985, s 24(5)(a).   
86 GSTA 1985, s 20C and 20G. 
87 See IRD “GST – Current issues: An officials’ issues paper” (2015) at ch 3.  
88 GSTA 1985, s 14(1)(c), (ca). 
89 Defined in s 2 of the GSTA 1985. 
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between exempt and non-exempt supplies. The apportionment leads to significant compliance 
costs90 as it becomes necessary to determine multiple apportionment rates, which must be 
applied to every expense and tracked. For example, expenses of the head office may relate to 
the entire business activity (which may include multiple villages), while other costs may relate 
to a specific village or part of a village and therefore the proportion of taxable/non-taxable 
supplies may differ.91      
GST payable for the tax period must be remitted to the IR on or before the due date for filing 
GST return.92 As a rule, it is the 28th day of the month following the end of the tax period.93 
The amount of GST indicated in the return is the amount that must be paid to the IR unless the 
IR challenges the amount or issues a reassessment.94 
 
4.2.4 Fringe Benefit Tax  
In New Zealand, Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) is a tax levied on an entity for the non-monetary 
benefits provided by it to its employees in connection with their employment. Such benefits 
may include: 
 an entity’s motor vehicle provided to employees for their private use;95 
 loans provided by an entity to an employee;96 
 subsidised transport;97  
 contributions to life or health insurance;98 and   
 unclassified benefits. 99   
                                                     
90 IRD, above n 86.  
91 IRD, above n 86. 
92 GSTA 1985, s 23. 
93 GSTA 1985, s 23(1) and s 16. 
94 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 927. 
95 ITA 2007, s CX 6(1). 
96 ITA 2007, s CX 10(1). 
97 ITA 2007, s CX 9. 
98 ITA 2007, s CX 16(5). 
99 ITA 2007, ss CX 2(1)(b)(ii) and CX 37. 
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Due to the availability of resources, large enterprises are more likely to provide a number of 
such benefits to their employees as a part of an attractive remuneration package. Large 
enterprises may offer loans to their directors and senior managers and offer attractive health 
plans and life insurance to their employees. Some benefits, not mentioned above, are 
unclassified fringe benefits, if they are provided by an enterprise to its employees in connection 
with their employment and are not excluded fringe benefits.100  Unclassified benefits may 
include: free or discounted goods,101 and free or discounted services.102 
An example of a free or discounted service can be free travel offered by large enterprises to 
their expatriates seconded to work overseas. A large enterprise may provide free or subsidised 
return overseas travel for its seconded employees. This situation, when expatriate employees 
are offered such a fringe benefit can apply to large enterprises with an overseas head office and 
branches or subsidiaries in New Zealand as well as to large New Zealand enterprises with 
overseas branches or subsidiaries. 
However, the taxation of fringe benefits offered to employees of large enterprises may depend 
on several factors. Benefits provided in New Zealand to employees of non-resident large 
enterprises may not be subject to fringe benefit tax if employees do not receive a PAYE income 
payment that is taxable in New Zealand.103 By way of contrast, fringe benefits offered to an 
employee of a non-resident large enterprise who receives a PAYE income which is taxable in 
New Zealand will be subject to FBT in New Zealand. Finally, when non–resident employees 
PAYE income payments are exempt from tax in New Zealand by either the ITA 2007 or a 
relevant double tax agreement (DTA), any fringe benefits provided to that employee do not 
attract FBT. 
In situations when a large enterprise with a head office in New Zealand provides fringe benefits 
to employees employed in overseas branches, the taxation of these fringe benefits is determined 
again, by whether the overseas branch employees receive a PAYE income which is taxable in 
New Zealand. Therefore, fringe benefits offered to employees of a New Zealand large 
                                                     
100 ITA 2007, s CX 37. 
101 ITA 2007, s RD 40.  
102 ITA 2007, s RD 41 
103 ITA 2007, s CX 26.  
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enterprise who are stationed in overseas branches are not subject to FBT if the employees 
PAYE income is not taxable in New Zealand.104      
Filing and payment of FBT by large enterprises is undertaken on a quarterly basis by 
completing the form IR420. There are two FBT rates available to large enterprises (as well as 
to any other enterprise that opts to file on a quarterly basis):105 
 Single rate of 49.25% of the value of all fringe benefits in each of the four quarters 
of the tax year. 
 Single rate of 49.25% in the first three quarters and alternate rate in the fourth quarter 
of the tax year. 
Under the alternate rate option a large enterprise may choose to pay FBT at the rate of 43% on 
the value of all fringe benefits offered to employees in the first three quarters. A rate of 49.25% 
must be used if the rate of 43% is not applied in any of the first three quarters. In the fourth 
quarter a detailed calculation of FBT is required, which involves square-up calculations and 
the attribution of fringe benefits to particular employees.106  
Large enterprises are more likely to have to pay FBT on a quarterly basis. As mentioned in 
section 5.1 of this chapter, large enterprises are those entities whose annual turnover exceeds 
NZ$80 million. FBT quarterly payments are required when total PAYE in the previous tax year 
exceeds NZ$1million.107 PAYE deductions exceeding NZ$1million correspond approximately 
to NZ$3.3 million of wages and salaries paid to employees during the tax year. This 
approximation can be obtained by grossing up NZ$1million of annual PAYE by the highest 
marginal tax rate on individual income of 33%. Statistics on industry benchmarks from 
2013/2014 financial data provided by Statistics New Zealand indicate that the salary and 
wages/turnover ratio for large enterprises located in the fourth quantile (turnover greater than 
NZ$10 million) is between 6% and 22%.108 Based on even the smallest turnover ratio of 6% it 
is clear that for an enterprise with an annual turnover exceeding NZ$80 million (a large 
                                                     
104 ITA 2007, s CX 26. 
105 ITA 2007, ss RD 58 and RD 59(4). 
106 ITA 2007, s RD 59. 
107 ITA 2007, s RD 61(1)(a). 
108Statistics New Zealand “Business Performance Benchmarks” 
<https://www.stats.govt.nz/experimental/business-performance-benchmarker> (last accessed 1 January 2019).   
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enterprise), the annual PAYE deduction will be more than the NZ$1million threshold 
prescribed by s RD 61(1)(a) of the ITA 2007. Accordingly, this simple analysis shows that 
large enterprises are more likely to file quarterly FBT returns. Both the FBT return and FBT 
payment must be made by the 20th of the month that follows the end of the quarter.      
 
4.2.5 Cross-Border Taxation   
Due to the size of their activities large enterprises are likely to engage in cross-border 
operations which may involve transactions with overseas entities (import/export operations) as 
well as carrying out business activities overseas through a PE, such as branches, or through 
subsidiaries. From the perspective of a large enterprise which comprises of multinational 
enterprises operating in a variety of jurisdictions, tax compliance will extend beyond New 
Zealand. However, the focus of this section is specifically on the New Zealand taxation of the 
cross-border operations of either a multinational group of enterprises with a New Zealand 
resident parent or a multinational group of enterprises with an offshore parent, which has 
presence in New Zealand through a subsidiary or branch.     
Large enterprises with a head office in New Zealand (New Zealand resident parent) are taxed 
on their worldwide income and therefore have to file an income tax return in New Zealand, 
which includes both New Zealand sourced and overseas income, which can be attributed to 
either the New Zealand head office or any other New Zealand resident member of a group.109 
Conversely, a large enterprise with head office located outside New Zealand, which operates 
in New Zealand through a subsidiary or branch, will be subject to income tax on New Zealand 
sourced income only.110 Therefore, a large enterprise may only be partially affected by New 
Zealand cross-border tax regulations to the extent of the operations of its PE or subsidiary in 
New Zealand.    
Taxation of the cross–border activities of a large enterprise in New Zealand is determined by 
the rules established in the ITA 2007 and by relevant DTAs. It should further be noted that 
cross-border taxation, and therefore the tax compliance of large enterprises, is increasingly 
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affected by the newly adopted BEPS initiatives. 111  These initiatives have a purpose to 
strengthen the existing tax legislation and add new tax rules in order to combat the tax 
avoidance of offshore large enterprises generating business income in New Zealand. The BEPS 
initiatives will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection. This section will provide an 
overview of New Zealand tax regulation of cross-border activity. Specifically, the following 
tax rules will be outlined:  
 Controlled Foreign Companies (CFCs); 
 Thin Capitalisation; and 
 Transfer Pricing.  
 
4.2.5.1 Controlled Foreign Companies  
The current CFCs rules were enacted in 2009 in order to protect the tax base in New Zealand 
and therefore prevent profit shifting to offshore jurisdictions. When a New Zealand large 
enterprise carries on business activities through subsidiaries established overseas, dividend 
income received from non-resident enterprise is exempt income for a New Zealand resident 
corporate shareholder under s CW 9 of the ITA 2007. Therefore the large enterprise in New 
Zealand does not have to pay tax on this dividend income. However, some types of overseas 
income earned by subsidiaries which meet the definition of a CFC, will be attributed to a large 
enterprise in New Zealand for which it will be liable to pay income tax. The CFC rules target 
New Zealand resident enterprises when they use offshore companies in order to shift profit-
making activities of a passive nature, like dividends, interest, rent and royalties, out of New 
Zealand to jurisdictions with a lower tax rate.  
What type of overseas enterprise will be considered to be a CFC?  If fewer than five New 
Zealand resident shareholders own more than 50% of a foreign enterprise’s decision-making 
rights, such as ownership of shares, the foreign enterprise will be considered a CFC112 and 
therefore subject to the CFC rules. A large enterprise may include a CFC in a number of ways, 
depending on the complexity of a large enterprise’s structure. For example, a large enterprise 
                                                     
111 See Adrian Sawyer and Richard McGill “The Adoption of BEPS in New Zealand” in Kerrie Sadiq, Adrian 
Sawyer and Bronwyn McCredie (eds) Tax Design and Administration in a Post-BEPS Era: A Study of Key Reform 
Measures in 18 Jurisdictions (Fiscal Publications, 2019) at 214, for further information on the recently adopted 
BEPS initiatives in New Zealand.   
112 ITA 2007, s EX (1).   
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which is a single New Zealand resident entity will include a CFC if the large enterprise owns 
more than 50% of the foreign company. A large enterprise which is comprised of a group of 
enterprises may also include a CFC if five or fewer of its members, each of whom is New 
Zealand resident, own more than 50% of the foreign company.  
The key concepts regarding CFC income incorporate passive income and attributable income. 
Passive income can be understood as a type of income that involves no or minimal activity by 
a recipient in order to receive it. Passive income includes: 113 
 Interest; 
 Dividends; 
 Rent; and 
 Royalties. 
The idea of attributable income on a gross basis is described in s EX 20B of the ITA 2007. 
Under this section only certain types of passive income derived by a CFC are attributed back 
to New Zealand resident shareholders, including large enterprises.  However, an attributable 
CFC income or loss, described in s EX 20B of the ITA 2007, is attributed to parent of the CFC 
on a net basis (taxable income minus tax deductible expenses) via the rules contained in ss EX 
20C-EX 20E of the ITA 2007.   
Apart from passive income, a CFC can derive active income from activities such as 
manufacturing and trading. Derivation of active income by a CFC is exempted from the 
attribution rules described above.114  A CFC which derives both passive and active income will 
be exempt from attributing its passive income or losses to New Zealand resident shareholders, 
including a large enterprise, if the share of passive income in the total income of the CFC is 
less than five per cent.115 A CFC with less than five per cent passive income is called “non-
attributing active CFC”. Therefore, in order to determine whether a CFC’s passive income is 
less than five per cent it is necessary to undertake a test under which the ratio of passive income 
to total income of the CFC over the tax period (which usually runs from 1 April to 31 March) 
is calculated.  
                                                     
113See IR “Resident Withholding Tax: Glossary” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/rwt/info-help/rwt-glossary.html#res> 
(last accessed 1 January 2019).  
114 ITA 2007, s EX 21B.  
115 ITA 2007, s EX 21B. 
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There are two ways that the test to calculate the passive income of a CFC and the total revenue 
derived by a CFC over a tax year, can be performed: use of the accounting method and use of 
the tax method. The accounting test can be applied on a single CFC basis or on the basis of a 
group of CFCs. The formula for the calculation of the passive income ratio in accordance with 
accounting standards is provided in s EX 21E(5) of the ITA 2007. This formula requires the 
calculation of passive income and total revenue according to accounting standards, whereby 
passive and total revenue amounts are calculated in the functional currency of the CFC,116 
which is the primary currency in which the CFC carries out its business activities.117 The tax 
method can also be applied on a single CFC basis or on the basis of a group of CFCs, but 
requires that all CFCs in the group to which is the test is applied to, be residents of the same 
country and liable for the income tax in that country.118 For the tax method, all amounts must 
be converted to New Zealand dollars or a functional currency must be used.119 A group of CFCs 
must be consolidated, and intercompany transactions and balances must be eliminated.120 The 
formula for the calculation of the ratio under the tax method is provided in s EX 21D(4) of the 
ITA 2007.    
As explained in subsection 4.2.1, all large enterprises defined for the purpose of this chapter 
have to comply with the requirements of the FRA 2013 and therefore prepare their financial 
statements based on NZ IFRS. NZ IFRS 10 requires a CFC to be included in the consolidated 
return of the New Zealand parent (a large enterprise).121 Therefore, if a large enterprise chooses 
the accounting method for undertaking the test, a large enterprise can use information on the 
CFC passive income and total income from the set of accounts that the  CFC or group of CFCs 
will prepare for the inclusion in the consolidated financial statement of the New Zealand parent 
(a large enterprise). Likewise, a large enterprise may opt for the tax method to undertake the 
test and use information from the tax returns that a CFC or a group of CFCs will file in the 
jurisdictions they are resident in. In any case, the requirement to determine whether a CFC or 
                                                     
116 ITA 2007, s EX 21E(4).  
117 NZ IAS 21: “The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates”, para 8.  
118 ITA 2007, s EX 21D(1)(a).  
119 ITA 2007, s EX 21(4). 
120 ITA 2007, s EX 21(1B). 
121 NZ IFRS 10: “Consolidated Financial Statements”, para 2(a).  
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a group of CFCs is a non-attributing active CFC imposes additional obligations for a large 
enterprise which is the parent of CFC or a group of CFCs.  
Section EX 22 of the ITA 2007 makes all Australian CFCs non-attributing CFCs and therefore 
there is no need for a New Zealand large enterprise to undertake the test described above for 
an Australian CFC. An Australian CFC is defined as an entity which is a tax resident of 
Australia and subject to tax in Australia. Therefore, having a CFC or a group of CFCs in 
Australia, should mean less compliance for a New Zealand large enterprise compared to in 
other jurisdictions, as there is no need to perform the test and to attribute passive income.   
In summary, if a large enterprise in New Zealand has a CFC (or a group of CFCs), that large 
enterprise will have to attribute the passive income of its CFC (except for an Australian CFC). 
Accordingly, it must undertake a test using either the accounting or tax methods described 
above, in order to establish whether the CFC can be exempted from attribution. This is likely 
to lead to more tax compliance obligations.   
 
4.2.5.2 Thin Capitalisation  
The main purpose of the thin capitalisation regime is to prevent a non-resident enterprise 
(including a large enterprise) or a group of non-resident enterprises (including a group which 
meets threshold for a large enterprise as defined earlier in this chapter) from allocating an 
excessive portion of its worldwide debt to a New Zealand enterprise or a group of New Zealand 
enterprises. The thin capitalisation regime applies when a non-resident enterprise or a group of 
enterprises holds more than 50% of direct interest in a New Zealand enterprise or a group of 
New Zealand enterprises.122 The thin capitalisation rules disallow a deduction for interest 
expenses for such a New Zealand enterprise, or a group of New Zealand enterprises, if the New 
Zealand enterprise’s debt is greater than 110% of the non-resident enterprise or group of non-
resident enterprises’ worldwide debt, and the New Zealand group debt percentage is below 
60%.123 The interest deduction for the New Zealand enterprise or a group of New Zealand 
enterprises is disallowed if both of the thresholds noted above (“safe harbours”) are breached. 
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For example, as long as the New Zealand group debt percentage remains below 60% it does 
not matter whether the worldwide group percentage debt threshold is exceeded.  
Therefore, in order to avoid the disallowance of interest expense, a non–resident large 
enterprise needs to comply with the thin capitalisation rules stipulated in s FE 5 of the ITA 
2007 when it establishes a New Zealand subsidiary. This is applicable when it has more than 
50% direct interest and finances its activity through worldwide debt.   
As a non-resident large enterprise may own a number of enterprises in New Zealand, it becomes 
necessary to calculate a debt percentage of the whole New Zealand group, rather than just of a 
single enterprise. To this end, it is necessary to identify the New Zealand parent enterprise, 
which will determine what other enterprises should be included in the group. The parent 
enterprise will be a top-tier New Zealand enterprise that is an enterprise in which non-resident 
shareholders own more than 50% of direct ownership.124  The New Zealand parent entity will 
make a determination about what other enterprises to include in the New Zealand group based 
on either the accounting test (greater than 50% ownership) or the tax test (greater than 66% 
ownership).125 Once the New Zealand group has been formed, the next step will be to calculate 
the group debt percentage, which is achieved by consolidating the financial statements of every 
enterprise in the group under accounting principles (for example, NZ IFRS).  
Total debt of the New Zealand group is defined in s FE 15 of the ITA 2007 and includes 
financial arrangements and financial leases.126 There is no restriction on the source of debts. 
Any debt, whether borrowed from an associate (non-resident large enterprise) or in New 
Zealand from an arm’s length lender (bank or other financial institution), is considered when 
calculating the New Zealand group debt. Section FE 15 of the ITA 2007 specifies that the 
financial arrangement must provide funds to the borrower and therefore, the New Zealand 
group must receive funds from its lender to be counted as debt under thin capitalisation rules.127  
Thus, swaps of interests or currency obligations, as well as other financial derivatives such as 
future contracts and options, will not be included in the definition of debt, as they do not 
provide funds directly to the New Zealand group. 
                                                     
124 ITA 2007, s FE 26. 
125 ITA 2007, s FE 27(2). 
126 ITA 2007, s FE 14. 
127 Coleman and others, above n 22, at 805.  
86 
 
In the case that a New Zealand group uses borrowed funds in order to lend it to a third party 
outside the New Zealand group, there is a concession stipulated in s FE 13 of the ITA 2007 
which exempts a New Zealand group in this situation from the thin capitalisation rules. This 
concession is known as the on-lending concession and has been designed so that financial 
institutions and their subsidiaries in New Zealand will not be penalised by the regime.     
Since the New Zealand group debt percentage is calculated by dividing the total amount of debt 
by the amount of the group’s total assets, a group’s total assets must be valued as well. Total 
assets can be valued in the following ways:128 
 Values taken from the group’s consolidated financial statements;  
 Net current value of the assets; or 
 Market selling value of the trading stocks (if the same valuation basis is used for tax 
purposes).  
From 1 July 2018,129 new BEPS initiatives require a New Zealand group to measure its total 
assets net of non-debt liabilities, which are defined in s FE 16B of the ITA 2007. Non-debt 
liabilities are all of the liabilities in the group’s financial statements that are not counted as debt 
under s FE 15 of the ITA 2007. However, s FE 16B(1) excludes the following kinds of 
liabilities from the definition of non-debt liabilities:  
 Certain interest free loans from shareholders;  
 Certain shares held by shareholders (for example, preference shares); 
 Provisions for dividends; and 
 Deferred tax liabilities.  
In addition, effective from 2014, the value of total assets used in the calculation of the debt 
percentage cannot include an asset uplift that has resulted from an internal revaluation.130 
Normally NZ IFRS requires many types of assets, including intangible assets, to be valued at 
cost. However, when enterprises in a New Zealand group become consolidated in what is called 
a “business combination”, NZ IFRS 3 requires use of the fair market values of assets in the 
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financial statements of the consolidated enterprises,131 and thus the value of assets can be 
inflated if they were revalued upward.  
Total debt and total assets must be calculated in New Zealand dollars. Conversions from 
foreign currency must be made at the spot exchange rate on the relevant measurement day.132  
The debt percentage of a non-resident large enterprise can be obtained from its consolidated 
financial statements which under s FE 17(a) of the ITA 2007, can be prepared based on the 
financial standards used in the jurisdiction that the non-resident large enterprise resides, or an 
ultimate parent resides if a non-resident large enterprise comprises a group of enterprises.  
The debt percentage of the New Zealand group and worldwide debt percentage should be 
compared with the following thresholds133 in order to check if the New Zealand group will be 
denied an interest expense on the borrowed funds:134 
 60 % safe harbour of New Zealand group’s debt; and  
 110 % of the worldwide non-resident large enterprise’s debt. 
As mentioned in subsection 4.2.5.2, it is necessary to exceed both thresholds, before the thin 
capitalisation rules start to apply. The thin capitalisation regime may impose more tax 
obligations on non-resident large enterprises as they constantly need to monitor the debt 
percentage of their New Zealand enterprises or group of enterprises. This requires them to take 
into account all of the recently adopted rules (exclusion of non-debt liabilities and disallowance 
of the use of assets uplift) regarding the valuation of the New Zealand group’s assets and to 
make sure that their debt to assets ratio stays below the designated thresholds.     
 
4.2.5.3 Transfer Pricing  
The transfer pricing regime is contained in ss GC 6-GC 14 of the ITA 2007. Its purpose is to 
prevent the erosion of the New Zealand tax base. Large enterprises operating in New Zealand 
through either a parent office or a subsidiary become subject to the transfer pricing regime 
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when they engage in business transactions with associated persons.135 This situation is typical 
for large enterprises when they have transactions with their subsidiaries (associated persons) 
located either in New Zealand or offshore. It should be noted that the transfer pricing regime 
rules apply to transactions between separate enterprises only (such as a parent enterprise and a 
subsidiary) and not to a transaction within a single enterprise (such as between a head office 
and a branch).  
As large enterprises are often formed as a group comprising a number of separate enterprises, 
transfer pricing will apply in the following situations:136 
 There is a supply and acquisition of goods and services (for example management 
services), financial loans, intangible properties (like trademarks, licenses); 
 The supplier and acquirer are associated persons (within definitions of subpart YB of 
the ITA 2007); or 
 The supplier is a resident enterprise in New Zealand and the acquirer is a non–resident 
enterprise located offshore, and vice versa. 
When there is a transaction between a supplier and acquirer who are associated persons they 
often may adopt a price that does not reflect the market value of the transaction. This non-
market price is charged so that the world-wide after-tax profits of a large enterprise will be 
maximised.  In the event that the price charged by an associated person is not an arm’s length 
amount, the transfer pricing regime will adjust this non–arm’s length price and accordingly 
adjust the taxable income of the New Zealand resident enterprise (either the supplier or 
acquirer). The adjustment is undertaken by way of comparison of the price charged between 
the associated parties with the prices charged in similar but arm’s length transactions between 
non-associated parties.    
Therefore, a large enterprise which engages in cross-border transactions with associated 
persons, must use of one of the five methods listed in s GC 13 of the ITA 2007 in order to 
determine the market (arm’s length) amount of consideration and and explain its calculation of 
the arm’s length price to the IR.137 Then it must compare the determined market amount with 
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the consideration charged for the transaction with the associated person. The five methods 
provided in s GC 13 of the ITA 2007 are: 
 Comparable uncontrolled price (CUP); 
 Resale price method (RPM); 
 Cost plus (CP); 
 Transactional net margin (TNM); and  
 Transactional profit split (TPS) 
Effective from 1 July 2018, the transfer pricing rules in New Zealand have been amended to 
incorporate the new BEPS initiatives. Consequently, attention will be paid to the economic 
substance of transaction rather than legal form of documentation. From 1 July 2018 the IR is 
empowered to reconstruct commercially irrational transfer pricing arrangements “which 
involve terms that the third parties would not be willing to agree to”.138 In addition, the burden 
of proof that the transfer pricing is reasonable and reflects an arm’s length transaction price has 
been shifted onto the taxpayer (the large enterprise). Therefore, it is an obligation of a large 
enterprise to prepare documentation supporting the charged price.139 Finally, the time period 
during which the IR can investigate and amend the tax return of a large enterprise has been 
extended from four years to seven years in relation to transfer pricing.140        
One of the problems in complying with the transfer pricing regime which large enterprises face 
in New Zealand is the difficulty in finding comparable transactions for determining an arm’s 
length price. This difficulty arises because of the small size of the New Zealand economy which 
makes application of the first three methods listed above (CUP, RPM and CP) extremely 
difficult and therefore the last two methods (TPS and TNM) have to be used instead.141 CUP, 
RPM and CP are considered to be the most reliable as they provide a comparison with similar 
transactions between independent parties. However, there are many factors to consider for a 
large enterprise in order to determine whether transactions between associated persons and 
transactions between independent parties are comparable (for example, factors such as the 
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characteristics of goods and services, industry type, contractual terms, business strategies and 
losses).142      
 
4.3 Further Aspects of Tax Obligations of Large Multinational Enterprises in New Zealand   
4.3.1 Large Multinational Enterprises and BEPS Initiatives in New Zealand  
Among large enterprises (as defined earlier in section 4.1 of this chapter) which operate in New 
Zealand there is a sub-group of large enterprises which are multinational enterprises. IR have 
reported that there are 600 taxpayer groups in the significant enterprise segment with a turnover 
exceeding NZ$80 million.143 Of this number, 50% were foreign owned and another 25% were 
engaged in cross-border transactions mainly through CFCs. 144  Significant enterprises, as 
defined in section 4.1 above, receive closer attention from the IR because of their importance 
to tax revenue. Due to the size of their business operations, large multinational enterprises are 
included in the category of significant enterprises and, therefore, receive close attention from 
the IR.  
The heightened interest from the IR to significant enterprises and especially multinational large 
enterprises is part of the IR’s strategy to combat BEPS. In simple terms, BEPS is an 
arrangement that shifts profit to countries with lower taxes or makes income disappear, which 
potentially leads to double non-taxation of income.  Large multinational enterprises are known 
for their ability to structure their business activities in ways which allow them to pay as little 
tax as possible anywhere in the world.145 The wide range of tax planning techniques which 
large multinational enterprises exploit for achieving tax reduction purposes are known as BEPS 
tax strategies.  
In 2012 the aggressive tax planning strategies of large multinationals became a focus of global 
media concern. Subsequently, in 2013 the G20/OECD adopted a 15-point Action Plan which 
recommended changing domestic tax rules, tax treaties and administrative measures in order 
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to allow countries to effectively and consistently combat BEPS. 146  In response to the 
G20/OECD’s BEPS Action Plan, the New Zealand government released its own BEPS 
programme in 2016 to combat BEPS issues in New Zealand. The New Zealand legislative 
BEPS initiatives are contained in the Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) 
Act 2018, which took effect from 1 July 2018. The newly adopted BEPS initiatives include the 
following: 147 
 Interest limitation rules (rules to prevent multinationals from charging artificially high 
interest rates on loans from related parties).148 These rules require the debt interest rate 
to be determined in accordance with transfer pricing methodology.149  
 New rules on related party transactions (transfer–pricing), which charge a price that 
does not have economic or commercial foundation.150  
 New rules on PEs, which prevent large multinational groups from avoiding having a 
taxable establishment in New Zealand. 
 Rules on combatting hybrid mismatch arrangements, which exploit differences in tax 
treatment of hybrid arrangements between different jurisdictions.151  
 Empowering the IR to request further information from large multinational groups 
(information can be requested from offshore members of the group). These rules target 
large multinational groups with an annual turnover over EURO750 million (NZ$1.3 
billion).152  
Discussion on further BEPs initiatives in New Zealand currently concerns issues of the digital 
economy and new business arrangements when large multinational enterprises provide digital 
                                                     
146 IR “Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Bill-Commentary on the Bill” (2017), at 3.   
147 Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018.  
148 Some of these rules have been discussed in the subsection 4.2.5.2 above on thin capitalisation. 
149 James Coleman and others New Zealand Taxation 2019: Principles, Cases and Questions (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2018), at 818. 
150 Some of these rules have been outlined in the subsection 4.2.5.3 above on transfer pricing. 
151 Examples of situations that can be impacted by these rules include:  loans that are treated as debt in one country 
and equity in another; deduction of interest on accrual basis while recognising interest income on cash basis; dual 
resident enterprises.  
152  EURO-NZ$ exchange rate (1 NZ$ = 0.58 EURO). See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
92 
 
services in New Zealand while not having taxable presence that falls under the definition of 
PE.153 
 
4.3.2 Large Multinationals’ Tax Compliance  
As a part of the BEPS strategy the IR requires large multinational enterprises to submit yearly, 
a basic compliance package (BCP), which includes information on group structure, financial 
statements and tax reconciliation. Based on the risk level which is gauged by reviewing the 
BCP, the IR determines if further compliance interventions are necessary. In 2015, the IR 
introduced an International Questionnaire, 154  which large multinational enterprises must 
complete, providing information on such aspects as: 
  Name and IR number of the New Zealand parent. 
  Country and name of the ultimate parent enterprise.  
 New Zealand group financial statements data (gross revenue, gross profit, selling, 
general and administration expenditures, total assets (excluding goodwill), and total 
liabilities). This data must be taken from the consolidated financial statements of the 
New Zealand group which are filed with the Companies Office.155  
 Amount of tax adjustments (if any) in relation to interest income/expense. This 
adjustment may be necessary because of a disallowance of interest expense due to thin 
capitalisation.  
 Issues with transfer pricing. If there was greater than NZ$10 million of interest-bearing   
debt with a non-resident associated person and what was the highest interest paid by a 
member of the New Zealand group during the year. 
 Amount of financing that any member of the New Zealand group held during the year 
and which was issued by a non-resident associated person. Financial instruments with 
a face value of NZ$30 million raise red flag if a deduction of interest expense from this 
financial instrument in New Zealand  is not accompanied by the corresponding interest 
income taxable in other jurisdictions. 
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 Country-by country report (CbCR). This report must be prepared by large multinational 
groups with annual turnover over EURO750 (NZ$1.3 billion)156 where the ultimate 
parent is located in New Zealand.  
 
In order to strengthen tax compliance among large multinational enterprises, the IR in 
accordance with the tax control framework 157  released by the OECD’s Forum on Tax 
Administration,158 expects large multinational enterprises to establish good and effective tax 
governance. It is expected that there will be a documented tax strategy, and effective systems 
and procedures will be put in place to manage tax risk. Moreover, the annual financial 
statements prepared by a large multinational enterprise should contain a reconciliation of the 
income tax expense in the financial statements with the actual amount of cash remitted to the 
IR.159 Very close attention is paid to the effective tax rate of large multinational groups, 
especially if the effective tax rate is substantially lower than New Zealand statutory rate of 28%.  
As discussed earlier in section 4.2.5.1, large enterprises in New Zealand may have attributed 
income from a CFC if the CFC fails to pass the active business income test and there is net 
passive income. The IR specifically focuses on how the active business income test is 
performed and the calculation of taxable income or losses, which must be attributed from a 
CFC.  In particular, a large multinational enterprises must provide the following information 
in regard to their CFCs and ensure that appropriate procedures are taken. First, large 
multinational enterprise must disclose annually its interest in CFCs using form IR458 (Foreign 
investment fund/Controlled foreign company disclosure(s)). Second, if a large multinational 
enterprise uses the accounting method for undertaking the active business income test, financial 
statements must be prepared in accordance with IFRS or NZ IFRS and have an unqualified 
audit opinion.160 Third, a CFC’s passive income has a number of exemptions from attribution 
(for example, rental income derived from land situated in the same jurisdiction where the CFC 
                                                     
156  EURO-NZ$ exchange rate (1 NZ$ = 0.58 EURO). See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
157 The tax control framework is the set of processes and internal control procedures, which ensure that an 
enterprise’s tax risks are known and controlled, and tax obligations are met in a timely manner.   
158 OECD “Co-operative Tax Compliance - Building Better Tax control Framework” (Paris, 2016). 
159 IR above n 3, at 1 and 4.  
160 At 10. 
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is located) and therefore a large multinational enterprise needs to undertake a review to see if 
any of these exemptions apply to it.161  
 
4.3.3 Large Multinational Groups and Their Tax Obligations in New Zealand  
Thus far, the discussion in this chapter has mainly covered the tax compliance of large 
multinational enterprises operating in New Zealand. However, there is a special segment within 
the category of large multinational enterprises which deserves separate consideration in this 
section. This special segment is that of large multinational groups162 and includes a group of 
enterprises with a member resident in New Zealand and other members being resident of a 
country other than New Zealand. The turnover of such group must exceed EURO750 million 
(NZ$1.3 billion) 163 in a year.  
The recently enacted Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018 allows 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) to request any additional information or 
documentation from any member of a large multinational group including non-resident 
members.164  For instance, the CIR can request that a New Zealand subsidiary of a large 
multinational group provide additional documentation on transfer pricing. If the New Zealand 
subsidiary does not have the requested documentation, it must source the documentation from 
other members of the group and submit it to the IR.165  Where a large multinational group fails 
to provide the requested documentation, s 139AB of the TAA 1994 allows the CIR to impose 
a civil penalty of NZ$100,000.  
Although the Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018 has provided 
the IR with new powers to investigate large multinational groups, New Zealand members 
within large multinational groups will be treated only as agents for tax liabilities of the non-
resident group members. Moreover, if a New Zealand member of such a large multinational 
                                                     
161 At 10.   
162 See section 4.1 of this chapter for the definition.   
163  EURO-NZ$ exchange rate (1 NZ$ = 0.58 EURO). See IRD “Currency rates – rolling average” 
<https://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/8/d/8de01e54-60d4-49ad-9e89-dd185007c345/mid-month-nov-2018.pdf> 
(last accessed 29 December 2018).  
164 Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018, s 56 and 57; TAA 1994, s 17(1CB).  
165 IR “Definition of Large Multinational Group” (August 2018), at 3; TAA 1994, s 17(1CB). 
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group has been assessed as an agent, the New Zealand member will be able to dispute this 
assessment.166   
In the tax years commencing after 1 January 2016, large multinational groups where the 
ultimate parents are headquartered in New Zealand are required to file a CbCR within 12 
months after the reporting year end. 167  The report contains information on the group’s 
operations in each jurisdiction where the group operates. Specifically, a CbCR should contain 
the following information:168 
 Gross revenue;  
 Profit or loss before income tax; 
 Amount of income tax paid on a cash basis; 
 Amount of accrued income tax expense in the current year; 
 Stated capital;  
 Retained earnings;  
 Number of employees; and  
 Value of tangible assets.  
In addition, a large multinational group needs to provide a list of all its enterprises in each of 
the jurisdictions it operates and describe the business activity of each enterprise.169 The form 
IR1032 is prescribed for completing a CbCR.170 The information which must be included in 
the report can be taken from the consolidated financial statements which an ultimate New 
Zealand parent of a large multinational group must prepare in accordance with the requirements 
of the FRA 2013. Currently, the requirement to file a CbCR applies to about 20 multinational 
groups in New Zealand who have been notified by the IR.171  
In addition, recently adopted BEPS initiatives in New Zealand strengthen the PE rules for large 
multinational groups. A large multinational group may structure the sale of their goods and 
                                                     
166 Sawyer and McGill, above n 111, at 225. 
167 TAA 1994, s 78G. 
168 IR IR1032: Country-by-Country Report (May 2018). 
169 IR, above n 165, at 9.  
170 IR, above n 165.   
171 IR, above n 165, at 9. 
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services in New Zealand in a way that allows avoiding a PE in New Zealand and therefore 
avoiding having a source of taxable income. Often a large multinational group sells goods and 
services in New Zealand from one of its members (non-resident member) located in a low tax 
jurisdiction, through their subsidiary in New Zealand. Subsidiaries locate customers and 
promote the products of the non-resident member to them, while the non-resident member 
gives approval and signs contracts. Under the current PE rules set out in DTAs, subsidiaries of 
large multinational groups do not become a “dependent agent” in this situation as they do not 
have full autonomy in the decision-making regarding the selling of the goods and services. 
Therefore, a large multinational group will arguably not have a PE in New Zealand despite the 
fact that both the large multinational group and its subsidiary in New Zealand are operating as 
one economic entity. The recently passed Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting) Act 2018 introduced new PE anti-avoidance rules which will deem a PE to exist in 
New Zealand for a non-resident member of a large multinational group if the following 
conditions are met:172 
 The non-resident member is a part of a large multinational group; 
 The non-resident member makes a supply of goods and services to a person in New 
Zealand; 
 A person carries on activity in New Zealand in order to facilitate the supply of these 
goods and services;   
 A person is either associated with the non-resident member or depends commercially 
on it; and 
 The purpose of the arrangement is to avoid having a PE in New Zealand.    
It is possible that the compliance of a large multinational group will increase as a result of the 
adoption of the new PE rules as large multinational groups will have to examine the risks of 
having a PE in New Zealand under the current arrangements and re-structure in response to 
these risks. In addition, if a large multinational group is deemed to have a PE under the new 
rules, it will have to apportion sales income between the PE in New Zealand and the offshore 
operations of its non-resident member based on the amount of contribution each makes to the 
sales income in New Zealand.        
                                                     




4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the tax compliance obligations for large enterprises 
in New Zealand. A large enterprise has been defined as either a single entity or a group of 
entities operating in New Zealand with an annual turnover being above NZ$80 million 
threshold. The tax compliance obligations of large enterprises operating in New Zealand 
predominantly include compliance with taxes such as business income tax, GST, PAYE and 
FBT. Each of these taxes along with their major compliance procedures have been discussed 
in this chapter.   
Cross-border transactions are most likely to add greater compliance obligations for large 
enterprises given that there are complex rules to follow when a large enterprise engages in 
cross-border operations through a CFC or has transactions with associated overseas enterprises. 
In the case of CFCs, it is necessary to undertake an active business income test in order to 
determine whether a CFC’s passive income must be attributed to a large enterprise in New 
Zealand and disclose its interest in the CFC.  A large enterprise needs to determine a transaction 
price according to one of five methods provided in s GC 13 of the ITA 2007 in order to establish 
the transaction price that would be used between two independent parties in a similar situation.   
Another situation that may add to the compliance obligations of a large enterprise in New 
Zealand is when a New Zealand subsidiary of a large enterprise is financed through debt. The 
thin capitalisation rules may deny the partial deductibility of interest expenses for a New 
Zealand subsidiary if the thresholds (“safe harbour”) established by the thin capitalisation rules 
are exceeded.  To avoid this situation a large enterprise needs to monitor the level of debts and 
assets of the New Zealand and world-wide group and ensure that thresholds levels are not 
breached.  
Large multinational enterprises are likely to face further compliance obligations due to the 
recently enacted BEPS Action Plan and the requirements to provide additional documentation, 
such as the BCP requested by the IR. In addition, they are expected by the IR to establish good 
tax governance in order to have effective tax systems to manage tax risks. Large multinational 
groups represent a special segment of large enterprises, comprising only 20 such groups 
headquartered in New Zealand. They face even higher compliance obligations and may be 
requested by the CIR to provide any additional information regarding their business activities. 
These large multinational groups are required to file a CbCR providing information on the 
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business activities of each of their enterprises in each jurisdiction where these enterprises 
operate.   
Next chapter will present an outline of research methodology applied in this study to address 
research questions. The outline will include description of the methodological approach as well 















Chapter 5:  Conceptual Framework and Methodology  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the costs of tax compliance and the 
methodological approach applied in this study to answer the research questions set out in 
Chapter 1. A conceptual framework is presented here in order to introduce the types of tax 
compliance costs, how they can be measured and what the difference between the internal and 
external costs of tax compliance is. The discussion on the conceptual framework is extended 
in order to introduce the idea of the unobservable costs of tax compliance, which have not been 
considered in prior studies that were presented in Chapter 2.  A model of cost efficient tax 
compliance administration, based on the premises of the Rational Choice Theory, is also 
introduced in this chapter in order to demonstrate how cost efficient tax compliance 
administration can assist in reducing the unobservable costs of tax compliance. Although, it is 
not a purpose of this study to measure the costs of tax compliance and efficiency of tax 
compliance administration of large enterprises, a conceptual framework and the model serve 
as a guide in considering what are the relevant tax compliance costs for large enterprises.     
The methodological approach will explain the method this study applies in order to collect and 
process the findings to address the research questions. The structure of this chapter is as 
follows. Section 5.2 introduces the conceptual framework, followed by section 5.3, which 
explains the idea of unobservable costs of tax compliance and sets out the model of optimal tax 
compliance administration. Section 5.4 discusses the methodology of this study and section 5.5 
then summarises the chapter.   
 
5.2 Conceptual Framework for Measuring Tax Compliance Costs  
The majority of empirical studies investigating the issue of tax compliance costs presented in 
Chapter 2 draw upon the conceptual framework on the measurement of tax compliance costs 
proposed by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick.1 This conceptual framework is briefly outlined 
                                                     
1 Cedric Sandford, Michael Godwin, and Peter Hardwick Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation 




below. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a distinction between gross and net tax 
compliance costs, where the former represents social tax compliance costs and the latter the 
costs directly born by taxpayers.  
Gross tax compliance costs: These costs consist of monetary and psychological costs. 
Monetary costs represent the value of resources that a firm expends on compliance with tax 
regulations. The gross monetary value of tax compliance costs consists of two components:  
 
 Labour costs 
 Non-labour costs 
Labour costs include the costs of internal labour; for example, employees or contractors, and 
also external labour costs, which refer to outlays on services provided by external tax 
practitioners.2 In the case of large enterprises the types of tax compliance activities undertaken 
in-house and the services provided by external tax practitioners may range from record 
keeping, preparation and lodgement of tax returns to advice in relation to information 
technology systems relating to tax matters. 3  Internal labour costs can be measured by 
multiplying the time spent by internal staff on particular tax activities by their average hourly 
wage rate. External labour costs can be obtained from records on amounts that a business 
expends on services from external tax practitioners, accountants and lawyers. Usually external 
labour costs can be obtained only as a lump-sum amount.4  
Non-labour costs usually constitute costs incidental to tax compliance activities, such as 
purchasing of the specialised tax accounting software or internet bills. Non-labour costs can be 
either of recurring (internet bills) or capital nature (laptop or specialised tax accounting 
software). As Evans and Tran-Nam5 indicate, it is normal to exclude both recurring costs and 
capital costs from the calculation of tax compliance costs due to the fact that recurring costs 
are related to labour costs and capital investments can be used for purposes other than tax 
                                                     
2 Chris Evans and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs in New Zealand: An International Comparative 
Evaluation” (Tax Administration for the 21st Century Working Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2014) 
at 9. 
3 Chris Evans, Philip Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large corporations: An Empirical 
Inquiry and Comparative Analysis” (2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751 at 779, 780. 
4 Evans and Tran-Nam, above n 2, at 9. 
5 At 10. 
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compliance activities. Inclusion of capital costs would require apportioning of the costs directly 
related to tax compliance, which is very difficult in practice.  
Psychological costs related to tax compliance represent the negative emotional aspects of 
dealing with tax system.6 They usually refer to stress, anxiety and frustration caused by tax 
obligations, and are very difficult to quantify. These costs are particularly relevant to small 
businesses, because they have limited resources and opportunities to rely on the services from 
professional tax advisers.7  
Net tax compliance costs: Tax compliance can bring not only a burden to a taxpayer, but also 
a number of benefits. These benefits can partially offset gross tax compliance costs resulting 
in net tax compliance costs. The literature identifies the following types of benefits to taxpayers 
ensuing from tax compliance activities: 
 Cash flow benefits: This type of benefit is particularly relevant in the case of firms 
and arises when there is a gap in the time between when a tax payment is due and 
when it is actually paid to the government. This benefit is particularly noticeable when 
an employer withholds income tax (pay as you earn (PAYE)) from salary payments to 
employees on their behalf, but does not immediately remit the withheld tax amounts. 
Payments of Value Added Tax (VAT) or Goods and Services Tax (GST) is another 
example of cash flow benefits that might accrue to a business taxpayer.8 
 Deductibility benefits: Expenses incurred by businesses on tax compliance are 
generally deductible in the calculation of the business income tax. 
                                                     
6  Robin Woellner and others “Taxation or Vexation-Measuring the Psychological Costs of Tax Compliance” in 
Chris Evans, Jeff Pope and John Hasseldine (eds) Tax Compliance Costs: A Festschrift for Cedric Sandford 
(Prospect, Sydney, 2001). 
7  Evans and Tran-Nam, above n 2, at 8. 
8  It worthwhile to note here, that the New Zealand context, it is small enterprises rather than large enterprises 
who are more likely to enjoy the cash flow benefits from withheld payroll taxes (PAYE) and GST received. In 
the case of PAYE, a small enterprise or “small employer” (with an amount of withheld payroll taxes within a 12 
month period of less than NZ$500,000) has at least 20 days to remit to the Inland Revenue (IRD) the withheld 
amount of payroll taxes (Income Tax Act 2007, s RD 4(1) and s RD 22(3)). In the case of GST payments, the 
Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 allows business entities, whose total taxable supply in the last 12 months have 
not exceeded or not likely to exceed in the next 12 months NZ$500,000, to remit GST received once every six 




 Managerial benefits: This type of benefit ensues from the fact that tax compliance 
promotes better record-keeping of business financial transactions which can lead to an 
improvement in the information available for management decision making.  
The above discussion regarding the conceptual issues of tax compliance costs and their 
measurement can be summarised through the following equations:  
1. Gross Tax Compliance Costs = Internal Labour Costs + External Labour Costs + Non-
Labour Costs (Capital and Recurrent Expenses)  
If non-labour costs are ignored in the above equation, then gross tax compliance costs can be 
measured as the sum of two variables: internal and external labour costs 
2. Net Tax Compliance Costs = Gross Tax Compliance Costs – Tax Compliance Benefits 
(Cash, Deductibility and Managerial Benefits)  
While quantification of the first two benefits (cash and deductibility) appears to be feasible in 
practice, managerial benefits are very difficult to quantify. The majority of studies to date rarely 
used managerial benefits in their estimations.9  
It is worthwhile to note that there are unresolved aspects related to the measurement of tax 
compliance costs. These aspects relate to the questions of whether to consider tax planning as 
a part of tax compliance and accordingly, whether the costs that arise in connection with tax 
planning should be included in total tax compliance costs. In this regard, tax planning is viewed 
as a form of “avoidable” tax compliance costs in contrast to “unavoidable” tax compliance 
costs; for example, computation of the income tax which is due to the revenue authority. The 
idea that tax planning should be counted as a legitimate tax compliance activity has been 
strongly debated by policy-makers who insist that only the costs relating to computation of tax 
must be considered as a part of tax compliance costs.10 In contrast to this view, Evans and Tran-
Nam suggest that tax planning should be considered as part of tax compliance activities and 
therefore the costs of tax planning should also be included in the estimation of tax compliance 
                                                     
9 Binh Tran-Nam and others “Tax Compliance Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from 
Australia” (2000) 53(2) National Tax Journal 229 at 232. 
10 Chris Evans “Taxation Compliance and Administrative Costs: An Overview” in Michael Lang, Christine 
Obermair, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer  and Patrick Weineger (eds) Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an 
Enlarged European Community edited by (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2007) at 452. 
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costs. 11  However, tax planning activities and tax computational activities have not been 
separated in the majority of previous studies,12 apparently because it is almost impossible to 
disentangle the costs of tax planning from the overall costs of tax compliance.13 Along similar 
lines, according to Evans and Tran-Nam,14 costs arising in connection with legal disputes of 
businesses with tax authorities regarding a particular tax position should also be included in 
the measurement of tax compliance costs.   
Among the types of costs of tax compliance outlined above the estimation of the gross costs of 
tax compliance will be more relevant in the case of large enterprises. This is because managerial 
benefits and cash benefits, which are main components of the net tax compliance costs, are 
likely to have little effect for large enterprises in New Zealand. Given that large enterprises 
have accounting systems in place that they need to maintain for purposes other than taxation 
managerial benefits ensuing from tax compliance should be of much less tangible value for 
large enterprises. As for the cash benefits, which might ensue from withholding PAYE and 
retaining GST payable amounts, New Zealand’s Inland Revenue (IR) requires large enterprises 
to remit withheld payroll taxes twice a month and GST payable once a month.15 These two 
requirements largely negate cash benefit effect for large enterprises in New Zealand.       
    
  
5.3 Unobservable Costs of Tax Compliance  
5.3.1 What are the Unobservable Costs of Tax Compliance?   
The costs of tax compliance presented in section 5.2 above, except for psychological costs, can 
usually be both observed in practice and measured. Observable costs of tax compliance, such 
as internal staff labour costs and service fees of external tax practitioners, have been used in 
order to estimate gross tax compliance costs in the previous empirical studies introduced in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Therefore, in prior studies the estimation of the costs of tax compliance 
                                                     
11 Evans and Tran-Nam, above n 2, at 11. 
12 See Cedric Sandford Hidden Costs of Taxation (Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 1973); Cedric Sandford, 
and others Costs and Benefits of VAT (Heinemann, London, 1981). 
13 Evans, above n 10, at 452. 
14 Evans and Tan-Nam, above n 2, at 11. 
15 Income Tax Act 2007, ss RD 4(1) and RD 22(3); Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 15(4). 
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has been based only on observable costs. However, gross tax compliance costs are determined 
not only by the expenses on internal staff and by outlays on external services provided by tax 
practitioners, but also by how the tax compliance activity is implemented by large enterprises. 
Large enterprises usually have a choice of various strategies, or tax compliance administration, 
for dealing with their tax compliance: tax compliance can be performed wholly or partly in-
house or outsourced to external tax practitioners. For tax compliance which is carried out in-
house a large enterprise might opt for investing in specialised automated systems, which would 
significantly facilitate the processing of a large number of transactions. Eichfelder and Schorn 
argue that adoption of cost efficient (cost minimising) tax compliance administration affects 
cost of tax compliance as cost efficient choice assists in minimising cost of tax compliance.16  
In other words, tax compliance administration is also considered to be a factor that either 
increases or decreases costs of tax compliance. According to Lignier, Evans and Tran-Nam17 
the costs of tax compliance which arise due to inefficient tax compliance administration are 
referred to as unobservable costs of tax compliance as these costs cannot be observed in 
practice.   
The fact that costs which arise from inefficient tax compliance administration cannot be 
observed in practice does not mean that these costs cannot be estimated. Economic theory, 
especially neoclassical economics, has theories available to deal with the issues of cost 
efficiency.18 One of the theories provided by neoclassical economics which explains how the 
cost efficient choice is made by economic agents is the Theory of Rational Choice. Before 
moving to a discussion of the Theory of Rational Choice, it is suffice to say that the Rational 
Choice Theory offers a basis for modelling the cost efficient behaviour of economic agents. If 
unobservable costs of tax compliance occur because a large enterprise chooses a tax 
compliance strategy which is not cost minimising (cost efficient) then by modelling the cost 
efficient tax compliance strategy, unobservable costs of tax compliance can be estimated.     
                                                     
16 Sebastian Eichfelder and Michael Schorn “Tax Compliance Costs: A Business Administration Perspective” 
(2012) 68 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 191 at 192. 
17 Philip Lignier, Chris Evans and Binh Tran-Nam “Measuring Tax Compliance Costs: Evidence from Australia” 
in Chris Evans, Richard Krever and Peter Mellor (eds) Tax Simplification (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2015). 
18 Alexandr Soukup, Mansoor Maitah and Roman Svoboda “The Concept of Rationality in Neoclassical and 
Behavioural Economic Theory” (2014) 9 Modern Applied Science 1 at 2. 
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 5.3.2 Rational Choice Theory  
The Theory of Rational Choice is at the heart of neoclassical economics. 19  An informal 
definition of the rational choice states that “the choice is said to be rational when it is 
deliberative and consistent”.20 According to this informal definition, the decision maker has 
thought about what they are going to do and their actions, which are based on choices they 
make, exhibit consistency. In other words, there should be no unexpected and inexplicable 
swings in their choices over time and that the means they choose are well-suited for attainment 
of their goals.21 This definition lacks precision and does not seem to allow us to separate 
rational behaviour from irrational, as almost every action would seem to be “deliberative” and 
“consistent”.22  
The formal definition of rational choice is better explained by referring to the example of 
consumers who have transitive preferences and who strive to maximise their utility subject to 
various constraints. Transitive preferences are those preferences for which the following 
statement is true: if a consumer prefers good A over good B and B is preferred to good C, then 
for that consumer good A is preferred over good C.23 Similarly, economists assume that utility 
maximisation by a consumer is an obvious trait and they are puzzled if someone does not 
display it.24  
Economists have found the Rational Choice Theory to be a very useful and strong tool for 
modelling firms’ behaviour. As an example, economic theory predicts that when wages 
increase, the demand for labour decreases while the supply of the labour increases. Similarly, 
when the price of a good or service rises, all other things being equal, production will shift 
toward the supply of that good or service. When the price of input increases relative to its 
                                                     
19 Thomas Ulen “Rational Choice Theory in Law & Economics” in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest 
(eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Volume I - The History and Methodology of Law and Economics 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1999) at 791. 
20 At 791. 
21 At 791. 
22 At 792. 
23 At 793. 
24 At 793. 
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substitute, a rational producer will use more of the substitute and less of the input which has 
become more expensive.  
Deviations from the results predicted by the Rational Choice Theory are largely attributed to 
market failures (such as monopoly or monopsony), asymmetry of information, public goods, 
which prevent a rational economic agent from making rational and optimal decisions.25 Even 
if a consumer exhibits behaviour that is thought to be anomalous to the predictions of the 
theory, economists can still explain it by making a slight amendment to the theory.26 For 
example, if consumers react to the increase in a price of a good by increasing their demand for 
it, an economist might describe such a seemingly irrational phenomenon, as a “snob” effect.27  
There is a presumption among economists that rational consumers will prosper, while irrational 
consumers will waste their resources. Rational profit-maximising businesses will outperform 
those businesses that do not operate according to a rational plan.28  
Nobel Prize winner Garry Becker has shown that even if there is a large number of consumers 
with intransitive preferences, and who behave irrationally due to this fact, their irrational 
behaviour does not affect the prediction of the Theory of Rational Choice much and it is not an 
issue for the aggregate market behaviour.29 Thus, the presence of “irrational” consumers can 
be ignored.   
The discussion below now moves to the simple model of rational choice which describes the 
relationship between tax compliance costs and the tax administration strategy pursued by a 
profit-maximising taxpayer.  
 
                                                     
25 At 794. 
26 At 794. 
27 At 794. 
28 At 794. 




5.3.3 Model of Tax Compliance Costs Strategy under the Assumption of the Rational Choice 
Theory   
In order to demonstrate how a rational decision-making taxpayer adopts the strategy that 
minimises their tax compliance costs, a mathematical model based on the premise of the Theory 
of Rational Choice has been taken from Eichfelder and Schorn.30 In line with the Rational 
Choice Theory a rational decision taxpayer (a large enterprise) strives to maximise net income 
for which it has to take into account both taxes and tax compliance costs. For simplicity this 
model does not consider exceptions to the Theory of Rational Choice such as “bounded” 
rationality31 or “limited information”.  
The model can be briefly outlined as follows. A large enterprise employs both internal (in-
house personnel and capital, for example, automated technology) and external (tax 
practitioners) resources in order to comply with its tax obligations. It is assumed in the model 
that the in-house personnel and capital resources have different efficiency parameters, which 
are less than 1. For simplicity, the efficiency parameter of the external tax practitioners is 
assumed to be equal to 1. Being rational (the main assumption in the framework of the Rational 
Choice Theory) a large enterprise strives to maximise its net income subject to a constraint. 
This constraint is represented in the model by the tax compliance activity which the large 
enterprise cannot avoid. At the same time, the large enterprise resorts to a tax planning activity 
in order to minimise taxes it has to pay. Maximisation of net income is achieved through 
minimisation of the costs expended on the tax compliance activity taking into account the fact 
that the cost minimisation is constrained by the amount of the tax compliance activity on which 
some portion of the costs must be expended.    
Notwithstanding a number of simplifying assumptions made in the model, it can nevertheless 
predict the optimal behaviour of a rational business taxpayer in regard to their tax compliance 
costs strategy. The model predicts that the cost efficient condition (that is when the costs 
associated with the implementation of the tax compliance activity are minimised) is achieved 
                                                     
30  Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 16.  
31 The assumption that when economic agents make decisions their rationality is “bounded” by the amount of 
information available, meaning that they cannot be fully rational in their choice due to the limited information. In 
addition, not only does information appear to be limited, but also the time required to make decision is limited as 
well. Consequently, economic agents seek a “satisfactory” solution, rather than the optimal solution. The term 
“bounded rationality” was first coined by Herbert Simon in 1955. See Herbert Simon “A Behavioural Model of 
Rational Choice” (1955) 69 Quarterly Journal of Economics 99.    
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when the marginal cost of one unit of internal staff, adjusted for the productivity of internal 
staff, will be equal to the marginal cost of one unit of capital, adjusted for its productivity, and 
equal to a market price of the external tax practitioner.  
In the context of large enterprises this model can help to visualise the following cost optimal 
tax compliance strategy: efficient separation of tax compliance functions between internal staff 
and external tax practitioners. According to the model efficient separation implies performance 
of simpler tasks by internal personnel, while outsourcing more complex tasks to external tax 
practitioners.  
Since it is not the purpose of this study to test this model, mathematical workings of the model 
are provided in Appendix 1 of this thesis. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Methodological Approach  
This study undertakes an analysis of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New 
Zealand. In addressing the research questions set out in the Chapter 1 of this thesis, this study 
has adopted a qualitative methodology, specifically explorative analysis (the features of which 
will be elaborated further in this chapter). Although most of the previous studies of the costs 
of tax compliance in large enterprises are predominately quantitative, the reason why a 
qualitative research method has been adopted in this study is that undertaking of quantitative 
study appears to be problematic. As indicated in the literature review in Chapter 2, most 
quantitative studies of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises use large scale self-
administered surveys as a means of data collection. 
However, the response rate of such large scale surveys is usually low.32 Among the studies 
presented in Chapter 2, only the Australian study showed a relatively high response rate of 
42%. As explained in Chapter 2, subsection 2.4.2.2, such a high rate is attributed to the strong 
endorsement from Australian Taxation Authority (ATO) and professional bodies. Furthermore, 
as shown in Chapter 3, there is an issue with the definition of large enterprises in New Zealand. 
                                                     
32 European Commission “A Review and Evaluation of Methodologies to Calculate Tax Compliance Costs” 




This poses a significant challenge for conducting an empirical study. Considering this fact and 
also that to date no large scale survey has been undertaken among large enterprises in New 
Zealand for collecting information on the cost of tax compliance, it was decided to adopt 
qualitative methodology for this study.   
Thus, rather than conducting an quantitative analysis that emphasises collection and 
econometrical analysis of data, this study focuses on words as the essence of qualitative 
analysis.33 According to Cassell and Symon, qualitative research represents the process of 
collection and analysis of written or spoken texts and also directly observing the object(s) of 
study.34  Qualitative analysis has been traditionally used in disciplines such as tax, accounting 
and law, where ethnographic research, grounded theory, case study and phenomenological 
research appear to be the most commonly applied approaches.35 
Among the advantages of qualitative research are, first, the ability to provide detailed 
descriptions of the opinions and experiences of participants, based on which further 
interpretation can be made. 36  Secondly, qualitative data collection methods, such as 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews, allow direct interaction with participants during 
the data collection process.37 Thirdly, qualitative research permits flexibility in designing the 
research structure,38 which can be easily adjusted in response to the circumstances of the study. 
Finally, one form of qualitative research, exploratory analysis, can provide information which 
can be used as a baseline for future studies.39   
                                                     
33 Allan Bryman and Emma Bell Business Research Methods (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, United 
Kingdom, 2007). 
34 Catherine Cassel and Gillian Symon Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research (Sage, London, 1994). 
35  Margaret McKerchar Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson Reuters, 
Pyrmont, 2010) at 94. 
36 Shidur Rahman “The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches and 
Methods in Language “Testing and Assessment” Research: A Literature Review” 6 (2016) 102 at 104. 
37 At 104.  
38 Joseph Alex Maxwell Qualitative research design: An interactive approach (Sage, London, 2012). 
39 Joyce J Fitzpatrick and Meredith K Wallace Encyclopedia of Nursing Research (3rd ed, Springer, New York, 
2012) at 169.  
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A disadvantage of qualitative research is that it does not allow the researcher to make 
generalisations of the findings over the larger population due to a small representative sample.40 
However, since the purpose of this study is to provide an exploratory analysis of the magnitude, 
composition and determinants of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New 
Zealand, the generalisation of the results of this study over the wider population of large 
enterprises is not required. 
Exploratory research or analysis, by definition, involves exploration and does not purport to 
provide a final and conclusive solution to the problem being investigated.41 Therefore, research 
questions are principally explored during exploratory analysis without being given a 
confirmatory solution or conclusive evidence. Exploratory research represents an initial stage 
of studying a problem, laying down the groundwork for more conclusive analysis in the future. 
It assists in determining “research design, sampling methodology and data collection 
methods”.42 Exploratory research is very useful in those situations when there is no, or very 
little, research on the problem or question which is being explored.43 In this regard, exploratory 
analysis appears to be a useful methodological approach for this study as little research has 
been carried out to date on the tax compliance costs of large enterprises in New Zealand and 
the difficulties with collection of data pose a large challenge for conducting an empirical study.       
The scope of exploratory analysis is rather broad as the definition of the word “exploration” 
includes “investigative exploration”, which purpose is to create something new, such as a 
method or design. 44 The definition also includes “innovative exploration”, which has a goal to 
achieve a “degree of familiarity with the properties and substances and procedures”.45 Finally, 
“limited exploration” denotes types of exploration when a researcher knows what in particular 
they are looking for and systematically searches for it. In this type of exploration, discovery 
                                                     
40 Stanley Thomson “Qualitative research: Validity” (2011) 6 Journal of Administration and Governance 77 at 79. 
41 Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill Research Methods for Business Students (6th ed, Pearson 
Education, Harlow, 2012) at 140. 
42 Kultar Singh Quantitative Social Research Methods (Sage, New Delhi, 2007) at 64.  
43 Reva B Brown Doing Your Dissertation in Business and Management: The Reality of Research and Writing 
(Sage, London, 2006) at 43. 
44 Robert Stebbins Exploratory research in the social science (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2001) at 3. 
45 At 3. 
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(“investigative exploration”) and innovation (“innovative exploration”) are of a secondary 
importance. 
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate specific issues related to the costs of tax 
compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, exploratory analysis in this study represents 
limited exploration. Moreover, both the conceptual framework for the measurement of tax 
compliance costs and the model of cost efficient tax administration, equip the researcher with 
a certain degree of clarity of the issues to explore in this study.  
As Stebbins explains further, exploratory research (exploration) is primarily inductive, 
implying that the researcher uses the data obtained to induce an understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon in order to form a theory.46 In contrast, confirmatory research (confirmation) uses 
a deductive approach, in which a model generated by an already existing theoretical framework 
is used to test a hypothesis. Therefore, the goal of exploratory research is to generate new ideas, 
make new discoveries or form new theories, particularly grounded theories, whereas the goal 
of confirmatory research is to verify the validity of existing models and test hypothesises. In 
this sense confirmatory research in “both the social and natural sciences is aimed at preventing 
discovery”.47  
One important point to make in this regard is that although this study employs explorative 
analysis to address the research questions, it is not intended to be purely inductive. Rather, an 
explorative analysis of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand relies 
on the findings of previous studies, as well as the conceptual framework and model (which 
were discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3.3, respectively). Although no hypothesis is tested in this 
study, the findings of this study are compared with the existing empirical literature on the costs 
of tax compliance of large enterprises in order to confirm the validity of the findings. In this 
regard, the explorative analysis undertaken is a mixture of exploration and confirmation, as its 
findings are used to generate ideas about aspects of the cost of tax compliance in large 
enterprises in New Zealand. Furthermore, the findings can be verified (to see if they are in line 
with previous empirical studies).   
                                                     
46 At 3.  
47 Jerome Kirk and Marc Miller Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research (Sage Publication, Newbury Park, 




In line with exploratory analysis two main data collection methods can be used. One method 
is to conduct a case study or a number of case studies, while the other method is to employ 
interviews. A combination of these methods is also possible. For the reason explained in the 
next section interviews as the data collection method were chosen in this study. Interviews have 
been used to gain insight from the opinions of stakeholders who have knowledge about the 
costs of tax compliance in large enterprises and are experienced in practical aspects related to 
the taxation of large enterprises in New Zealand.  For the reason, as elaborated further in this 
chapter, external tax practitioners from large chartered accountant firms and an IR official were 
chosen as the participants of the semi-structured interviews.  
 
5.4.2 Interviews  
5.4.2.1 Why interviews and not a case study or a survey?      
A case study generally involves undertaking an in-depth exploration of a process, event or 
activity, during which a researcher seeks to understand a case in the context of its particular 
situation.48 For example, in the case study of the cost of tax compliance of Hewlett-Packard 
(HP), a multinational company, the researcher, a tax counsel in HP, described a process of 
filing the United States (US) federal income tax return.49 The purpose of the HP case study was 
to provide insight into details and the length of the tax filing process in order to demonstrate 
how long it takes a large multinational enterprise in the US to deal with the most complex part 
of tax compliance. In this regard, the advantage of carrying out a case study lies in the fact that 
in a result a detailed knowledge of a particular process (for example the process of complying 
with tax obligation) can be gained.  
Often, a case study is undertaken in order to test some hypothesis or a theory and serves as a 
supplementary investigation in a quantitative research.50  By the way of example, a case study 
of the cost of tax compliance of Indian corporations by Chattopadhaya and Das-Gupta51 was 
                                                     
48 McKerchar, above n 35, at 102.  
49 David R.Seltzer “Federal income tax compliance costs: a case-study of Hewlett-Packard company” (1997) 
National Tax Journal 50(3) 487. 
50 McKerchar, above n 35, at 103.  
51 Saumen Chattopadhyay and Arindan Das-Gupta “The Income Tax Compliance Costs of Indian Corporations” 
(National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 2002). 
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carried out by the authors in order to elucidate certain important features of tax compliance 
activities which could not be ascertained through the questionnaire. In this respect, a case study 
may serve as a useful method for verification of quantitative findings already made.  
The fact that this study does not seek to verify the validity of a hypothesis, nor to undertake in-
depth analysis of how large enterprises in New Zealand comply with their tax obligations, 
makes the use of a case study as a method for collecting data to be less relevant.   
Furthermore, Yin52 argues that whether a case study is a right method depends on factors such 
as type of research questions posed. Thus, “how” and “why” research questions are more 
exploratory in nature and are likely to lead to the use of a case study method. The research 
questions such as “what”, “how much”, “who” and “where” are better addressed with survey 
method.53 As noted, the research questions posed in Chapter 1 of this thesis are primarily 
“what” and “how much” type of questions. However, given the lack of certainty with the 
concept of large enterprises in New Zealand and exploratory nature of the current study, 
interviews appear to be a better way than a survey for obtaining a qualitative information.   
The choice of the interview can also be explained by the following facts. First, as mentioned 
in chapter one, sub-section 1.1.3, self-administered large scale surveys usually have a low 
response rate. Second, in line with the qualitative methodology adopted, it is not the purpose 
of this study to generalise the findings over the wider population of large enterprises in New 
Zealand. Therefore, interviews were considered to be the most feasible method for collecting 
data for conducting explorative analysis. Furthermore, interviews provide the interviewer with 
an opportunity to uncover information which may not have been obtained through surveys.54 
During an interview the interviewer can ask additional questions in order to gain clarification 
or explore a problem more deeply, which is not possible to do in the case of a survey. Another 
advantage of conducting interviews over self-administered surveys is an ability to rephrase or 
simplify a question during an interview.55  As a result, more accurate responses can be received, 
which increases the accuracy of data.  
                                                     
52 Robert K. Yin. Case Study Research. Design and Methods (5th ed. SAGE Publications, 2014) at 9. 
53 Yin, above n 52, at 10. 
54 Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight. How to Research (3rd ed, Open University Press, 
Berkshire, 2006) at 172. 
55 Zoltan Dornyei, Research Methods in Applied Linguistics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007).  
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5.4.2.2 Overview  
According to Roulston,56 there are three main types of interviews which are used in social-
science research: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and unstructured 
interviews. In structured interviews, or standardised interviews, an interviewer follows a 
predetermined set of questions, reading the questions as worded without adding or skipping 
anything. Structured interviews are usually applied in quantitative research in the form of 
surveys. Data extracted from structured interviews are used predominately for testing 
hypothesis.  
In contrast to structured interviews, semi-structured and unstructured interviews are forms of 
non-standardised interviews allowing the interviewer more freedom in choosing the wording 
and the sequence of questions depending on the flow of the interview. Additional questions 
can also be asked to seek further clarification during semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews. Data extracted from these forms of interviews is mainly used for description and 
interpretation, and is analysed by means of inductive methods.57  
An advantage of semi-structured interviews over unstructured interviews is that, unlike the 
free-flowing conversation format of unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews are 
usually conducted following an interview guide, which represents questions or topics to be 
explored by the interviewer.58 The existence of the guide allows the interviewer to achieve 
optimal use of the time allotted for an interview and to keep the interview focused on the main 
issues.59 
Considering the limited amount of time available for each interview and the necessity in 
obtaining the desired information which would be sufficient for answering the research 
questions, semi-structured interviews were adopted as the data collection tool in this study.  
 
                                                     
56 Katherine Roulston Reflective Interviewing: A Guide to Theory and Practice (Sage, London, 2010) at 14-15. 
57 Roulston, above n 56.  
58  Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin Crabtree “The qualitative research interview” (2006) 40 Medical 
Education 314 at 315. 




5.4.2.3 Sample Selection  
One of the widely used sampling methods in qualitative research is purposive sampling.60 The 
purposive sampling technique is a method in which participants are selected or sampled on the 
basis of their knowledge and experience with the subject of the problem being researched.61 In 
contrast with probabilistic sampling applied in quantitative studies, purposive sampling is non-
random technique which does not require the creation of a sample that is representative of the 
population from which this sample is drawn. Instead, the researcher determines what 
information needs to be gained and consequently searches for participants who are able, by 
virtue of their knowledge, experience and willingness, to provide this information.62  
Accordingly, in line with the purposive sampling method, the interview participants in this 
study were selected from the following groups, which the researcher believed to possess 
knowledge about the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand and have 
experience in dealing with tax issues of large enterprises: 
1. Tax practitioners of large chartered accountant firms  
2. Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and tax managers of large enterprises  
3. IR officials  
External tax practitioners were initially selected from the websites of the largest tax accountant 
firms in New Zealand (known as the “Big Four”), located in Christchurch, Wellington and 
Auckland. A covering letter, outlining the study and the purpose of the interviews was sent to 
those tax practitioners who were believed to have knowledge and experience in dealing with 
large enterprises in New Zealand, asking them to participate in an interview. However, only 
one response was received from a tax practitioner in Christchurch (where the researcher was 
based). Due to this being an ineffective way of approaching tax practitioners directly, it was 
decided to approach Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ), a 
professional body representing tax practitioners in Australia and New Zealand, for assistance 
in selecting and contacting tax practitioners on the researcher’s behalf. As result of this request, 
                                                     
60 Michael Patton Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2002). 
61 John Creswell and Vicki Clark Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
2017). 
62 Ilker Etikan, Abukabar Sulaiman and Rukayya Alkassim “Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive 
Sampling” (2016) 5 American Journal of applied and Theoretical Statistics 1 at 2.    
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CA-ANZ New Zealand Tax Leader, John Cuthbertson, suggested a list of practitioners who on 
a basis of their knowledge and experience would be the most appropriate candidates for an 
interview. The list included the names and contact details of eleven tax practitioners. Five of 
the tax practitioners were from accounting firms located in Auckland, four practitioners were 
from Wellington and the remaining practitioners were from Christchurch. This time a covering 
letter endorsed by the CA-ANZ New Zealand Tax Leader was sent out to all tax practitioners 
from the list. As result, four positive responses were received, among which two were from tax 
practitioners in Christchurch. A copy of the covering letter used to contact the tax practitioners 
is provided in Appendix 4 of the thesis. 
It is worthwhile to note that each tax practitioner who agreed to participate in an interview held 
the position of a partner in their firm. This fact adds greater credibility to the responses provided 
by the tax practitioners, since as partners the tax practitioners have real-world experience in 
overseeing the tax matters of large enterprises in New Zealand and dealing with various 
complex tax issues.     
With respect to contacting tax managers and CEOs of large enterprises, an attempt was made 
to approach them through the tax practitioners. To this end the tax practitioners were 
specifically asked if they could assist in arranging interviews with large enterprises (who were 
the tax practitioners’ clients). However, only negative responses were received, explaining that 
for their clients’ confidentiality they could not provide such assistance. Further attempts to 
contact a number of large enterprises (seven were contacted) directly by the researcher, asking 
if their tax managers and CEOs would be willing to participate in an interview, resulted in no 
positive responses. 
In the researcher’s opinion, one of the reasons why CEOs or tax managers were not responsive 
to the invitations to participate in the interview, is that they saw little benefit in the results of 
the current study for their organisations. The organisations which specialise in market research 
and have an extensive experience in interviewing CEOs and top managers of large 
organisations, indicate that in order to elicit a cooperation, CEOs and top managers need to feel 
that the feedback provided by the study will potentially effect change and result in 
improvements directly benefiting their firm. 63  In this regard, it is likely that the top 
                                                     
63 The Rockbridge “Executive Interviewing: How to Survey Hard-to-Reach Corporate Heads” (9 December 
2013) < https://rockresearch.com/executive-interviewing-how-to-survey-hard-to-reach-corporate-heads/ > (last 
accessed 16 July 2019).  
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management of the large enterprises contacted had little interest in the current study. The other 
possible reason why CEOs and tax managers did not respond positively to the invitation is that 
the cost of their time is very high. Due to time limitations it was decided not to pursue 
approaching tax managers and CEOs of large enterprises any further and therefore no 
interviews were conducted with this group for this study.   
IR officials were contacted upon the recommendation of one of the tax practitioners from the 
list suggested by the CA-ANZ New Zealand Tax Leader. This effectively turned out to be the 
employment of a snowballing sampling method.64 One of the contacted IR officials agreed to 
participate in an interview. A copy of the covering letter used to contact the IR official 
contained in Appendix 5 of the thesis.   
 
5.4.2.4 Development of the Interview Guide  
As mentioned in the subsection 5.4.2.2, semi-structured interviews use an interview guide to 
ensure that the interviews are conducted in a systematic manner and remain focused on the 
main subject of the investigation. Moreover, the use of an interview guide assists the researcher 
in managing the limited time allotted for an interview. Since the interviews were to be 
conducted with external tax practitioners and an IR official, two different interview guides were 
prepared as the majority of the content of the interviews with each group was intended to be 
different. While the interviews with the external tax practitioners were largely focused on the 
aspects of the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, the interview with 
an IR official was aimed at gaining insights into how the IR monitors tax compliance in large 
enterprises. However, one commonality in the interviews with the external tax practitioners 
and the IR official is that both groups were asked to define large enterprises in New Zealand.   
    
                                                     
64 A nonprobability sampling method, where participants of the research recruit other participants for research. 
See Mahin Naderifar, Hamideh Goli and Fereshteh Ghaljaie “Snowball Sampling: A Purposeful Method of 
Sampling in Qualitative Research” (2017) 14 Strides in Development of Medical Education 1.  
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5.4.2.4(a) Tax Practitioners’ Interview Guide 
The development of the interview guide with the external tax practitioners was largely 
influenced by the research questions and the conceptual framework for the measurement of the 
costs of tax compliance. To recap, there are three research questions identified in this thesis:  
 
RQ 1. How can we define a “large enterprise” in New Zealand, if we want to study and 
measure its tax compliance costs? 
 
RQ2. What are the magnitude, composition and drivers of tax compliance costs in large 
enterprises in New Zealand?  
 
   RQ3.  How do large enterprises differ from SMEs in terms of the tax compliance activities and 
composition of tax compliance costs? 
Therefore, in order to address the research questions the interview guide was separated into 
two parts. The first part comprised a number of questions which were aimed at gaining an 
understanding of the tax practitioners’ perspectives on the magnitude and composition of tax 
compliance costs in large enterprises in New Zealand. In addition, a question was specifically 
asked about how tax practitioners understand the concept of a large enterprise. Another 
question directly asked how much the particular tax practitioner’s firm would charge for the 
preparation of a particular tax return for a large enterprise. Due to the potential unwillingness 
of tax practitioners to provide numbers for commercial and confidentiality reasons, the 
researcher realised that obtaining answers to this question from the interviewees might not be 
possible. However, it was decided to include this question in the interviews in the hope of 
obtaining at least ballpark numbers.   
The second set of interview questions had the purpose of elucidating the tax practitioners’ 
opinions about the causes of the tax compliance cost burden in large enterprises and the factors 
driving these costs. Initially it was intended to ask tax practitioners what suggestions they 
would make in order to simplify the current tax rules that affect large enterprises so that the 
costs of tax compliance in large enterprises could be reduced. However, due to the limited 
interview time, this question was omitted in the interviews conducted. A copy of the tax 




5.4.2.4(b) IR Official’s Interview Guide  
The interview with the IR official sought to obtain crucial information on how the IR defines 
large enterprises and also what approaches the IR uses to monitor the tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand.  The information on the approaches the IR uses to monitor large 
enterprises was expected to provide insights for Chapter 4 of this thesis, which outlines the tax 
compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. Therefore, the development of the interview 
guide for the IR official was influenced by these two goals. In comparison with the tax 
practitioners’ interview guide, this guide is shorter and comprises only one set of questions. 
The first question asks how the IR defines large enterprises. The remaining questions ask what 
methods the IR applies to monitor the tax compliance of large enterprises, what are the basic 
tax compliance obligations of large enterprises, and what difficulties the IR experiences in 
monitoring the tax compliance of large enterprises. A copy of the interview guide with an IR 
official is contained in the Appendix 3 of this thesis.   
 
5.4.2.5 Sample Size   
When determining a sample size, the question arises as to what sample size is appropriate 
(effective) for undertaking a study. In the case of quantitative research, factors that determine 
effective sample size are usually the width of confidence intervals and population variance.65 
In regard to qualitative research, according to Patton, 66 there are no rules for determining the 
size of a sample. The goal of a research, the usefulness of information obtained and credibility 
of facts gathered determine how large a sample should be in qualitative research.67  
Despite the absence of clear rules for establishing sample size in qualitative research, the 
concept of data saturation might be a helpful approach to determine the effective sample size. 
Saturation of data indicates that “… on the basis of the data that have been collected or analysed 
hitherto, further data collection and/or analysis are unnecessary”.68 Therefore, data saturation 
                                                     
65 Russel V Lenth “Some Practical Guidelines for Effective Sample Size Determination” (2001) 55 American 
Statistician 187. 
66 Patton, above n 60. 
67 At 244. 
68  Benjamin Saunders and others “Saturation in Qualitative Research: Exploring Its Conceptualization and 
Operationalization” (2018) 52 Quality & Quantity 1893 at 1893.  
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serves as the criterion for discontinuing further data collection as each new piece of data does 
not bring new information. According to Seale, a researcher who carries out a qualitative study 
and finds that each new instance (in this case, an interview) generates results similar to those 
they encountered earlier, can conclude that their data is saturated.69 
Due to the fact that the present study uses qualitative approach, no plans were made in regard 
to the size of the sample at the outset of the study for the reasons explained above. The sample 
size was eventually determined on a basis of two following factors. First, despite a small sample 
size, after having interviewed five tax practitioners, the researcher noticed that a number of 
similar answers was received from each of them, indicating that the data saturation point may 
have been achieved. Second, as the number of “Big Four” senior staff in New Zealand is 
relatively small, interviewing more tax practitioners makes it highly likely that tax practitioners 
from the same firm will be interviewed. Moreover, given the relatively small size of the 
population of large enterprises in New Zealand,70 gaining a new information (beyond what was 
already established in the literature) about the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises from 
interviewing more tax practitioners was considered to be unlikely. Consequently, it was 
decided not to interview more tax practitioners upon completion of the fifth interview.  
In relation to the interview with an IR tax official, information provided by an IR official during 
the interview was based entirely on the official information released by the IR. Therefore, 
unlike external tax practitioners who provided the opinions of their firms when responding to 
the interview questions, the IR official’s responses were reflecting the IR position and were not 
based on their personal opinion. As the purpose of the interview was to gain an insight into 
how the IR defines large enterprises and what approach it applies to monitor their tax 
compliance in New Zealand, interviewing only one IR official was considered sufficient for 
this purpose.    
 
                                                     
69 Clive Seale The Quality of Qualitative Research (Sage, London, 1999). 
70 Based on IR figures, large enterprises comprise 0.2% of the total number of registered enterprises in New 
Zealand. See IR “Registered customers by groups 2008-2017” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-
stats/customers/reg-by-customer-group/customers-reg-cust-by-groups.html> (last accessed 23 December 2018). 
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5.4.2.6 Data Collection  
Interviews with the selected participants were conducted on a one-to-one basis, either face-to-
face or over the telephone. Although interviews over the telephone have certain disadvantages 
compared to face-to-face interviews, including the inability to see nonverbal reactions of the 
participant,71 telephone interviews were considered more convenient for the tax practitioners 
located in Auckland and Wellington. The interviews with the IR official and tax practitioners 
in Christchurch were conducted face-to-face.  
Prior to the interview each participant was provided with an information sheet and consent 
form and was asked to sign and return the consent form by e-mail or in person. The information 
sheet contained an outline of the study, the reasons for conducting the interview and an 
explanation of the interview process. Both the consent form and information sheet requested 
the participants’ permission to audio-record the interview and mentioned that the participants 
will be provided with a copy of the transcribed interview upon their request. Copies of the 
consent form and information sheet which were emailed to the tax practitioners and the IR 
official are provided in Appendices 6 and 7 of this thesis.  
The interviews with the tax practitioners and the IR official took place between 20 February 
2018 and 7 August 2018.  The average interview time was 30 minutes.    
 
5.4.2.7 Ethical Considerations    
The Human Ethics Committee (HEC) of the University of Canterbury requires all researchers, 
including students, whose research is related to dealing with human subjects, to obtain approval 
prior to commencing research. Accordingly an application was submitted to the HEC outlining 
the measures that would be taken to ensure confidentiality of the interview participants and 
how the transcribed interviews would be stored. The application also outlined that the 
participants’ consent would be obtained through the signed consent form, as discussed in 
section 5.4.2.5 above. Approval from the HEC was received on 12 January 2018. The 
information sheet and the consent form provided to the interview participants indicated that 
                                                     
71 Mark Saunders, Phillip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill Research Methods for Business Students (5th ed, Prentice 
Hill, Harlow, 2009). 
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approval of HEC had been obtained. A copy of HEC approval letter is contained in Appendix 
8 of this thesis.   
  
5.4.2.8 Data Analysis 
One of the methods used in the qualitative research to analyse data is thematic analysis, which 
represents the process of identifying themes or patterns within the data obtained in qualitative 
research. According to Braun and Clark,72 thematic analysis is a useful method which equips 
the researcher with skills that can be applied in “many other kinds of analysis”.73 Braun and 
Clark identify six phases for conducting thematic analysis:74 
1. Becoming familiar with the data 
2. Generating initial codes 
3. Searching for themes (pattern in the data) 
4. Reviewing themes 
5. Defining themes  
6. Writing report  
In this study the data gathered from the interviews was analysed in line with thematic analysis 
following the six phases suggested by Braun and Clark75. However, due to the relatively small 
sample size, it was considered that the generation of codes would not be necessary. Therefore, 
the content of audio-recorded interviews was first transcribed and compiled into tables. Each 
table contained the responses provided by the interview participants to a particular question 
from the interview guide. The content of each table with the participants’ responses was then 
reviewed to identify interview themes for the subsequent analysis. Finally, the interview 
findings were summarised based on this analysis.    
 
                                                     
72 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology” (2006) 3 Qualitative Research 
in Psychology 77. 
73 At 81. 
74 At 87. 




In this chapter the conceptual framework which is widely applied in the literature on the 
measurement of the cost of tax compliance, was presented. In addition, the discussion was 
extended to incorporate the model of cost optimal tax administration based on the premise of 
the Theory of Rational Choice. This model can assist in the estimation of the unobservable 
costs of tax compliance which influences the gross costs of tax compliance as this group of 
costs arises due to inefficient tax compliance practices.  
The chapter then outlined the methodological approach employed in this study of exploratory 
analysis, which features both exploration (making new findings) and confirmation (comparison 
with prior studies). The conceptual framework and the model of cost efficient tax compliance 
administration serve as the guidance based on which the researcher will explore the magnitude, 
composition and determinants of the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New 
Zealand.  
In line with exploratory analysis, semi-structured interviews were used in this study as the main 
data collection method. Accordingly, this chapter has discussed the features of semi-structured 
interviews, as well as other aspects such as development of the interview guide, sample 
selection, sample size, data collection and data analysis procedures related to the 
implementation of semi-structured interviews. Chapter 6, which follows, will present the 
findings from the semi-structured interviews. 
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This chapter provides the results of the interviews conducted with the New Zealand tax 
practitioners and an Inland Revenue (IR) official on the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand. The purpose of the interviews was to find out how tax practitioners 
and the IR understand the concept of a large enterprise and to elucidate tax practitioners’ 
opinions on the magnitude, composition and determinants of the costs of tax compliance of 
large enterprises. Findings from the interviews were analysed in order to draw inferences aimed 
at addressing the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Accordingly, the 
structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 provides information about the interview 
participants in respect of their gender, occupation, position and their association with 
professional bodies. An outline of the participants’ responses along with an analysis of their 
responses is provided in section 6.3. The findings from the interviews are then summarised in 
section 6.4  
 
6.2. Participants in the Interviews  
As mentioned in Chapter 5 (in sections 5.4.2.3 and 5.4.2.4) the majority of tax practitioners 
were recruited from a list provided by the New Zealand Tax Leader of Chartered Accountants 
Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ). The list included the names and contact details of 11 
tax practitioners from Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. All of the tax practitioners from 
the list were contacted by the researcher through e-mail and four gave positive replies. One 
more tax practitioner, whose name was not on the list, was recruited by the researcher through 
direct contact.    
An IR official was also recruited through an e-mail sent by the researcher as the result of a 
recommendation made by one of the tax practitioners from the list provided by the CA-ANZ 
New Zealand Tax Leader. Ultimately, six participants took part in the interview, comprising 
five tax practitioners from large chartered accountant firms in Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch, and an IR official from Christchurch.    
125 
 
Table 6.1 below presents information regarding the interview participants. All five tax 
practitioners were members of CA-ANZ.  In addition to belonging to CA-ANZ, one of the tax 
practitioners was a member of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and another two tax 
practitioners were members of the Institute of Directors in New Zealand. One tax practitioner 
was also an accredited member of the International Fiscal Association (IFA). As for their 
positions, four of the tax practitioners were working in their firms in the position of partner and 
one tax practitioner was a director. The IR official was also a member of CA-ANZ and was 
working as a tax specialist in the IR.  
 
Table 6.1: Participants in the interviews    
Participant as coded 
in the thesis 




Tax Practitioner 1 Male Partner, tax and 
legal advisor 
CA-ANZ, NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 2 Male Partner, tax advisor CA-ANZ, Institute 
of Directors in New 
Zealand 
Tax Practitioner 3 Male Partner, tax advisor CA-ANZ 
Tax Practitioner 4 Male  Partner, tax advisor CA-ANZ, Institute 
of Directors in New 
Zealand 
    Tax Practitioner 5 Female   Director, tax advisor CA-ANZ, IFA 
IR Official Male Tax Specialist CA-ANZ 
 
 
6.3. Interview Results 
Due to time limitations, the questions for the tax practitioners regarding their suggestions for 
reducing the cost of tax compliance in large enterprises, and whether in their opinion, large 
enterprises followed cost efficient tax compliance administration, were omitted. In addition, 
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although the interview with the IR official covered areas such as the methods that the IR applies 
to monitor tax compliance of large enterprises and the basic tax obligations of large enterprises, 
only the part of the interview which concerns the definition of large enterprises is presented in 
this chapter. The reason for including only this part of the interview with the IR official is that 
it is most relevant for addressing the research questions. Further, in regard to the quality of 
responses provided by the tax practitioners, it was expected they would be more concise in 
their content. However, despite this limitation, the interviews with both the tax practitioners 
and the IR official resulted in satisfactory information for addressing the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. While some of the tax practitioners could offer only general 
information, their answers nonetheless allowed the researcher to form a basis for making 
conclusions. The responses of the participants and an analysis of their responses are provided 
below.   
 
6.3.1 Definition of Large Enterprise 
6.3.1.1 Tax Practitioners’ Perspectives 
The first question asked during each of the interviews was how tax practitioners understand the 
concept of large enterprises to apply in New Zealand. It should be noted that in responding to 
this question, the tax practitioners offered their personal perspective on the definition of large 
enterprises and not the perspective of their firms. 
Analysis of the responses of the tax practitioners to this question revealed that there is no 
common understanding amongst tax practitioners as to what comprises a large enterprise in 
New Zealand. Each of the tax practitioners interviewed provided their own criteria which, in 
their minds, were most appropriate for describing what a large enterprise is. Table 6.2 contains 
excerpts from the practitioners’ responses. The tax practitioners in Table 6.2 (and in the 
remaining tables in this chapter) have been coded as indicated in Table 6.1 above (as Tax 







Table 6.2:  How tax practitioners define large enterprise in New Zealand   
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“I guess you could measure it by turnover, you can measure it by profit or by 
amount of tax firm pays like for example payroll tax....   It is all depends on how 
you want to define it...from my perspective we would probably look at turnover, 
size and complexity”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 2 
“It is […] in the eye of the beholder … My preference is that of financial reporting 
standards. A very large enterprise defined by the standards of financial reporting 
will be the one that got assets in excess of NZ$30 million, NZ$ 60 million in 
revenue, lower for the overseas [enterprises]…”.   
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“An entity with turnover of NZ$100 million. One of the feature of a large 
enterprise is having a tax manager on board…”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“Well by large enterprises I normally understand an enterprise with a NZ$100 
million turnover…i.e. it is the IR approach. Also, one can use a threshold of 
NZ$30 million, but it will rather apply to foreign owned enterprises…”.    
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“Various criteria can be applied here… for example for a very large multinational 
it is NZ$1.3 billion turnover, NZ$80 million dollars for domestic enterprise or 
NZ$30 million for foreign owned. Also a large number of employees can 
characterise an enterprise as large”. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.2, although the majority of the tax practitioners were referring in 
their answers to the thresholds established by the IR or the Financial Reporting Act 2013 (FRA 
2013) for defining large enterprises, each tax practitioner had their own idea of what a large 
enterprise in New Zealand might look like. Obviously, tax practitioners apply certain criteria 
to define a large enterprise according to their professional requirements, which may depend on 
the particular client for whom they provide a service. The fact that each of the tax practitioners 
interviewed used different thresholds and benchmarks to define a large enterprise might 
indicate that there is no established concept of a large enterprise among tax practitioners in 
New Zealand. Nevertheless, while some of the criteria cited by Tax Practitioners 3, 4 and 5 are 
similar (the IR criterion of NZ$100 million and NZ$30 million), their responses still 
demonstrate that they differ in what thresholds to use to define large enterprises.    
Notably, Tax Practitioner 3 was the only participant who used qualitative characteristics to 
define a large enterprise – the presence of a tax manager in an organisation. During the 
interview, Tax Practitioner 2 mentioned that they use “quantitative criteria, because generally 
quantitative criteria are readily ascertainable”. This points to the fact that both qualitative and 
quantitative criteria can be applied to define large enterprises. However, tax practitioners prefer 
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to rely on quantitative criteria as it is much easier to describe the size of an organisation using 
numerical values.  
 
6.3.1.2 An IR Official’s Perspective 
Unlike the responses of the tax practitioners which reflected their personal opinions on how 
they define large enterprises in New Zealand, the IR tax official’s responses were based 
completely on the official interpretation of the IR of what enterprises are considered to be large 
in New Zealand.    
Although some of the thresholds that the IR applies to designate large enterprise were presented 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the interview with the IR official provided additional information in 
regard to how the IR classifies large enterprises in New Zealand. Based on the interview, the 
remainder of this section summarises the IR current stance on the classification of large 
enterprises in New Zealand. 
Currently the IR no longer officially uses the term “large enterprise” for monitoring tax 
compliance, but instead uses the new term of “significant enterprise”. As explained in Chapter 
3, section 3.1, of this thesis, a NZ$100 million turnover threshold is used to designate large 
enterprises in the context of customer service function of the IR and includes a number of tax 
exempt organisations such as Government departments. These tax exempt organisations are 
not a part of the IR core compliance population.1   
There is a unit within the IR structure known as the “significant enterprises customer segment” 
which monitors the tax compliance issues of significant enterprises. The IR defines a 
significant enterprise as a taxpayer group (whether a single enterprise or a group of enterprises) 
with more than 50 employees, or with an annual Goods and Services Tax (GST) turnover above 
NZ$80 million for New Zealand-owned enterprises, and NZ$30 million for foreign-owned 
enterprises. During the interview, the terms “significant enterprises” and “large enterprises” 
were used by the IR official almost interchangeably for taxpayer groups with an annual GST 
turnover above NZ$80 million. Further clarification by the IR official revealed that the IR 
considers taxpayer groups with an annual turnover greater than or equal to NZ$80 million as 
“large enterprises”. However, this term is not officially used for the purposes of monitoring tax 
                                                     
1 Email from Stephen Casey (International Revenue Strategy team) to the researcher regarding the definition of 
large enterprises in New Zealand (25 September 2018).   
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compliance. According to the IR official there are approximately 600 taxpayer groups that can 
be labelled as “large enterprises”. 
The interviewer sought to clarify how the IR treats New Zealand-owned enterprises when the 
number of employees is less than 50 and the annual turnover is greater than NZ$30 million but 
less than NZ$80 million. The IR official responded: 
 
It will certainly be included in significant enterprises, we will deal with it in a same 
way as we deal with a large enterprise, but if it is below $30 million than we will classify 
it as small and medium enterprise. If they is just below $80 million threshold they 
generally get treated the same way, but if they are below $30 million they fall into 
category of small to medium. There is no much difference for the top range, there is 
difference for the lower range. 
 
A follow-up by e-mail to the interview with the IR official, which occurred four months after 
the interview took place, further clarified that currently enterprises which have an annual GST 
turnover in excess of NZ$30 million will be included in the significant enterprises segment and 
be treated accordingly. Obviously, in such a case, it is irrelevant whether such an enterprise is 
foreign-owned or New Zealand-owned. Based on the additional information provided by the 
IR official in the follow up email, inclusion of enterprises with annual GST turnovers of less 
than NZ$80 million but greater than NZ$30 million will increase the number of taxpayer 
groups in the significant enterprises segment to 930.  
Therefore, from the information provided during the interview and the follow-up email, the 
following conclusion can be drawn regarding how the IR classifies large enterprises and Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs):  
 
  SME 
Less than 50 employees or an annual GST turnover of less than NZ$30 million  
 Significant Enterprises  
More than 50 employees or an annual GST turnover of more than NZ$30 million 
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 Large Enterprises (within classification of significant enterprises) 
An annual GST turnover of more than NZ$80 million  
 
With the confirmation provided by the IR official following the interview,2 one of the criteria 
that must be fulfilled for an enterprise to move from the SMEs category to the category of 
significant enterprises is the number of employees or an annual GST turnover. For instance, if 
an enterprise has an annual GST turnover of NZ$ 25 million, but at the same time the number 
of its employees is over 50, then this enterprise will be considered  “significant”, as one of the 
criteria is fulfilled. In the same vein, an enterprise with 30 employees, but which annually 
generates more than NZ$ 30 million of GST turnover, will also be classified as “significant”.   
As indicated above, the IR does not apply qualitative characteristics in its new classification to 
define large enterprises but uses numerical criteria such as a number of employees and GST 
turnover. Notable, the number of employees that the IR applies as a metric to measure whether 
an enterprise is significant (and large if its turnover exceeds NZ$ 80 million) is half the number 
of employees which New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE) 
uses to define large enterprises.3 This fact once again emphasises that different stakeholders 
(the IR and MBIE) may apply different thresholds to define large enterprises despite using the 
same criterion (number of employees).  
 
6.3.2 The Magnitude and Composition of Tax Compliance Costs in Large Enterprises 
This section contains an analysis of the replies provided by the tax practitioners to various 
questions concerning the magnitude and composition of the tax compliance costs in large 
enterprises.  
 
                                                     
2 Email from the IRD official to the researcher regarding the definition of significant enterprises in New Zealand 
(2 July 2019).   
3  MBIE define large enterprises as those with more than 100 employees. See MBIE “The small business sector 




6.3.2.1 Magnitude of Tax Compliance Costs 
In order to obtain information regarding the magnitude of tax compliance costs in large 
enterprises, each of the tax practitioners was asked the following question: 
 “Can you give the fee range that you would charge a large enterprise for the preparation of a 
tax return?” 
The answers to this question are reproduced in Table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3: How much tax practitioners would charge large enterprises for the 
preparation and review of tax return  
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“Depends on the amount of work done in house by a large enterprise. Large 
enterprises should have resources. They may do 90-99% themselves and then just 
ask us to do a high level safe-check of their numbers. So the fee range can be from 
a few thousand dollars if everything is done in house and submitted to us or if 
everything is outsourced to us the range might get up to NZ$50,000” 
Question: Do all large enterprises do 90% of work in house and then ask you 
to check or how does it normally happen in large enterprises? 
“So in my experience the most common pattern is somewhere in the middle, where 
in house personal would do all the calculations and prepare all the numbers and 
we will do detailed review” 
Tax  
Practitioner 2 
“It will be based on the complexity of calculations. So for example a multinational 
that has a multinational exposure would take a significant amount of time and they 
will also carry some amount of risk and so the fee will be complexity and risk 
basis associated in this particular return. It depend on what else we will be doing 
and how much work is being done by the company internal resources as well. In 
some cases in might be a straightforward tax return and it might be 3-4 thousand 
dollars and in other cases it might be 10-15 thousand dollars tax return it will also 
depend on if there is more or less advice…”. 
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“Usually we do tax review only. Pricing is based on the complexity of tax return, 
say cross-border transactions or CFC or FIF affects the complexity. Our review 
fee is based on hourly rate of NZ$750 and above”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“It is very difficult to tell the number as everything is determined by the 
complexity, type of tax and a case. For example, such elements as transfer pricing 
and operating in other jurisdictions can significantly affect complexity”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“We mostly do reviews of tax return, as preparation is done by large enterprises 
internally. Reviews can range from NZ$2,000 –NZ$20,000. Much work will be 





As the question about the fee range was asked to tax practitioners from different accounting 
firms, a relatively wide range of fees that might be charged to a large enterprise for the 
preparation or review of tax returns was received. It should be noted that most of tax 
practitioners indicated that the majority of large enterprises in New Zealand prepare their tax 
returns internally and they require tax practitioners to review the return before it is filed. 
Therefore, the fees that were mentioned by the tax practitioners were predominantly fees 
charged for reviewing the internally-prepared tax returns of large enterprises. According to the 
numbers provided in the interviews, a large enterprise in New Zealand might be charged in the 
range of NZ$2,000 to NZ$20,000 for the review of its tax return, depending to a great degree 
on the complexity of the tax return.  
It is very likely that large enterprises would ask external tax practitioners for their help for tax 
advice in relation to business structure, a particular transaction, and tax planning. However, all 
of the tax practitioners responded to the question about the fee range for these kind of services 
by only saying that it would depend on the industry within which the large enterprise operates 
and the complexity of the advice. An hourly rate of NZ$750 quoted by Tax Practitioner 3 might 
suggest that the cost to a large enterprise for tax advisory and tax planning could be sizable. 
 
6.3.2.2. Composition of Tax Compliance Costs 
As the interviews were conducted with external tax practitioners and not with large enterprises 
themselves, the information about the composition of tax compliance costs in large enterprises 
is limited to the information regarding the types of services that tax practitioners provide for 
their respective clients (large enterprises). Thus, it is difficult to form an opinion about the total 
composition of tax compliance costs in large enterprises based on these interviews alone. 
Moreover, the nature of the information obtained during the interviews does not allow 
inferences to be made about the composition of tax compliance costs in large enterprises in 
percentage terms.  Most of the tax practitioners found it difficult to answer what percentage of 
each type of service they provided among all the services that they provided to their clients. 
Nevertheless, the responses from the tax practitioners might provide an idea of which types of 




Tax Practitioner 1 responded that the services their firm provides to large enterprises include: 
1. Income tax returns, Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT), GST and pay as you earn (PAYE) tax - 
although it was not confirmed whether it was preparation of these returns or their review; 
2. Income tax planning and advisory regarding overseas transactions, mergers and 
acquisitions; 
3. Dealing with the IR’s claims and notices; and 
4. Consulting in relation to tax structure.  
Following the interview with Tax Practitioner 1, an attempt was made to contact Tax 
Practitioner 1 by e-mail4 in order to ask them to clarify whether the services provided by their 
firm in regard to the Income tax, FBT, GST and PAYE were preparation or reviews of these 
taxes. However, Tax Practitioner 1 did not provide any response to this request.   
Tax Practitioner 2 mentioned that large enterprises would usually purchase the following 
services: 
1. Income tax return preparation (although most of this work is done internally); 
2. Income tax return review; 
3. Tax advisory relating to the tax treatment of particular transactions (major acquisitions, 
doing business in a foreign jurisdiction) as well as advisory in relation to thin 
capitalisation and transfer pricing regimes requirements; and 
4. Responding to the IR’s request for additional information. 
 
Among the services provided to large enterprises by the accounting firm of Tax Practitioner 3, 
were the following services: 
1. Preparation of income tax returns, tax planning and tax advice; 
2. Tax advisory relating to transfer pricing and particular complex transactions (the tax 
practitioner did not mention what kind of transactions); and 
3. Due diligence and employee stock option planning. 
 
                                                     
4 Researchers’ e-mail to Tax Practitioner 1 (26 October 2018). 
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Tax Practitioner 4 replied that usually their firm provide the following services to large 
enterprises: 
1. Income tax return reviews; 
2. Complex advisory services such as transfer-pricing; 
3. Support in resolving issues related to customs; and 
4. Installation of special accounting technology (software) in large enterprises and the 
training of a large enterprise’s staff to use and maintain this technology. 
 
 Tax Practitioner 5 mentioned the following type of services:  
 
1. Review of tax returns (42% of all the services provided); 
2. Assistance in business structuring; and 
3. Tax planning services. 
 
One particular feature that can be inferred from the responses above is that the bulk of the 
services provided by external tax practitioners to large enterprises concerns income tax services. 
Income tax reviews, tax advisory in regard to transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, business 
structuring and overseas transactions, assist large enterprises in filing correct and accurate 
income tax forms (IR4 and IR10), and also to submit correct Basic Compliance Package (BCP). 
It is not surprising that income tax services were mentioned by all of the tax practitioners. 
Income tax is the most complex type of tax and, as shown in Chapter 4, the business activities 
of large enterprises often trigger various tax regimes. This significantly increases the 
complexity of the calculation of the taxable income of large enterprises.  
As illustrated by the responses provided in Table 6.4 below, working on the income tax issues 
of large enterprises does indeed take up a significant proportion of the total time that tax 










Table 6.4:  Most time-consuming types of tax for tax practitioners 
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“I guess income taxes would take most of my time specially. It depends on 




“If you focus on large enterprises they by definition will normally have their own 
finance function resources and therefore they will generally be doing their own 
GST returns. We will be focused on providing external advisory services in regard 
to particular transaction. Also large enterprises may want to have their income tax 
return prepared externally so that they know that their workings will be reviewed 
and that their workings results guarantee correct return”.   
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“Income tax would probably be most time consuming due to complexity. The 








“Income tax return. There is very little work to do about GST, Payroll and FBT, 
as these are done internally”. 
 
Without a proper quantification of the external tax compliance expenses and a breakdown of 
these expenses by the type of services provided, it is very difficult to say how much large 
enterprises in New Zealand spend on external preparation, review, tax advice, tax planning, 
audit and litigation relating to income tax. However, the following two facts suggest that the 
expenses on income tax services provided by external tax practitioners may account for the 
largest proportion of the total external tax compliance expenses of large enterprises in New 
Zealand. First, based on the tax practitioners’ responses, it would appear that large enterprises 
require services in connection with their income tax issues more often than services relating to 
other type of taxes. Second, as the responses in Table 6.4 suggest, dealing with large enterprises’ 
income tax issues does indeed make up a significant portion of tax practitioners’ time. This is 
compatible with the results of the studies by Slemrod and Blumenthal,5 and Evans, Lignier and 
Tran-Nam,6 on the tax compliance costs of large corporations in the United States (US) and 
Australia, respectively. Approximately 72% of the total cost of external tax services of large 
                                                     
5 Joel Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business” (1996) 24 Public 
Finance Quarterly 411. 
6 Chris Evans, Philip Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large corporations: An Empirical 
Inquiry and Comparative Analysis” (2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751. 
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US corporations were related to corporate tax services,7 while the expenditures on all types of 
external services that related to income tax in large Australian corporations were more than 60% 
of the total external costs.8  
Based on the responses provided by the external tax practitioners and the findings in the 
literature, it is possible to assume that large enterprises, including those in New Zealand, may 
have a comparably similar composition of external tax compliance costs, with expenses on 
income tax being the largest category of external tax compliance costs (more than 50%).  
As mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, conducting interviews with only external tax 
practitioners is the main limitation of this research. For a fuller picture of the composition of 
the tax compliance costs (including the internal costs of tax compliance) of large enterprises in 
New Zealand, conducting interviews with tax managers and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 
of large enterprises would be helpful. In addition, undertaking a survey among a sample of 
large enterprises would also allow information on internal cost of tax compliance to be obtained. 
Moreover, conducting a survey among large enterprises would help to quantify the external 
expenses and possibly confirm the findings from these interviews.  
 
6.3.2.3 Factors Influencing the Magnitude of Tax Compliance Costs 
A number of factors might contribute to the magnitude of the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises. The literature on tax compliance costs identifies two main methods of determining 
the factors driving the costs of tax compliance: statistical analysis, and questionnaires or 
interviews. Statistical analysis helps to identify the determinants of tax compliance costs and 
quantify their effect. Slemrod and Blumenthal9 identified, through statistical regression, four 
potential factors which affect tax complexity and hence the costs of tax compliance of the 
largest US corporations: 
 
 size of an enterprise; 
 type of industry an enterprise operates within; 
 breadth of activity; and 
                                                     
7  Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 5, at 423.  
8  Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam above n 6, at 779.  
9 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 5, at 425. 
137 
 
 number of taxes 
 
Questionnaires and interviews serve to identify factors contributing to tax complexity 
perceived by participants. Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam 10 utilised a questionnaire to identify 
a number of other potential factors which were perceived by tax executives of large Australian 
corporations as the main drivers of tax compliance costs: 
 
 complexity of the tax law; 
 frequency of changes in tax rules; 
 existence of international operations and cross-border transactions; 
 duration and cost of tax disputes resolutions; and 
 complexity of commercial transactions  
 
In this present study, the tax practitioners interviewed were asked the following question in 
order to obtain their perceptions on the possible factors that may drive the cost of tax 
compliance in large enterprises in New Zealand: 
 
“In your opinion, what are the main factors driving cost of tax compliance in large enterprises?” 
The responses from the tax practitioners to this this question are provided below in Table 6.5: 
 
   
  
                                                     
10 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6, at 785 and 786. 
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Table 6.5:  Perceived drivers of tax compliance costs in large enterprises 
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
So, so, I think, complexity will be the main factor to drive costs up, this is more in 
relation to advisory services. In term of compliance, I think big factor here ten years 
ago the compliance process and the steps that organisation would take to prepare 
income tax return, GST, payroll was all furnished somewhere, whereas today people 
are really looking at structure at how they beat the tax more instead of compliance 
functions. By spending money upfront on the technology and getting better 






 Practitioner 3 
“I think it is the IR audit, because it requires preparation of a lot of documentation 
and therefore the cost of tax compliance might soar up….”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“Cost of penalties might be very high… Cost of disputes with the IR…”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“I think frequently changing tax regulation is the culprit of rising cost of tax 
compliance. More than 300 pages of new tax legislation every year…”. 
“A lot of changes in relation to BEPS… 76 pages.” 
    
    
It should be noted that the reason why Table 6.5 does not include the response from Tax 
Practitioner 2 is that the question about drivers of tax compliance costs was inadvertently 
skipped by the researcher during the interview with Tax Practitioner 2. The researcher made 
an attempt to contact Tax Practitioner 2 by e-mail11  after the interview had taken place; 
however, Tax Practitioner 2 did not respond to the researcher’s request for clarification.   
From the answers provided by the other four tax practitioners, four factors can be identified as 
driving the cost of tax compliance in large enterprises: 
1. Complexity  
2. IR audits  
3. Penalties  
4. Frequently changing tax regulation  
 
The complexity factor mentioned by Tax Practitioner 1 was not elaborated upon during the 
interview. However, the fact that it was “… more in relation to advisory services” suggests that 
                                                     
11 Researcher’s email to Tax Practitioner 2 (4 November 2018).  
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Tax Practitioner 1 was probably referring to the complexity of advisory services. The 
complexity of advisory services provided to large enterprises may depend on factors such as: 
size of business operations, complexity of transactions and the existence of cross-border or 
overseas operations and business structuring.  Tax Practitioner 1 further mentioned that, in their 
opinion, the tax compliance activity itself (presumably that undertaken internally) is not a 
driving force behind the cost of tax compliance:  
In term of compliance, I think big factor here…ten years ago the compliance process 
and the steps that organisation would take to prepare income tax return, GST, payroll 
was all furnished somewhere, whereas today people are really looking at structure at 
how they beat the tax more instead of compliance functions.  
This answer may suggest that for large enterprises in New Zealand, the main determinants of 
tax compliance costs are probably not connected with tax compliance activities, but rather with 
endogenous factors such as the complexity of the business operations carried out by the large 
enterprise or business restructuring which large enterprise undertakes to “beat the tax”.12 
Moreover, according to Tax Practitioner 1, by installing automated processes to deal with tax 
compliance functions internally, large enterprises can “get systems that can help bring 
compliance costs down”. 
The other three factors (IR audits, penalties and frequently changing tax rules) mentioned by 
Tax Practitioners 3, 4 and 5 as driving forces behind the cost of tax compliance in large 
enterprises, are compatible with the perceived factors in Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam’s 
Australian study. 13  In relation to the frequently changing tax rules mentioned by Tax 
Practitioner 5, the new BEPS initiatives (as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis) may be one 
of the main factors contributing to the tax compliance costs of large enterprises. A number of 
transactions carried out by large enterprises may be caught by the recently adopted BEPS 
initiatives,14 thereby increasing the complexity of the tax treatment of these transactions and 
further contributing to the cost of tax advice related to this tax treatment.  Furthermore, Hoppe 
                                                     
12  It is most likely that by “to beat tax” Tax Practitioner 1 means adopting a legal tax strategy that allows large 
enterprises to minimise their tax payable. 
13 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6, at 786. 
14 See Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.1 of this thesis, for these factors.    
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and others,15 in their study on the drivers of tax complexity among multinational enterprises, 
found through a survey among 221 external tax practitioners from 108 countries (including 
New Zealand) that frequently changing tax regulation was the second most relevant complexity 
driver (excessively detailed tax regulation being the first) in the case of multinational 
enterprises. The BEPS developments are cited by Hoppe and others as one of the factors 
contributing to the frequency of changes in tax regulation.16 Therefore, the response provided 
by Tax Practitioner 5 on frequently changing tax rules being a tax compliance costs driver is 
in line with the findings in the literature.      
One of the factors that is likely to contribute to the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises 
in New Zealand is the existence of overseas operations or operating in foreign jurisdictions 
through a CFC. Blumenthal and Slemrod17 measured the effect of worldwide presence on the 
costs of tax compliance of the largest US corporations. It was found that there is a pronounced 
effect on the increase in the costs of tax compliance when large US corporations operated in 
foreign jurisdictions. Accordingly, in this current study, the tax practitioners were asked the 
following question in order to seek their opinions on the effect that overseas operations and the 
existence of CFCs have on the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises: 
“In your experience, do cost of tax compliance change significantly, if a large enterprise has 
overseas subsidiaries (CFC) or investments in foreign entities (CFC or FIF) or simply engages 
in cross-border transactions?”   
Table 6.6 below presents their responses to this question: 
  
                                                     
15 Thomas Hoppe and others “What Are the Drivers of Tax Complexity for Multinational Corporations? Evidence 
from 108 Countries” (WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2017-12, 2017). 
16 At 10. 
17  Marsha Blumenthal and Joel B Slemrod “The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign-Source Income: Its 




Table 6.6: Does the existence of CFCs or overseas transactions affect tax compliance 
costs in large enterprises?  
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“Yes, it does. Part of it would be that in-house team won’t have experience with 
the overseas jurisdiction and so for New Zealand tax, tax compliance cost is the 
time spent by the in-house team, while for overseas operation you have to rely 
more on advice. So if you look at the costs it does not necessarily increase the 
cost, it is just either internal costs or external costs. But there is complexity to 
determine whether CFC is active or passive…then there is cross-border transfer 
pricing requirements, thin capitalization issues. There are always additional things 
to do”.   
Tax  
Practitioner 2 
“Well yes, if we talk about cross border transactions we mean just selling overseas. 
They don’t have permanent establishment. Say for example New Zealand business 
is exporting to Australia and distributing through the third party, its independent 
distributor, there. They may have GST exposure in Australia in that situation but 
generally they don’t have income tax obligations there if they don’t have PE in 
Australia. As soon as you’ve got PE, say you are operating through a branch of New 
Zealand entity, or you are operating through a subsidiary – dependent distributor. 
Then all the sudden the door opens and the transfer pricing issues appear and people 
want to get an advice on how to minimise their global tax, what appropriate 
structures to have in place whatever mechanism that could be used like transfer 
pricing. Even so, even for private individual who may have foreign business the 
cost of doing income tax calculation may be significant, because unless he goes 
through financial advisor management system, he will need to spend a lot of money 
figuring out where his money is coming from.  
I have worked for one private individual who had 20 million investment in overseas 
portfolios and interests, and it might be 5 grands a year just to work out what his tax 
is because of all the calculation you need to make. Well it was just a private 
individual …imagine if we have a large enterprise that has CFC, FIF, whatever, that 
where it becomes complex…. and particularly how the imputation system 
works ….so the answer is yes”. 
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“Yes they do, CFC rules are very complex especially in the context of 
multinationals. Engaging in cross-border transactions may often require the 
knowledge about other jurisdiction as well as transfer pricing issues. All these 
aspects pose significant risks and require our review of tax return very often”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“There is no big difference between SME and large enterprises in this regard. The 
main driving factor of costs here is the uncertainty of interpretation of tax rules and 
disputes with the IR”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“They definitely do, but not necessarily from the perspectives of New Zealand 
taxation. Very often it can be tax laws of the other jurisdiction”. 
 
From the responses provided in Table 6.6, it is possible to conclude that the existence of a CFC 
or engaging in overseas operations, does indeed increase the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises. The costs of tax compliance increase due to increased complexity from the CFC 
regime as it requires complex calculations and knowledge of the CFC rules in order to 
determine whether a CFC is an active or passive CFC. According to the response from Tax 
142 
 
Practitioner 1, for tax matters relating to overseas jurisdictions, overseas transactions, CFCs, 
transfer pricing and thin capitalisation, large enterprises have to seek the assistance of external 
tax practitioners as their internal staff usually do not have the knowledge to deal with such 
complex situations:  
In-house team won’t have experience with the overseas jurisdiction and so for New 
Zealand tax, tax compliance cost is the time spent by the in-house team, while for 
overseas operation you have to rely more on advice. 
Therefore, if a large enterprise has a CFC or has to deal with other cross-border regimes, this 
will not necessarily increase the internal cost of tax compliance. However, it is likely to 
increase the external costs as a complex tax situation caused by the CFC or other cross-border 
regimes will require more work and special knowledge from tax practitioners.  
The existence of a CFC or foreign operations may also increase the costs of tax compliance as 
a large enterprise may seek the advice of tax practitioners on how to structure the group 
business in order to minimise the global tax that the large enterprise will face in New Zealand 
and in other jurisdictions. According to Tax Practitioner 2:  
…Then all the sudden the door opens and the transfer pricing issues appear and people 
want to get an advice on how to minimise their global tax, what appropriate structures 
to have in place whatever mechanism that could be used like transfer pricing. 
The response provided by Tax Practitioner 3 confirms the already mentioned fact of complexity 
which the CFC or transfer-pricing regimes bring in, and that dealing with these regimes 
requires specialist knowledge. Moreover, Tax Practitioner 3 mentions that the existence of a 
CFC or engaging in overseas transactions poses significant risks, and that tax returns prepared 
by large enterprises internally will often require these returns to be reviewed by external tax 
practitioners. Therefore, increased tax risks from having a CFC or engaging in cross-border 
operations may also be a driving force of the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises. 
Tax Practitioner 4 responded by saying that:  
The main driving factor of costs here is the uncertainty of interpretation of tax rules and 
disputes with the IR. 
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This implies that uncertainty of interpreting tax rules concerning the CFC regime and overseas 
transactions might result in disputes with the IR, thereby increasing the costs of tax compliance 
of large enterprises.  
Finally, Tax Practitioner 5, although agreeing that the existence of CFC and cross-border 
transactions drive the costs of tax compliance, replied by saying that: 
… not necessarily from the perspectives of New Zealand taxation. Very often it can be 
tax laws of the other jurisdiction. 
This implies that dealing with taxes of the jurisdiction where a CFC is located may increase 
cost of tax compliance for large enterprises from having a CFC or engaging in foreign 
operations.  
The four factors, mentioned by the tax practitioners, contributing to the cost of tax compliance 
in large enterprises in New Zealand, along with their comments on them, suggest that certain 
characteristics of large enterprises may contribute to higher compliance costs. For example, 
complexity as a factor in determining the costs of tax compliance is more likely to be caused 
by complex business transactions or business restructuring undertaken by large enterprises, as 
well as simply by the size of a large enterprise. The other two factors – ongoing IR audits or 
disputes – are more likely to be triggered by the tax position taken by a large enterprise, with 
which the IR may disagree. This disagreement is most likely to be caused by a complex tax 
situation resulting from either a complex business transaction or uncertainty in the 
interpretation of tax legislation. Finally, frequently changing tax legislation, (which was 
perceived by Tax Practitioner 5 as the factor driving the costs of tax compliance), may be to a 
large extent the result of the new BEPS initiatives which are primarily focused on large 
multinational enterprises.       
Engagement in business operations in foreign jurisdictions through a CFC or engagement in 
cross-border transactions also adds to costs of tax compliance of large enterprises based on the 
responses provided by the tax practitioners. An increase in the costs of tax compliance may 
occur due to the level of the complexity of foreign operations of a large enterprise, which can 
be expressed, for example, by the number of CFCs. The complex tax rules of CFCs, and of 
other cross border regimes contained in the ITA 2007, contributes to the increase in the costs 
of tax compliance. Although it is not possible to quantify the effect of each of the factors in 
this study, the previous literature can confirm the effect of the complexity of foreign operations 
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and the complex tax rules of CFCs on the costs of tax compliance. Blumenthal and Slemrod 
identify a number of characteristics relating to the complexity of foreign operations, including 
the value of foreign assets, number of foreign staff, foreign sales turnover and the number of 
majority owned foreign subsidiaries.18 Statistical analysis undertaken by the authors showed 
that only the number of majority owned foreign subsidiaries had an effect on costs of tax 
compliance of the largest US corporations. This implies that having more CFCs contributes to 
increased costs of tax compliance. The authors further investigated the effect of features of the 
US Internal Revenue Code on the tax compliance costs of US large enterprises and found that 
a large number or respondents mentioned disclosure of information about CFCs and transfer 
pricing as the most complex areas of the US tax code in relation to foreign income.  
 
6.3.3 Large Enterprises vs SMEs: Tax Compliance Activities and Composition of Tax 
Compliance Costs 
Based on the responses provided by the tax practitioners, this section provides some insights 
into the differences between SMEs and large enterprises in New Zealand in terms of how the 
tax compliance functions are carried out and the composition of tax compliance costs in these 
respective types of enterprises. The importance of looking into the differences in aspects of the 
tax compliance activities between SMEs and large enterprises lies in a fact that the tax 
compliance activities of SMEs in New Zealand have previously been studied and the costs 
measured. 19  However, little is known about how large enterprises carry out their tax 
compliance functions and the composition of their tax compliance costs. Moreover, gaining an 
insight into how the tax compliance activities of an organisation change when an organisation 
is growing will help to better understand the determinants and composition of tax compliance 
costs in large enterprises.  
This subsection consists of two subparts: the first subpart discusses differences between SMEs 
and large enterprises with respect to how tax compliance functions are carried out; the second 
subpart explores whether the composition of tax compliance costs in large enterprises is 
different from the composition of tax compliance costs in SMEs.  
                                                     
18 Blumenthal and Slemrod, above n 17.  
19 See Chapter 2, section 2.3 of this thesis, for a brief outline of the studies of the cost of tax compliance in SMEs.   
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6.3.3.1 Tax Compliance Functions:  Large Enterprises vs SMEs  
Since the preparation of tax returns (at least the income tax return) should be a common feature 
of both SMEs’ and large enterprises’ tax compliance functions, the tax practitioners were asked 
the following question in order to gain their views on the difference between SMEs and large 
enterprises in regard to how their tax compliance is organised: 
“In your experience, what is the main difference (if there is any) between preparation of tax 
return for SMEs and large enterprises?”      
The tax practitioners’ responses are provided in Table 6.7 below: 
 




“I think in some ways the preparation of tax return can be easier for large enterprises 
if they spend some money on technology to help the problem, to set up automated 
processes to help them have good systems and people in place. While for SME the 
process is more manual and relatively more time consuming “ 
 
Question: 
 So basically even if transactions of large enterprises are more complex transactions, 
still as you said, they may use technology and technology will help them to process 
it faster without spending too much time 
 
“Potentially. Large organisation may typically have complex transactions and set 
up in-house accounting of these transactions. Once you set up systems for 
processing it becomes pretty efficient to run. While for SME they may have 
complex transactions every now and then, after which they have to manually 
process it all….” 
 
Question: it is because they don’t have money to set up such systems? 
Answer:  “they won’t spend money on the technology and processing and will pay 
us to help. 
So if you measure cost of tax compliance based on the total amount of, say tax paid, 
large organisations will have a lower percentage than SMEs” 
 
Question: Why?  
Answer: “Because of  [economies of] scale” 
 
Question: Right, because of economies of scale… 
 
Answer:   “Because large enterprises are particularly different type of 
businesses … large corporates tend to have a wider range or higher frequency of 
transactions and because of that they may be forced to use technologies. While 






“The main difference probably will be the calibre and experience of the person who 
has done initial preparation of the tax material. It goes back to discussion where 
small and medium enterprises often may have this work done by the outside firm 
rather than themselves. They may have a person who has some accounting training 
to make initial preparations. While large businesses, may have up to 10-12 people 
working internally in accounting team. Those people are more likely to have 
knowledge and experience that will result in correct calculations being done 
internally and so external support will be mainly to review their tax return and 
provide some advice. While for small entities we probably will be doing 
calculations. Many small entities won’t be doing any calculations at all and for this 
we will have to compile all their accounting records or whatever their system is and 
prepare tax return from a scratch”.   
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“There is complexity of a large enterprise’s operations vs that of SME. Therefore 
there is much higher risk of mistake. Unlike SMEs large enterprises compliance 
involves dealing with more regimes: 
- CFC 
- FIF 
- Financial Arrangement 
- Transfer Pricing  
Sometimes it may be necessary for a large enterprises to meet with the IR tax 
manager to review the tax return”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“Level of tax compliance. Large enterprises are more likely to have more complex 
transactions, like financial arrangements. While for SMEs transactions between 
owners-shareholders and company are more typical”.    
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“SMEs are more likely to outsource everything to professional tax firms. Whereas 
large enterprises prepare tax returns internally using their own resources and after 
that ask professional tax advisors to review the return. Many more complex 
transactions, greater risk of mistakes”. 
 
From the responses provided, the following conclusions can be drawn about the difference in 
how tax compliance functions are undertaken by SMEs and large enterprises. The main 
difference is that, unlike the majority of SMEs, large enterprises have the resources for 
processing and preparing tax returns internally. Responses by Tax Practitioners 1, 2 and 5 
confirm that the bulk of tax compliance work such as processing financial information and 
preparing the tax return, is usually carried out internally by large enterprises. The response 
provided by Tax Practitioner 1 was the most illustrative of how and why large enterprises 
process tax returns internally:  
... they (large enterprise) spend some money on technology to help the problem, to set 




… large organisation may typically have complex transactions and set up in-house 
accounting of these transactions. Once you set up systems for processing it becomes 
pretty efficient to run.  
Therefore, large enterprises generally set up automated systems within their organisations and 
hire qualified staff to run these systems to prepare tax returns.  Quoting the response from Tax 
Practitioner 2: 
Large businesses, may have up to 10-12 people working internally in accounting team. 
Those people are more likely to have knowledge and experience that will result in 
correct calculations being done internally. 
Unlike large enterprises, SMEs do not have the resources to do tax returns internally and 
therefore are more likely to outsource their tax compliance functions to external firms. 
According to Tax Practitioner 2: 
…for small entities we probably will be doing calculations. Many small entities won’t 
be doing any calculations at all and for this we will have to compile all their accounting 
records or whatever their system is and prepare tax return from a scratch.  
Tax Practitioner 3 stated: 
 …  SMEs are more likely to outsource everything to professional tax firm. 
The much greater scale and complexity of operations carried out by large enterprises explains 
why they are more likely to set up automated systems and process tax records in-house. As Tax 
Practitioner 1 explained further:  
Large enterprises are particularly different type of businesses … large corporates tend 
to have a wider range or higher frequency of transactions and because of that they may 
be forced to use technologies. While SMEs may have one or two tax adjustments, large 
organisation will have many more.  
Therefore, by setting up automated systems in-house in the first instance, large enterprises can 
reduce their costs of tax compliance due to economies of scale. This was confirmed in the 
response from Tax Practitioner 1:  
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… So if you measure cost of tax compliance based on the total amount of, say tax paid, 
large organisations will have a lower percentage than SMEs … Because of [economies 
of] scale.  
Furthermore, as large enterprises generally have more complex transactions, such as CFCs, 
FIFs, financial arrangements, transfer pricing (as mentioned by Tax Practitioner 3), they require 
more tax review and advisory services since the risk of mistakes is higher due to the complexity 
of transactions. Quoting tax practitioner 5: 
…Many more complex transactions, greater risk of mistakes. 
On the other hand, SMEs typically have more transactions with their owners (according to Tax 
Practitioner 4), and therefore, the level of complexity is lower.  
As large enterprises have greater internal resources and carry out large scale operations, 
undertaking most of the work relating to calculations and preparation of tax returns internally 
seems to be a rational way for large enterprises to organise their tax compliance functions. 
However, the complexity of transactions and therefore heightened risk of mistakes require 
external tax practitioners to review the tax returns and provide advice regarding the tax 
positions taken in the return. On the contrary, according to tax practitioners interviewed, SMEs 
are more likely to outsource tax return preparation to external tax practitioners. This constitutes 
the main difference between large enterprises and SMEs in New Zealand concerning the 
organisation of their tax compliance activities. 
The IR’s “Better for customers: SMEs’ compliance costs in 2016” report indicates that the 
median annual external cost of New Zealand SMEs was approximately 63% of their median 
annual in-house cost of tax compliance,20 implying that SMEs do not outsource all of their tax 
compliance activities to external professionals. However, the report indicates that the majority 
of SMEs undertake the preparation of GST and PAYE returns in-house, while the preparation 
of income tax return is outsourced to external tax practitioners.21 Thus, the findings from the 
IR’s report appear to confirm the responses from the tax practitioners in relation to New 
Zealand SMEs being more likely to outsource the preparation of their income tax returns. 
Moreover, findings from the literature (outlined in Chapter 2, subsection 2.5.1 of this thesis) 
                                                     
20 IR “Better for customers: SMEs’ compliance costs in 2016” (Full report, November 2016) at 8.  
21 IR, above n 20, at 14.  
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provide evidence that large enterprises are more efficient than SMEs in record keeping and tax 
computational activities. Therefore, large enterprises generally undertake these functions in-
house. This again validates the feedback provided by the tax practitioners on how tax 
compliance activities are carried out by large enterprises in New Zealand. 
Furthermore, in the case of large enterprises the pattern of separation of tax compliance 
activities between internal staff and external tax practitioners appears to be in line with the 
study by Eichfelder and Schorn22  (outlined in Chapter 5, subsection 5.3.3 of this thesis). 
Eichfelder and Schorn,23 using the profit optimisation model, found the strategy for the most 
cost-efficient tax compliance administration: undertaking part of tax compliance activities in-
house (usually basic tax compliance activities such as record keeping, tax computation and 
lodgement of tax returns) and outsourcing more complex activities to external tax practitioners. 
The fact that large enterprises in New Zealand generally separate their tax compliance activities 
in this way suggests that New Zealand large enterprises are likely to be cost efficient in dealing 
with their tax compliance obligations.  
 
6.3.3.2 Composition of Tax Compliance Costs: Large Enterprises vs SMEs  
It has been noted in the studies conducted by Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam24 and Slemrod and 
Verkatesh,25 that in contrast to SMEs, large enterprises have a greater propensity to rely more 
heavily on lawyers and tax advisers for external services.  Moreover, expenditures of large 
enterprises on external legal services in relation to audit, litigation and tax appeals, and services 
on tax planning and tax advice are quite substantial. Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam26 estimated 
that almost 23% of the external cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in Australia related 
to audit and litigation, while expenditures on professional advice relating to tax planning was 
24.4%. Slemrod and Blumenthal found that expenditures of the largest corporations in the US 
on external services relating to audit, appeals and litigation were almost 22% of the total 
                                                     
22 Sebastian Eichfelder and Michael Schorn “Tax Compliance Costs: A Business Administration Perspective” 
(2012) 68 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 191. 
23 Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 22. 
24 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6, at 776.  
25 Joel Slemrod and Varsha Venkatesh “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Large and Mid-Size Businesses” 
(Ross School of Business Working Paper No. 914, University of Michigan, 2002) at 23.  
26 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6, at 779. 
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external costs of tax compliance, while expenditures on tax planning accounted for 12% of the 
total external costs.27 Susila and Pope estimated that large enterprises in Indonesia spent 48% 
of their total expenditures on services by external tax practitioners on audit, litigation and tax 
appeals.28  
The fact that legal and tax planning services make up a substantial part of large enterprises total 
external costs of tax compliance suggests that the composition of tax compliance costs, at least 
the external costs in large enterprises, is different from the composition of tax compliance costs 
in SMEs. As mentioned above, in general large enterprises are likely to require more external 
services from lawyers and tax advisers, rather than accounting services as in the case of SMEs. 
In order to test the validity of this assumption for large enterprises in New Zealand, tax 
practitioners were first asked if, in their opinion or experience, large enterprises were more 
frequently involved in disputes with the IR and, second, whether large enterprises required 
more tax planning/tax advice services compared to SMEs.   
The responses provided by the tax practitioners to the first question are presented in Table 6.8 
below: 
  
                                                     
27 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 5, at 423. 
28 Budi Susila and Jeff Pope “The Tax Compliance Costs of Large Corporate Taxpayer in Indonesia” (2012) 27 
Australian Tax Forum 719 at 730.  
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“I think it come back to earlier we were talking about how the IR assesses the risk. 
And the IR actually establishes relationship with large taxpayers, which means the 
IR is keeping on the top of taxes that coming out of these large taxpayers and ask 
account-managers to advise them if there going to be any changes in provisional 
tax payments or any significant decrease in the amount of tax payment. If you are 
a large taxpayer the government expect you to have a turnover of 20 million dollars, 
so if your large organisation doesn’t come up with this turnover .. ”.   
Tax  
Practitioner 2 
“I don’t think so, I mean I don’t think it is more than the other. In some way it may 
be potentially so, because of the information request that the IR requires from large 
enterprises …they have to file annual questionnaire …that is actually interesting 
because from my experience of being a tax adviser for 25 years the number of audits 
initiated by the IR that I have seen is actually quite small…in respect to clients I 
have been looking after ….” 
Question: Do you mean small or large enterprises? 
Answer:  In all.  
Question: But perhaps right now with new BEPS initiatives the IR might try to 
chase large enterprises more actively especially multinationals… 
Answer: “Yes exactly, but it won’t be based on size, it will be based on the 
multinational exposure that probably won’t be differentiated…”. 
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“Yes they do. Tax manager (within the IR large enterprises unit) may have 
relationship/interactions with a large enterprise’s tax account manager”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“They may and may not, from my experience the area where large enterprises might 
potentially get involved in a dispute with the IR is transfer pricing and tax positions 
that large enterprises chose in regard to particular transaction”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
“60 organisations have tax account managers to deal with the IR. Often the IR may 
issue binding ruling. Many large enterprises have to submit compliance package. 
Overall large enterprises are involved in disputes more often than SMEs”. 
 
The responses given by all five tax practitioners interviewed suggest that large enterprises are 
potentially more likely to get involved in disputes with, or be audited by, the IR. However, as 
the experience of Tax Practitioners 1, 2 and 4 illustrates, in practice not so many large 
enterprises in New Zealand have disputes with, or are audited by, the IR. IR tax managers and 
large enterprises’ tax account managers have frequent interactions to ensure that large 
enterprises pay their taxes. Furthermore, those large enterprises included in the category of 
“significant enterprises” must submit a BCP every year.29 Moreover, the IR can issue binding 
                                                     
29 IR “Multinational Enterprises – compliance focus” (2016) at 4.  
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rulings in respect of particular transactions. 30  Perhaps these measures help to reduce the 
number of potential disputes between large enterprises and the IR. Nevertheless, Tax 
Practitioners 3 and 5 agreed that, overall, large enterprises are involved in disputes with the IR 
more often than SMEs: 
Yes they do. Tax manager (within the IR large enterprises unit) may have 
relationship/interactions with a large enterprise’s tax account manager.   
They may and may not, from my experience the area where large enterprises might 
potentially get involved in a dispute with the IR is transfer pricing and tax policies that 
large enterprises chose in regard to particular transaction. 
According to Tax Practitioner 4, potential areas where disagreement between the IR and large 
enterprises might arise are transfer pricing and tax positions chosen by large enterprise in 
regard to particular transactions.  
Overall, on the basis of the responses provided by the tax practitioners in Table 6.8, it is difficult 
to say if large enterprises are involved in disputes with the IR more often than SMEs. In this 
regard, conducting interviews with tax managers and CFOs of large enterprises as well as 
undertaking a survey amongst large enterprises in New Zealand may shed more light on the 
number of ongoing disputes and litigations that large enterprises have with the IR. Moreover, 
undertaking a survey may allow the amount of expenditures incurred by large enterprises on 
external legal services in relation to these disputes and litigations to be quantified.    
Table 6.9 below presents the tax practitioners’ responses to the second question: whether large 
enterprises require more tax planning services than SMEs.  
  
                                                     
30 Tax Administration Act 1994, ss 91D and 91E. 
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Table 6.9: Do large enterprises require more tax planning/ tax advisory services?  
Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“So what triggers the need for tax advice, if you do more transactions or unusual 
complex transactions, which is probably more likely to happen with large 
enterprises, so that why they call us for tax advice 
 
Question: So in your experience SMEs in New Zealand …their business is focused 
on domestic operations and not so many SMEs doing cross-border transactions 
 
Answer: “There are some, it depends on what sort of the sector you are looking at 
for example start-ups, technologies. They often do it quickly to access markets and 
obtain capital. Some are trying to raise capital in US, because people there may 
invest better in a new business than in New Zealand. So it depends on the sector, 
but if you are really generalising most of large enterprises are more likely to have 




“I think it is not necessarily so. As there are small entities doing business on 
particularly complex base and so you may have this family owned business with 
turnover 2-3 million dollars and they are exploring perhaps going to Australian 
market and they would need advice on structuring it. The same principle applies to 
large organisations, where large organisations will have more opportunities for tax 
planning, more risks and more exposure to the overseas business transactions, they 
are more likely to have employees going offshore or they may be seconding 
employees from overseas to this area and they might require advice around them. 
In respect to the size, yes, large organisation is more likely to need more advice, but 
at the same time small organisation may still need an advice and unlike large 
organisation where you can get advice from CFO or accounting employee who 
understands tax concepts and tax rules, small organisations usually seek advice from 
external adviser”. 
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 
“Yes. Main reason is complexity of large enterprises’ operations” 
Tax  
Practitioner 4 
“Large enterprises do require more tax planning and advisory services as they very 
often have cross-border transactions, more complex structure. This leads to transfer-
pricing issues, which is itself a very complicated thing”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 5 
Large enterprises is more likely to require tax planning/tax advice. This is often 
related to buying businesses, investing offshore, having cross-border transactions. 
Or concluding large contracts. So large enterprises might need us to review the 
contract and find possible issues that might trigger tax (like grey areas of taxation, 
regarding deductibility)”. 
 
Based on the responses provided above it is possible to conclude that large enterprises indeed 
require more tax planning and advisory services than SMEs. All five tax practitioners agreed 
that it is so. Although Tax Practitioner 2, speaking from their professional experience, pointed 
out that SMEs may also require tax advisory services in respect of complicated tax situations. 
However, taking into account the factors of size, the complexity of transactions which may 
trigger various tax regimes such as transfer-pricing and thin capitalisation, and the desire of 
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large enterprises to choose tax minimising business structure, it would appear that large 
enterprises in comparison to SMEs will in general rely more on external tax planning and tax 
advisory services. Moreover, Eichfelder and Vaillancourt31 argue that the larger the size of an 
enterprise, the more likely the enterprise is to resort to tax planning services.   
While the tax practitioners’ responses to the question on the frequency of disputes and litigation 
with the IR provided mixed results, their responses to the question whether large enterprises 
require more tax planning services seem to confirm that this is the case. This may be an 
indication that large enterprises in New Zealand have a different composition of the cost of tax 
compliance (at least the external costs) in which costs associated with services provided by 
legal and tax advisers make up substantially large share in the total costs. However, as 
mentioned earlier, further research using a survey may be helpful in establishing whether the 
composition of tax compliance cost of large enterprises in New Zealand does indeed differ 
from the composition in SMEs.  
 
6.3.4 Is Tax Planning Considered to be a Tax Compliance Activity? 
As noted by Evans, the costs of tax compliance can be divided into unavoidable costs of tax 
compliance (costs related to computations) and avoidable or voluntary costs (tax planning).32  
Many tax lawyers and policy-makers consider unavoidable costs as the only costs that should 
be included in computation of total costs of tax compliance.33 However, in studies conducted 
by Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam,34 and Slemrod and Blumenthal,35 the costs of tax planning, 
despite being considered as a voluntary cost of tax compliance, were nevertheless included in 
total costs of tax compliance of large enterprises. 
                                                     
31 Sebastian Eichfelder and Francois Vaillancourt “Tax Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost 
Structures” (Arqus Discussion Paper No. 178, 2014) at 23. 
32 Chris Evans “Taxation Compliance and Administrative Costs: An Overview” in Michael Lang and others (eds) 
Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an Enlarged European Community (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007), at 452.    
33 At 452. 
34 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6. 
35 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 5.   
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Recognising the importance of the ongoing debate in the literature and amongst tax lawyers 
concerning the validity of including tax planning as a part of the tax compliance activities of 
large enterprises, the tax practitioners were asked for their opinions on this contentious aspect. 
Their answers are provided below in Table 6.10: 
Table 6.10: Should tax planning be considered a part of tax compliance in large 
enterprises?    
  Tax  
Practitioner 1 
“Tax planning may be associated with a business requirements, like entering new 
markets or some other kind of unusual business transactions. So when we give 
advice we suggest that what is the best way to do it… so that planning is not in 
traditional sense is tax planning . So that sort of stuff and I think it is voluntary, the 
way I look at it is business as usual. So you have tax costs…tax compliance costs 
which are related to business as usual and are the cost of internal staff … and 
external costs how much support you get from external advisers.  Then there is a 
governance costs, in terms of how much costs the senior members of organisation, 
the board view their time...And then there are cost of technologies and planning 
certain transactions, which are voluntary. So the way I look at all these costs they 
are business as usual. There are also exceptional costs, like the cost of the IR 
investigation and they are also a part of compliance just a separate one. I would see 
tax planning as separate to compulsory compliance and I would see it as voluntary. 
I see it as a result of a new type of transaction or a new tax rule. You can’t just close 
your eyes to the tax implications of a transaction. This days it would be very rare 
to do some restructuring without underlying causes for this restructuring, like a 
change in the environment. So you may again say it was voluntary, but because 
there was a change in circumstances and environment, there was a change in 
organisation and a business …”. 
Tax  
Practitioner 2 
“Oh yes absolutely. I think planning is just “forewarned pre armed” thinking about 
the future organisation should plan ahead, especially when the IR has been 
successful in a number of cases on tax avoidance. In terms of planning, when you 
start talking about how to structure your business to minimise tax, people say: oh it 
is tax avoidance. So there is a lot of misconception about tax planning going 
around…” 
Question: Anyway it should be …it should be considered a part of tax compliance  
Answer: “Absolutely… even the simplest form of planning is thinking of what tax 
payments should be made in terms of minimising exposure to money interest ... as 
for large enterprises they should be thinking of what particular transactions might 
need to be taken care of in terms of taxes…”.   
Tax 
 Practitioner 3 




“Yes tax planning is related to consideration of tax consequences of large 








From the responses provided by the tax practitioners it appears that all five agreed that tax 
planning should be included in the overall tax compliance activities of large enterprises. 
However, the response from Tax Practitioner 1 was slightly ambiguous. From their response it 
may be concluded that, although tax planning is voluntary, it is nevertheless necessary when a 
large enterprise considers the tax implications of a new transaction or business restructuring. 
Thus, quoting Tax Practitioner 1: 
… I would see it as voluntary. I see it as a result of a new type of transaction or a new 
tax rule. You can’t just close your eyes to the tax implications of a transaction. 
The tax implications of a new transaction or business restructuring are the main reasons why 
large enterprises resort to tax planning, and therefore, the cost of tax planning result from the 
necessity for large enterprise to consider these tax implications.  The response provided by Tax 
Practitioner 4 indicated that tax planning: 
 [is] related to consideration of tax consequences of large enterprises’ activity like sale 
of assets, major transactions, cross-border transactions. 
Tax Practitioner 5 additionally stated: 
 [tax planning] is inseparable part of large enterprises’ business transactions. 
These responses confirm that the tax practitioners interviewed in this study, consider tax 
planning as a part of the overall tax compliance activity of large enterprises.   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the results of the interviews with five tax practitioners and an IR official were 
presented and analysed. As noted in the introduction to this chapter (see section 6.1), the 
purpose of the interviews conducted was to ascertain which enterprises are considered large in 
New Zealand, the magnitude and composition of the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises in New Zealand, the determinants of the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises, 
and how tax compliance in SMEs differs from tax compliance in large enterprises.   
While it was expected that more accurate and informative responses would be provided by the 
tax practitioners interviewed, the responses received, nevertheless, provided sufficient 
information for the analysis and for conclusions to be drawn. The findings from the interviews 
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provided helpful insights into the area of the cost of tax compliance in large enterprises, albeit 
they signified that in order to obtain a fuller picture of the costs of tax compliance, a larger 
survey involving large enterprises is required. Conducting interviews with tax practitioners 
only is the main limitation of the study. 
The main findings from the interviews and limitations of the interviews are elaborated on below. 
The first outcome from the interviews is that there is no universal understanding amongst tax 
practitioners concerning which enterprises are large in New Zealand. Each tax practitioner 
provided their own definition of a large enterprise, which was based either on their own concept 
of what criteria to use (turnover, number of employees or taxable profit), or on thresholds 
established by the FRA 2013 or the IR. As Tax Practitioner 2 remarked “it is in the eye of a 
beholder”, implying that the definition of a large enterprise depends to a great extent on who 
this question is asked to. The interview with the IR official helped to clarify the definitions the 
IR currently applies to classify large enterprises. In any future empirical studies of the cost of 
tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, the definition of large enterprises (and 
accordingly the population of large enterprises) may need to be considered in the context of 
“significant enterprises”. 
The second outcome of the interviews is that services in relation to income tax constitute the 
largest part of the services provided by external tax practitioners to large enterprises.  
According to the tax practitioners interviewed, this is the most time-consuming tax due to 
existence of various regimes associated with it. The complexity and extent of large enterprises’ 
business operations often trigger the application of these regimes, thereby increasing tax 
practitioners’ time on dealing with large enterprises’ income tax. A high percentage of 
expenses on income tax-related services out of total external expenses was also reported in 
studies by Slemrod and Blumenthal, 36  and Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, 37  for US and 
Australian large corporations. Although we cannot determine in this study the percentage of 
tax compliance costs that New Zealand large enterprises spend on their income tax-related 
external services, the responses from the tax practitioners suggest that it is possible that New 
Zealand large enterprises may have a composition of external costs of tax compliance that is 
comparable to US and Australian large enterprises.     
                                                     
36 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 5.  
37 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6.  
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Due to the broad responses provided by the tax practitioners about the fee they charge large 
enterprises for various tax services, it was not possible to form a conclusion on the magnitude 
of the external cost of tax compliance in large enterprises in New Zealand. According to the 
responses from the tax practitioners, a large enterprise in New Zealand might be charged in the 
range of NZ$ 2,000–NZ$ 20,000 for a review of its tax return.  
The third outcome of the interviews is that the main determinants of the costs of tax compliance 
in large enterprises, as identified by the tax practitioners, are complexity of transactions, IR 
audits and disputes, and frequently changing tax regulations. Based on the responses from the 
tax practitioners it is possible to conclude that size and the nature of business operations carried 
out by large enterprises contributes to an increase in the complexity of tax situations, thereby 
driving up the cost of external services. Often large enterprises initiate business restructuring, 
triggered by a changing economic environment, which in turn leads to a complex tax situation 
and increased cost of tax compliance. The existence of a CFC and engagement in cross-border 
operations are also factors which influence tax compliance costs. An increase in the costs here 
occurs due to the characteristics of the foreign operations of a large enterprise. These may, to 
a large extent, affect complexity, as well as complex tax rules related to CFC and cross–border 
regimes. Blumenthal and Slemrod 38 also found that the number of CFCs, and complex rules 
in the US Internal Revenue Code related to CFCs, were some of the main factors driving the 
costs of tax compliance in large US corporations.   
The fourth outcome of the interviews is that, based on the tax practitioners’ responses, SMEs 
and large enterprises in general organise their tax compliance functions in different ways.  
Large enterprises usually have internal resources and automated systems to process the 
information required for filing tax returns and making necessary calculations. External tax 
practitioners mainly review tax returns given that the risks of taking a wrong tax position are 
very high for large enterprises. By the way of contrast, SMEs are more likely to outsource tax 
preparation and filing functions to external tax practitioners as they do not have sufficiently 
qualified employees to perform these roles. The findings in the IR’s 2016 report39 on the costs 
                                                     
38 Blumenthal and Slemrod, above n 17.  
39 IR, above n 20. 
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of tax compliance in SMEs in New Zealand partly40 confirm the tax practitioners’ responses 
with respect to SMEs outsourcing the preparation of their tax return to external tax practitioners.  
Another difference between SMEs and large enterprises pertains to the composition of external 
costs of tax compliance. Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam41 mention that large enterprises rely 
more heavily on the services of lawyers and tax advisers, rather than accounting services (as is 
the case with SMEs). The responses from the tax practitioners were not conclusive as to 
whether large enterprises get involved in legal disputes with the IR more often than SMEs and 
therefore require more legal services. However, their responses confirmed that in regard to tax 
planning services there is a possibility of the composition of the external costs of tax 
compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand being different from SMEs in that large 
enterprises require more tax planning services from external tax practitioners than SMEs. 
Finally, all five tax practitioners agreed that tax planning should be considered as a part of the 
tax compliance activities of large enterprises. Considering that large enterprises are more 
efficient than SMEs in dealing with record keeping, calculations and preparation of tax returns, 
it is reasonable to assume that basic tax compliance is of less relevance to large enterprises. 
Consequently, it is also reasonable to assume that large enterprises have a better control than 
SMEs over their internal cost of tax compliance. The contribution of external costs to the total 
tax compliance costs of large enterprises should be quite significant since large enterprises 
frequently engage in complex transactions and require more tax planning services. In this 
regard, it is also possible to assume that external costs of tax compliance are of a greater 
relevance to large enterprises (than internal costs).       
Although the interviews have provided useful insights about various aspects of the costs of tax 
compliance in large enterprises, it is still not possible to make inferences about the magnitude 
and composition of tax compliance costs of large enterprises based on the responses received 
from the five tax practitioners. In addition, little inference can be made about differences in the 
tax compliance function and the composition of the costs of tax compliance between SMEs 
and large enterprises from this study. Overall, further investigation is required in order to 
ascertain the magnitude, composition and factors driving the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises. As suggested earlier in this chapter, interviews with tax managers and CFOs of 
                                                     
40 These findings confirm the tax practitioners’ responses partly because SMEs are more likely to outsource the 
preparation of their income tax returns while retaining preparation of GST and PAYE returns in-house.  
41 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 6, at 776. 
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large enterprises could assist in ascertaining whether internals costs of tax compliance are of 
less relevance to large enterprises and gaining a fuller picture of the composition of the tax 
compliance costs of large enterprises. Furthermore, an empirical study would be helpful in 
estimating the magnitude and percentage breakdown of the costs of tax compliance. Data for 
such an empirical study could be collected through a large-scale survey conducted amongst 
large enterprises in New Zealand. This would require establishing criteria to define a large 
enterprise so that a representative sample can be drawn from the population of large enterprises 
in New Zealand.  These are the tasks for future research. 
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Chapter 7:   Conclusion   
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the study along with a summary of the research findings. 
In addition, this chapter outlines the limitations, policy implications and areas for future 
research as well as sets out concluding comments. Accordingly, the structure of the remainder 
of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 presents an overview of the thesis, followed by section 
7.3 which provides a summary of the major findings from this research. Section 7.4 outlines 
the contribution made by this research, while section 7.5 sets out main limitations of the 
research. The policy implications and recommendations for future research are provided in 
section 7.6. Finally, Section 7.7 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
7.2 Thesis Overview  
The costs of tax compliance are considered in the literature as an extra burden on taxpayers. 
Due to the regressive nature of the cost of tax compliance the focus of the academic literature 
has been predominately on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). While the role that large 
enterprises play in national and global economies is significant,1 very few studies have been 
conducted to date on the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises. Available studies include 
empirical works focused on large enterprises in countries such as the United States (US), 
Canada, Australia, Indonesia and Hong Kong.2 Notwithstanding these studies little is known 
about the magnitude, composition and factors affecting the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand. In addition, there is no common definition of a large enterprise in 
                                                     
1 George Serafeim “The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future 
Research” (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 14-110, 2014).  
2 See John Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business” (1996) 24 
Public Finance Quarterly 411; Brian Erard “The Income Tax Compliance Burden on Canadian Big Business” 
(Working Paper 97-2 prepared for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1997); Chris Evans, Philip 
Lignier and Binh Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Costs of Large corporations: An Empirical Inquiry and 
Comparative Analysis” (2016) 64 Canadian Tax Journal 751; Budi Susila and Jeff Pope “The Tax Compliance 
Costs of Large Corporate Taxpayer in Indonesia” (2012) 27 Australian Tax Forum 719; Samuel Chan and others 





the literature and consequently, the concept of large enterprises still remains unclear. Therefore, 
the purpose of this study has been to provide an explorative analysis of the costs of tax 
compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand and to examine the various criteria which can 
be used in order to establish a common definition of a large enterprise in New Zealand.  
Accordingly, a qualitative analysis using six semi-structured interviews with tax practitioners 
and an Inland Revenue (IR) official in New Zealand have been undertaken in order to ascertain 
the magnitude, composition and drivers of the tax compliance costs of large enterprises in New 
Zealand. In addition, the opinions of the tax practitioners as well as the IR’s position on which 
entities are considered large in New Zealand was sought in these interviews. The interview 
findings enabled inferences to be made regarding the composition and factors driving the costs 
of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. Furthermore, the interview findings 
provided insights into developing a common definition of large enterprises in New Zealand.  
 
7.3 Summary of Findings      
This section presents a summary of the main findings on the research questions, as set out in 
Chapter 1, section 1.3 of this thesis. 
 
7.3.1   Research Question 1  
RQ1: How can we define a “large enterprise” in New Zealand, if we want to study and measure 
its tax compliance costs? 
Prior to conducting the interviews, the analysis outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis was 
undertaken in order to clarify how large enterprises, particularly in New Zealand, can be 
defined and explore whether it was possible to arrive at a common definition for New Zealand. 
The analysis indicated that generally the size of an enterprise can be determined using two 
types of criteria: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative criteria are more convenient as they 
operate with values such as turnover, number of employees or value of assets, and are easy to 
understand, identify and measure. Therefore, quantitative criteria have been predominately 
used in prior studies measuring the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises. Various 
quantitative criteria have been established by different stakeholders. In New Zealand these 
stakeholders include the Inland Revenue (IR), the Ministry of Business, Employment and 
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Economic Development (MBIE) and the Financial Reporting Act 2013 (FRA 2013). The 
differing numerical thresholds used to define large enterprises by these stakeholders creates 
uncertainty as to what criteria and threshold to choose. The size of the population of large 
enterprises in New Zealand will accordingly depend on this choice.     
In comparison, qualitative criteria reflect the intrinsic features of a large enterprise, which not 
only pertain to an enterprise of a larger size, but also signify that the enterprise is not an SME. 
Three qualitative criteria: organisational structure, capital structure and geographical span of 
business operations, were considered in Chapter 3. Although a strong correlation between the 
size of an enterprise and all three characteristics has been established in the literature, applying 
qualitative criteria alone may not always be helpful in separating large enterprises from SMEs. 
In this regard, as indicated by the analysis, a combination of quantitative criteria, for example, 
turnover, and one or more of the three of the qualitative criteria, could help to establish the 
lowest threshold above which certain enterprises in New Zealand would be considered to be 
large.  
The responses provided by the tax practitioners revealed that there was no universal 
understanding amongst them concerning which enterprises in New Zealand are considered to 
be large. As one of the tax practitioners interviewed remarked, the definition of a large 
enterprise largely depends on who is answering the question. Although, in general, the tax 
practitioners interviewed preferred to rely on quantitative criteria to define a large enterprise, 
one of the tax practitioners defined large enterprises in terms of a qualitative criterion.3 This 
shows that the application of both quantitative and qualitative criteria is possible for arriving 
at the definition of a large enterprise in New Zealand.  
The interview with the IR official provided useful insights into the relevant criteria and 
thresholds which the IR currently applies to classify large enterprises. The finding from the 
interview revealed that the IR no longer officially applies the term “large enterprise” for tax 
compliance purposes. Rather it uses the definition of a “significant enterprise” for monitoring 
the tax compliance of this class of enterprises. Significant enterprises, which are included in 
the upper threshold (NZ$80 million annual Goods and Services Tax (GST) turnover) were 
referred to by the IR official during the interview as “large enterprises”, despite the absence of 
                                                     
3 The qualitative criterion was having a tax manager in an organisation. See chapter 6, subsection 6.3.1.1, Table 
6.2 of this thesis.    
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such concept. This suggests that the current criteria and threshold, which apply to significant 
enterprises, may serve as a basis for the future empirical studies of the costs of tax compliance 
of large enterprises in New Zealand. 
In summary, the explorative analysis, and the feedback from the tax practitioners and the IR 
official, showed that in order to determine which enterprises are considered large in New 
Zealand for measuring the costs of tax compliance, the use of both quantitative criteria4 (with 
thresholds provided by the IR),5 and qualitative criteria, can assist in defining a population of 
large enterprises in New Zealand. 
  
7.3.2   Research Question 2 
RQ2: What are the magnitude, composition and drivers of tax compliance costs in large 
enterprises in New Zealand?  
The broad responses provided by the tax practitioners interviewed in relation to the fee that 
their firms would charge large enterprises for the tax related services prevented a conclusion 
to be formed about the magnitude of the external costs of tax compliance of large enterprises 
in New Zealand. Moreover, the fee indication provided by the tax practitioners mainly related 
to a review of internally prepared tax returns, and as such could be in the range of NZ$2,000–
NZ$20,000, depending on complexity. One of the participants replied that the fee charged to a 
large enterprise for tax-related services could be as high as NZ$750 (and possibly above) per 
hour. While the magnitude of the costs of tax compliance borne by large enterprises in New 
Zealand cannot be estimated based on the interview responses alone, the range of provided fees 
may at least suggest that the external costs of tax compliance of large enterprises could be 
sizable.      
As in the case with the magnitude of the costs of tax compliance, it was difficult to determine 
the composition of the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises based on the interviews 
conducted with the external tax practitioners alone. The interview results indicated that the 
services provided by the external tax practitioners to large enterprises include the review or 
                                                     
4 Business turnover can be the most helpful criterion for comparing the size of enterprises. See Tom Gibson and 
HJ van der Vaart “Defining SMEs: a less Imperfect Way of Defining Small and Medium Enterprises in 
Developing Countries” (Brookings Global Economy and Development, 2008) at 14.   
5 Thresholds used to classify “significant enterprise”. See Chapter 6, subsection 6.3.1.2 of this thesis. 
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preparation of tax returns, tax advisory, tax planning, installation of specialised tax software 
and responding to IR requests for information.  
The main finding from this part of the interviews is that among the services provided by the 
tax practitioners, income tax related services are the most often required by large enterprises. 
Moreover, providing income tax services to large enterprises took up most of the tax 
practitioners’ time when they provided services to large enterprises. Given the importance of 
income tax-related external services to large enterprises and that it was regarded by the tax 
practitioners as the most time-consuming type of tax service, it is reasonable to assume that 
expenses on external services related to income tax is the largest category of expenses that 
large enterprises in New Zealand spend on services provided by external tax practitioners. This 
finding is consistent with two previous studies conducted on large enterprises in the US6 and 
Australia7. In both of these studies, expenses on income tax-related services were found to be 
the largest among total external tax compliance expenses. Although the external expenses of 
large enterprises in New Zealand cannot be quantified in this study, the responses provided by 
the tax practitioners in this regard suggest that it is possible that the composition of the external 
cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand may be comparable to the 
composition of external costs of large enterprises in the US and Australia. 
In regard to the drivers of the costs of tax compliance, the following conclusion can be made 
based on the interview findings. The first driver is the complexity of large enterprises’ business 
operations which stems from the size and nature of operations, and also from the fact that large 
enterprises are more likely to undertake business restructuring. As one of the tax practitioners 
remarked, basic tax compliance activity is no longer a driving factor behind the costs of tax 
compliance for large enterprises, but rather it is the economic environment in which large 
enterprises operate. Complex economic transactions initiated by large enterprises in turn 
increase the complexity of advisory services provided by external tax practitioners, which 
ultimately impacts on the price of these services. The second and the third drivers identified by 
the tax practitioners interviewed are IR audits and penalties. These two drivers might be caused 
by either the tax position taken by large enterprises in a complex tax situation or by the 
uncertainty involved in the interpretation of tax legislation. The fourth driver is the frequently 
                                                     
6 Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 2. 
7 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 2.  
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changing tax legislation. Specifically, the new Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) 
initiatives which affect tax compliance of multinational enterprises (particularly large 
multinational enterprises) are one of the factors contributing to the costs of tax compliance in 
large enterprises. Many complex transactions, especially cross-border transactions, carried out 
by large enterprises trigger various tax regimes in New Zealand, such as thin capitalisation 
rules, transfer-pricing and permanent establishment (PE) rules (which are now more 
extensively covered by the new BEPS rules).8 The tax practitioners’ perceptions of frequently 
changing tax legislation being a driver of the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises in 
New Zealand is substantiated by findings in the literature. Frequently changing tax legislation 
was found to be one of the main factors contributing to tax complexity in multinational 
enterprises in a study conducted by Hoppe and others.9 Moreover, the study also found that 
frequently changing tax legislation occurs mainly through the BEPS rules.10   
The interview results further indicated that engaging in cross-border transactions through a 
controlled foreign company (CFC) also contributes to the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises. The responses received from the tax practitioners showed that the increase in the 
costs is primarily due to the following factors. The first factor is the complexity of the CFC 
rules, thin capitalisation and transfer pricing regimes, which require large enterprises to seek 
assistance of external professionals who have the knowledge and skills to deal with tax issues 
related to these regimes. It is worth noting that in addition to the complexity of the CFC and 
other regimes, the complexity of the foreign operations of a large enterprise, expressed by the 
number of CFCs that a large enterprise has in foreign jurisdictions, may also affect the costs of 
tax compliance. Empirical literature11 confirms the positive effect of the number of CFCs on 
the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in the US as well as the effect of complex CFC 
rules in the US Internal Revenue Code. The second factor is the desire of large enterprises to 
structure their business around CFCs to minimise their global tax, which again requires 
                                                     
8 IR “Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Bill-Commentary on the Bill” (2017). Also, see 
subsection 4.3.1 of this thesis for discussion of recently adopted BEPS initiatives in New Zealand.   
9  Thomas Hoppe and others “What Are the Drivers of Tax Complexity for Multinational Corporations? Evidence 
from 108 Countries” (WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2017-12, 2017). 
10 At 10.  
11  Marsha Blumenthal and Joel B Slemrod “The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign-Source Income: Its 




assistance of external tax practitioners. The third factor is the increased risk from involvement 
in CFC, thin capitalisation and transfer-pricing regimes, which requires tax returns to be 
reviewed by external tax practitioners. Finally, the existence of CFCs may drive up the costs 
of tax compliance due to the necessity to deal with the legislation in the foreign jurisdictions 
where the CFCs are located.  
 
7.3.3 Research Question 3 
RQ3: How do large enterprises differ from SMEs in terms of the tax compliance activities and 
composition of tax compliance costs? 
There are two main findings from the interviews with the tax practitioners in regard to research 
question 3. The first finding concerns the difference between SMEs and large enterprises in 
terms of how their tax compliance activities are carried out. The main difference is that, unlike 
SMEs, large enterprises have resources to process and prepare tax returns internally. Large 
enterprises have technology and automated systems in place and are able to hire qualified staff 
to run these systems. In contrast, SMEs do not have such resources and have to rely on the 
services of external tax practitioners. The fact that the majority of SMEs in New Zealand 
outsource the preparation of their income tax returns is confirmed by the IR’s 2016 report on 
the costs of tax compliance of New Zealand SMEs. 12  As mentioned by one of the tax 
practitioners, large enterprises represent essentially a different type of business which is much 
larger in scale and features a large number of transactions. In this regard, technology and 
automated systems installed in-house allow large enterprises to efficiently process large 
volumes of financial information and thus, provide the benefit of economies of scale. 
Consequently, compared to SMEs, large enterprises are more likely to prepare tax returns 
internally rather than outsourcing this process. However, large enterprises are more likely to 
require from external tax practitioners, the reviewing of their internally-prepared tax returns 
and obtaining tax advice as the risk of error is higher due to complexity of their business 
operations.  
                                                     




In general, by separating tax compliance activities between internal staff and external tax 
practitioners, large enterprises appear to follow a model of cost efficient tax compliance 
administration, according to which simpler tasks are performed in–house while more complex 
task are outsourced. The model of cost optimal tax compliance administration has been 
described in the literature.13   
The second finding is related to the composition of the external costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises and SMEs. Large enterprises are likely to have a different composition of external 
costs of tax compliance as they require more tax planning services from external tax 
practitioners than SMEs do. The literature indicates14 that due to their large size, complex 
transactions and increased risks, large enterprises in general require more legal services from 
external advisers, whereas SMEs typically require more accounting services from external 
professionals. The validity of this assertion was tested during the interviews. The tax 
practitioners were asked if large enterprises were more frequently involved in legal disputes 
with the IR and whether they required tax planning services more often compared to SMEs. 
The tax practitioner responses to these questions brought mixed results. It was not possible to 
confirm that large enterprises in New Zealand get involved more often than SMEs in legal 
disputes. However, since the tax practitioners’ responses indicated that large enterprises require 
tax planning services more often than SMEs, it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that 
the composition of the external costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand is 
likely to differ from SMEs.  
Overall, the literature15 and the interview findings16 suggest that tax calculations and tax filing 
activities (that is, the basic tax compliance activities) are of less relevance to large enterprises 
due to their efficiency in dealing with these activities, and that the main costs drivers identified 
by the tax practitioners interviewed primarily affect external costs. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the external costs of tax compliance make a tangible contribution to the total 
                                                     
13 Sebastian Eichfelder and Michael Schorn “Tax Compliance Costs: A Business Administration Perspective” 
(2012) 68 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 191. 
14 Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 2, at 776. 
15 Sebastian Eichfelder and Francois Vaillancourt “Tax Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost 
Structures” (Arqus Discussion Paper No. 178, 2014) at 21. 
16 See chapter 6, subsection 6.3.3.1 of this thesis.  
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cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand and thus, arguably are of greater 
relevance to large enterprises.    
 
7.4 Research Contribution  
This section will discuss three key contributions made by this study. These address the 
following aspects: 
 definition of large enterprises 
 cost of tax compliance of large enterprises 
 tax administration in large enterprises and cost of tax compliance   
 
7.4.1 The Definition of Large Enterprises  
The first contribution of this study to the literature is that it provides insights into the definition 
of a large enterprise, and demonstrates how the use of qualitative criteria may assist in 
determining the population of large enterprises in New Zealand. By showing that existing 
thresholds and criteria are established by various stakeholders for different purposes and 
therefore are often not compatible with each other, this study emphasises the importance of 
using qualitative criteria along with quantitative criteria. To the researcher’s knowledge, the 
analysis undertaken of which entities can be considered large in New Zealand is the first such 
study to define large enterprises using qualitative characteristics. This analysis is expected to 
assist in broadening the concept of a large enterprise (that is, the intrinsic features of large 
enterprises), which set them apart from SMEs. Therefore, in the New Zealand context, this 
analysis also points to the necessity of revisiting the definition of a SME since currently the 
line separating SMEs from large enterprises in New Zealand is blurred. Furthermore, the 
interview with the IR official provided further useful insights into the classification of 
“significant” enterprises applied by the IR. In the researcher’s opinion the analysis and the 
insights gained from this interview can be used as a foundation for future multi-faceted research 
in areas related to large enterprises in New Zealand, including studies into the costs of tax 
compliance of large enterprises. 
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7.4.2 Cost of Tax Compliance of Large Enterprises in New Zealand    
The second contribution this study has made is bridging the gap in the literature on the costs of 
tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. To date no study has been conducted in 
this area in New Zealand and therefore the findings made in this study shed light on aspects 
such as the magnitude, composition and determinants of tax compliance costs of large 
enterprises in New Zealand. The findings made in regard to the determinants of the cost of tax 
compliance reinforce the findings from the prior studies showing that the complexity of the 
business activity of large enterprises and business restructuring initiated by large enterprises in 
response to economic factors, often appear to be the drivers of the costs of tax compliance. 
These findings are considered useful in the New Zealand context as they provide a valuable 
insight into the potential sources of the burden of tax compliance in large enterprises in New 
Zealand. 
Furthermore, this study provides insights into the differences between large enterprises and 
SMEs in New Zealand in regard to the implementation of the tax compliance function and the 
composition of external costs of tax compliance. These insights are useful as they show how 
the tax compliance function and the composition of external costs of tax compliance change as 
the size of an enterprise increases.  
The fact that most of the findings in this study (obtained through the semi-structured interviews 
with the five New Zealand tax practitioners) are compatible with the existing overseas 
empirical research increases the usefulness and validity of these findings. It is believed that the 
findings from the qualitative research conducted will both provide direction and become a good 
foundation for the future empirical studies into the area of the cost of tax compliance of large 
business in New Zealand.  
 
7.4.3 Tax Administration of Large Enterprises and the Costs of Tax Compliance    
The third contribution made by this study is to raise the issue of how the tax compliance 
administration in large enterprises affects the costs of the tax compliance. Tax compliance 
administration in large enterprises is an established system of organising and dealing with tax 
compliance functions. Generally, the tax compliance functions in large enterprises can be 
performed by internal staff and external tax practitioners. The optimal distribution of tax 
171 
 
compliance functions between internal staff and external professionals should ensure the most 
cost efficient tax compliance administration. 
A mathematical model17 of the profit maximising behaviour of a firm based on the premises of 
rational choice was discussed in this study. According to this model, the most optimal 
distribution of tax compliance functions that minimises the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises is when simpler tasks, like tax return preparation, are undertaken internally. The 
more complex tasks, like tax return review and tax advisory, are outsourced to external tax 
practitioners. The findings of this study (discussed in chapter 7, section 7.3.3 of this thesis) 
indicate that large enterprises in New Zealand appear to follow cost optimal tax compliance 
administration. According to the study’s findings, large enterprises in New Zealand set up in-
house automated systems which allow them to process multiple transactions efficiently and 
prepare tax returns internally. At the same time they outsource to external tax practitioners 
more complex functions, like tax returns review, which require a higher level of specialised 
knowledge.  
The idea that the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises are also determined by the 
optimality of the tax compliance administration would be interesting area for future research 
into the measurement of the avoidable costs of tax compliance. According to Lignier, Evans 
and Tran-Nam,18 costs that result from the choice a taxpayer makes as to how to organise their 
tax compliance activities belongs to the category of avoidable costs of tax compliance. 
However, these costs cannot be observed in practice.19 Therefore, the model outlined in chapter 
4 section 4.3.3 of this thesis might become a foundation for future research into the issue of 
unobservable costs of tax compliance in large enterprises.   
 
7.5 Limitations of the Study   
The findings of this study, which were discussed above in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, should 
be interpreted in the light of the following limitations. The first limitation is that the interviews 
                                                     
17 Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 13. 
18 Philip Lignier, Chris Evans and Binh Tran-Nam “Measuring Tax Compliance Costs: Evidence from Australia” 
in Chris Evans, Richard Krever and Peter Mellor (eds) Tax Simplification (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2015) at 125. 
19 At 125. 
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were conducted with external tax practitioners only. Given that tax practitioners usually 
provide information from their perspective as external tax advisers of large enterprises, it is 
presumed that predominately external costs of tax compliance have been referred to and 
accordingly, analysed. Fuller information on the magnitude, composition and determinants of 
the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises, which would include internal costs of tax 
compliance, could be gathered through interviews with tax managers or Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) of large enterprises.  
The second limitation concerns the limited time which the tax practitioners had available for 
the interviews. At the outset of the study it was expected that more questions would be asked 
during interviews. However, owing to time limitations, several questions were omitted from 
the interviews. Thus, questions asking for the tax practitioners’ opinions on how the costs of 
tax compliance can be reduced in large enterprises and if large enterprises follow optimal tax 
compliance administration, were omitted. In addition the responses provided by some of the 
tax practitioners turned out to be vaguer than the researcher expected. Furthermore, in those 
interviews which were conducted by phone, the tax practitioners provided more limited 
responses. Generally the responses provided by phone were shorter and less clear compared to 
the more comprehensive responses provided by the tax practitioners in the face-to-face 
interviews.  
The third limitation is the small number of tax practitioners interviewed in this study. 
Interviewing a larger number of participants (for example, 12-15) might have generated more 
data which could have provided more findings or have strengthened the validity of the findings 
obtained. However, as data saturation is believed to be reached after the fifth interview, and 
taking into account relatively small population of large enterprises in New Zealand,20 it is 
unlikely that significantly new data would have been provided had more tax practitioners been 
interviewed.  
The fourth limitation is that although the findings of this study provide preliminary insights 
into the magnitude, composition and determinants of the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand, these findings nevertheless cannot be generalised over the whole 
population of large enterprises in New Zealand. This is due to the small sample of the interview 
participants and qualitative nature of the data collected from the interviews.  
                                                     
20 See subsection 5.4.2.4 of this thesis for more details regarding the sample size.  
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7.6 Policy Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
This section provides an overview of possible policy implications arising from this thesis and 
also sets out recommendations for future research.  
The policy implications are anticipated to serve as a recommendation to the IR for: 
- measuring the level of complexity of tax compliance obligations faced by large enterprises in 
New Zealand 
- defining large enterprises 
- reconsidering the stance taken by the IR on the issue of tax planning   
The usefulness of these policy recommendations is that they outline potential areas of tax 
complexity and actions that the IR could undertake in order to eliminate, if not all, but at least 
unnecessary complexity. Moreover, they seek to draw attention of the tax authorities in regard 
to the importance of establishment of the definition of large enterprises in New Zealand.  
Further, some recommendations are also provided in regard to methods of approaching tax 
practitioners and large enterprises for conducting interviews.  
The recommendations for the future research set out potential directions in which further 
investigation of the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises could be undertaken.   
 
7.6.1 Implications of Tax Complexity  
First, the findings made in this study indicate that the complexity of various tax regimes is one 
of the most important drivers of the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. 
In particular, complex rules for CFCs, transfer pricing and thin capitalisation were referred to 
by the tax practitioners in subsection 6.3.2.3 of this thesis as the factors contributing to the 
increase in the external cost of tax compliance. The adoption of the new BEPS initiatives, 
explained in more detail in section 4.3.1, are likely to increase even further the cost of 
complying with new rules primarily due to the following reasons: 
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- the new BEPS rules strengthen previously existing rules, for example transfer pricing,21 
and increase the level of accountability, for example by requiring large multinational 
groups to submit  Country-by country report (CbCR), which will increase their reliance 
on the services of external tax practitioners even further;22 
- the new BEPS rules are likely to increase a number of instances of audits from the IR 
as contracts between related parties will be viewed with a greater suspicion from now 
on.23 This will increase reliance on legal support from external advisers and lawyers;   
- the new BEPS rules increase the level of complexity, for example by imposing 
legislative requirements to establish the credit rating of the New Zealand borrower in 
the case of borrowing from a cross-border related-party.24 At the same time, the BEPS 
rules also raise the level of uncertainty. This implies that large enterprises are likely to 
resort even more to the assistance of external tax practitioners for the advice on tax 
implications that a particular BEPS rule might have for their business operations. 
It is worthwhile noting that the extent of increase in the cost of tax compliance caused by the 
adoption of the BEPS rules will to a great degree depend upon whether large enterprises 
respond by taking a more aggressive stance (by engaging in more tax planning) or by taking a 
conservative approach.  
Therefore, one possible measure that IR could take in order to mitigate to some extent the 
potentially negative impact of newly adopted BEPS rules on the cost of tax compliance of large 
enterprises is to organise a collection and analysis of the data on the cost of tax compliance of 
large enterprises. The data could be collected through a large scale survey distributed among 
large enterprises, which would aim to seek an information regarding the magnitude of internal 
and external cost of tax compliance. In addition, the survey should include questions, asking, 
for example, what tax rules (including BEPS rules) are seen by large enterprises as the most 
                                                     
21 See Adrian Sawyer and Richard McGill “The Adoption of BEPS in New Zealand” in Kerrie Sadiq, Adrian 
Sawyer and Bronwyn McCredie (eds) Tax Design and Administration in a Post-BEPS Era: A Study of Key 
Reform Measures in 18 Jurisdictions (Fiscal Publications, 2019) at 221.  
22 Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018, s 58; Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 
1994), s 78G. 
23 The Mazars “BEPS – A New Paradigm or Just More Complexity?” ( 21 May 2015) 
<https://mazarsledger.com/beps-a-new-paradigm-or-just-more-complexity/> (last accessed 29 June 2019). 
24 See Taxation (Neutralising Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Act 2018, above, n 22, s GC16.  
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burdensome to comply with and the completion of what forms appears to be most difficult and 
causes confusion.   
As the cost of tax compliance are viewed as a proxy for measurement of the complexity of tax 
rules,25 it is anticipated that survey results will allow an estimate of the monetary effect of tax 
rules to be made, particularly the BEPS rules. The high cost to comply with a particular rule 
should warn tax authority that this rule requires simplification. As, Budak, James and Sawyer26 
point out, a “considerable degree of complexity is inevitable”,27 given different objectives of 
taxation and, therefore, achieving tax simplification is not always possible. While complete 
elimination of complexity does not appear to be possible, it is a feasible task to eliminate 
unnecessary complexity. In this regard, the proposed methods of monitoring the cost of tax 
compliance and gaining feedback from large enterprises on arears of complexity, should assist 
the IR in reducing at least unnecessary complexity.   
 
7.6.2 Implications of Definitional Issues  
Second, as was set out in section 7.3.1, it is difficult to establish a common definition of large 
enterprises in New Zealand due to the existence of various criteria and thresholds. In this regard, 
it is advisable that IR makes it clear as to what enterprises can be considered to be large for the 
purpose of tax compliance. The definition of “significant enterprises”, which IR currently 
applies to monitor tax compliance of enterprises whose turnover or number of employees is 
above certain thresholds,28  provides little insight into what category of enterprises within 
“significant” are actually large. Moreover, uncertainty with the definition of large enterprises 
for tax compliance purposes in New Zeeland makes the comparison with other jurisdictions 
rather problematical. 
To address this issues IR could align the definition of large enterprises for tax compliance 
purpose with criteria and thresholds used in the Financial Reporting Act (FRA) 2013 for 
                                                     
25 Eichfelder and Vaillancourt, above n 15, at 2. 
26 Tamer Budak, Simon James and Adnian Sawyer “International experiences of tax simplification and 
distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary complexity” eJournal of Tax Research (2016) 14 (2) 337, at 
353. 
27 Above, at 337.  
28 See chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2 for the thresholds of significant enterprises.  
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financial reporting purposes. However, there is a problem concerning this suggestion. The FRA 
2013 determines the size of an enterprise also on the basis of asset value, which implies that an 
enterprise with a turnover below the “significant” enterprise’s threshold turnover would be 
classified as a large provided the value of its assets meets the FRA 2013 threshold.29 In this 
case, a certain number of enterprises would be classified as large but not “significant”. It is 
obvious that an attempt to align two definitions is fraught with difficulties.  
In the researcher’s view, IR could use a set of qualitative criteria and apply them to a population 
of significant enterprises in order to establish the cut-off threshold for turnover after which 
significant enterprises exhibit convergence in the defined qualitative criteria. Furthermore, 
being clear about the cut-off threshold beyond which SMEs cease and large enterprises begin 
should significantly assist IR in analysing the cost effect of the adoption of the BEPS rules 
mentioned above.  
 
7.6.3 Implications of Increasing Tax Planning   
Third, the fact that large enterprises engage in tax planning more often than SMEs and that the 
cost of tax planning tends to increase with the size of an enterprise30 gives a rise to the following 
issues. Some of the studies on the cost of tax compliance31 take a view that, although tax 
planning might be beneficial to enterprises, it reduces government revenue and, therefore 
appears to be a wasteful activity from societal point of view. At the same time, since tax 
planning is considered to be a part of tax compliance activity by both tax practitioners32 and 
academics, 33  an increasing share of tax planning in the external services used by large 
enterprises is likely to drive cost of tax compliance. Therefore, these two factors suggest that 
tax planning, which large enterprises often resort to with an intention to maximise their profits 
                                                     
29 Financial Reporting Act 2013 (FRA 2013), s 45(1)(a). 
30 See Eichfelder and Vaillancourt above n 15, at 23.  
31 See, for example Binh Tran-Nam, Chris Evans, Michael Walpole and Katrine Ritchie “Tax Compliance 
Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from Australia” (2000) 52 National Tax Journal 229, at 
235. 
32 See sub-section 6.3.4 for tax practitioners’ responses about whether tax planning should be considered as a 
part of tax compliance. 
33 Chris Evans “Taxation Compliance and Administrative Costs: An Overview” in Michael Lang and others 
(eds) Tax Compliance Costs for Companies in an Enlarged European Community (Kluwer Law International, 
The Netherlands, 2007), at 452. 
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(as any rationally behaving economic agent is expected to do), results in a loss of tax revenue 
and increased cost of tax compliance.  
One of the ways to discourage companies from engaging in tax planning is to levy a business 
income tax on a broad income tax base and at a low rate (BBLR). This policy was already 
adopted by New Zealand government and is applied by IR.34 However, recently enacted BEPS 
initiatives are likely to prompt large enterprises to engage more in tax planning. For instance, 
one of the BEPS initiatives, the new permanent establishment (PE) anti-avoidance rule 
discussed in section 5.3.3, will most probably create incentives for multinational enterprises to 
restructure their business operations in order to avoid being caught in this rule. In this regard 
the BBLR model, which in part seeks to reduce tax planning incentives of large enterprises, 
and the BEPS rules aimed at curbing tax avoidance are likely to produce diametrically opposite 
effect on large enterprises’ incentives to tax planning. Putting it differently, government takes 
actions in attempt to reduce tax planning incentives and at the same time stimulates them 
through introduction of new rules. According to Eichfelder and Schorn,35 large enterprises’ 
choices whether to engage in tax planning or not will largely depend on whether benefits from 
tax savings outweigh cost of tax planning.  
A very important fact which should be considered in this regard is that the above discussion is 
based entirely on the premise that tax planning employed by large enterprises brings about only 
dead weight losses, which reduce overall social welfare. However, a more rigorous economic 
analysis36 shows that the effect of tax planning on a social welfare is not so straightforward. 
Thus, Hong and Smart demonstrate that in high-tax rate countries tax planning might on the 
contrary lead to the increase in social welfare as tax planning allows maintaining high tax rates, 
while preventing outflow of foreign direct investment.37 In a similar vein, they show that an 
increase in tax planning can lead to increase in both statutory and effective tax rates, which 
ultimately leads to the increased social welfare.  
                                                     
34 IR “The New Zealand tax system and how it compares internationally” (2017), at 3.   
35 Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 13, at 198. 
36 See, for example, Joel Slemrod and John. D. Wilson “Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens” (2009) 93 
Journal of Public Economics 1261; Qing Hong and Michael Smart “In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax 
Planning and Foreign Direct Investment” (2010) 54 European Economic Review.  
37 See Hong and Smart, above n 36, at 92.  
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What are the implications that the above discussion about tax planning of large enterprises may 
have for New Zealand tax policy? First, almost nothing is known about the magnitude of 
resources which are lost due to tax planning undertaken by large enterprises in New Zealand. 
Second, equally important factor which also needs to be considered is, how large are the social 
gains from imposing new tax rules, for example BEPS initiatives. The Inland Revenue could 
invest more time and efforts into investigating at least these two questions. After all, the 
answers to these questions are expected to provide valuable insights into both cost of tax 
planning incurred by large enterprises and whether tax planning undertaken by large enterprises 
is indeed so detrimental for the social welfare in New Zealand.   
 
7.6.4 Recommendations for Approaching Tax Practitioners and Large Enterprises for 
Conducting Interviews 
One of the recommendation arising from this study concerns the practical aspects of conducting 
interviews with external tax practitioners and staff in large enterprises. The researcher felt that 
his experience could provide some insights that could be beneficial for future researchers in 
the area of tax compliance of large enterprises and who are planning to use interview method.  
The first recommendation is to focus on tax practitioners from the largest accounting firms 
(“Big Four”) as they are most likely to have direct exposure to working with large enterprises. 
One of the most efficient ways of getting tax practitioners to participate in an interview is to 
contact external professional organisations such as Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand (CA-ANZ) for the assistance in eliciting tax practitioners’ participation in an interview. 
As the researcher’s experience shows, contacting tax practitioners directly and asking them to 
participate turns out to be largely ineffective.  
The second recommendation concerns the issue of limited time that tax practitioners have for 
participating in an interview. In the researcher’s experience, the average time each tax 
practitioner interviewed could give was about 25-30 minutes. In this regard, an interview guide 
should be designed in a way so that all the questions which a researcher plans to ask could be 
asked within a 20-25 minutes period. The remaining five minutes could be used in the case 
researcher needs to ask tax practitioners to clarify something. Asking tax practitioners to clarify 
what appears to be unclear during an interview is very important, as they rarely have time to 
come back with clarifications when contacted again after the interview.  
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The third recommendation relates to the method of approaching large enterprises. As outlined 
in the chapter five, sub section 5.4.2.3, it was initially planned to conduct interview with CFOs 
and tax managers of large enterprises. However, despite the researcher’s attempts to contact 
large enterprises, none of the CFOs or tax managers contacted agreed to participate. In the 
researcher’s opinion, this approach was ineffective as CFOs and tax managers of large 
enterprises probably saw little value of this study for their enterprises and also due to the 
considerable costs of their time. In this regard, prior to approaching large enterprises future 
researchers could have an endorsement from external organisations such as IR. Furthermore, 
the literature38 also indicates that enlisting the support from a tax authority is essential for 
successful data collection process. Thus, in the studies on US and Australian enterprises 
presented in Chapter 2, the authors used support from the tax authority in their respective 
countries prior to approaching large enterprises. Apart from IR, obtaining support from 
professional organisations, such as, for example CA-ANZ, would also appear to be effective 
way to approach large enterprises.  
 
7.7 Recommendations for Future Research  
The limitations outlined in the section 7.5 provide a foundation for future research in the area 
of the cost of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. In the researcher’s view 
there are two main directions in which future research could follow. The first direction is the 
continuation of the qualitative research initiated in this study. The task of this research should 
expand the scope of explorative investigation into the costs of tax compliance of large 
enterprises, thereby providing more insights into aspects such as the magnitude, composition 
and determinants of tax compliance costs. To achieve these outcomes interviews with tax 
managers and CFOs of large enterprises could prove to be very helpful as a lot of information 
about large enterprises’ internal and external costs could be elucidated from such interviews. 
Furthermore, since in the current study the effect of the industry factor on the costs of tax 
compliance of large enterprises was not investigated, identifying a sample of large enterprises 
from various industries, and conducting interviews with these large enterprises, would deepen 
our understanding of how industry may affect the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises. 
                                                     
38 See Slemrod and Blumenthal and Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 2. 
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In addition, more interviews could be conducted with external tax practitioners in order to elicit 
their views on the effect of the industry factor on the costs of tax compliance.  
A second direction for future research concerns undertaking a quantitative study of the costs of 
tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. The first task of this research would be to 
define large enterprises, using criteria and thresholds identified in this study, and to determine 
a representative sample of large enterprises based on the definition adopted. This representative 
sample should include large enterprises from various industries thus capturing industry effect 
on the costs of tax compliance.  The second task would be the choice of a data collection 
method. In line with previous studies,39 large scale surveys conducted among large enterprises 
could be a method of data collection for this empirical research. The third task would be to 
estimate the magnitude of the costs of tax compliance in large enterprises and accordingly 
determine their composition. The contribution of the proposed research would be greater if 
regression analysis examining factors (determinants) influencing the magnitude of the costs of 
tax compliance in large enterprises is performed. For identification of the costs determinants, 
future research could rely on the findings of this and other previous studies on large enterprises, 
particularly studies undertaken in the US and Australia. This proposed future quantitative 
research could be a good method to test the validity of the findings made in this study in regard 
to the magnitude, composition and determinants of the costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises.    
As a further direction for future research, a study could be undertaken in order to estimate the 
magnitude of the unobservable costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand. 
Estimation of unobservable costs of tax compliance would assist in elucidating whether large 
enterprises in New Zealand follow cost optimal tax compliance administration.    
Both the future qualitative and quantitative research discussed above are anticipated to expand 
our knowledge of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand and to 
provide greater insights into the factors influencing these costs. In comparison to the 
explorative nature of the present qualitative research, quantitative research would provide 
numerical estimations and accordingly allow generalisation of the results over the wider 
population of large enterprises in New Zealand. Therefore, in the researcher’s view, conducting 
quantitative research would enable more accurate picture of the magnitude, composition and 
                                                     
39 See Slemrod and Blumenthal, above n 2; Evans, Lignier and Tran-Nam, above n 2.  
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determinants of the costs of tax compliance. Moreover, the results of the quantitative research 
of the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand could be compared with the 
results of the studies performed in other jurisdictions.  
 
7.8. Concluding Remarks  
The aim of this study was to provide an explorative analysis of the costs of tax compliance of 
large enterprises from a New Zealand perspective. In addition, the study has explored criteria 
that can define large enterprises in New Zealand, and which can clearly set them apart from 
SMEs. Furthermore, this study introduced the concept of “significant” enterprises in New 
Zealand and outlined criteria that apply to classify enterprises as “significant”. By applying 
qualitative analysis, this study has found that income tax is likely to be the most costly tax for 
large enterprises to comply with. Second, it has found that the complexity of business 
operations carried out by large enterprises appears to be potential factor driving up the cost of 
tax compliance. Third, the study has revealed that the way large enterprises implement their 
tax compliance functions, and the composition of their external tax compliance costs, are 
different from SMEs. Given that this study represents one of the initial studies in the area of 
the costs of tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand, its findings are expected to 
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Appendix 1: Mathematical Model of the Rational Choice Theory 
 
We can denote the net income that a rational business taxpayer strives to maximise with Y, 
which is obtained by reducing gross earnings E, by tax payments T, as well as by the costs of 
tax compliance C. These costs of tax compliance C also include costs of tax planning as 
suggested in the research literature.1  
Tax burden T rises with gross earnings E and is reduced by the deductibility of tax compliance 
costs C. For simplicity, it is assumed that all tax compliance costs are deducted at the same tax 
rate. A business taxpayer also resorts to some specific tax planning options, denoted by Ok, as 
income shifting or use of an optimal depreciation method (for example diminishing value 
method). This tax planning option usually results in a lower tax payment, but higher costs of 
tax compliance due to the fact that tax planning costs are considered as a part of tax compliance 
costs C. Taking the above assumptions into consideration, the net income of the business 
taxpayer can be written as: 
 
                                              Y = E – T (E, C, Ok) – C                                            (1) 
 
 
Three different types of compliance costs are considered in this model. These costs are: 
 
 Personnel costs (Cp) that result from using efforts of in-house personnel (Rp). In-house 
personnel are assumed to perform such functions as record keeping, tax-filing, tax-
planning and other tax related activities 
 
 Capital costs (Cc) that result from using capital (Rc)  by which a business taxpayer can 
substitute personnel resources 
 
                                                     
1  Sebastian Eichfelder and Michael Schorn “Tax Compliance Costs: A Business Administration Perspective” 
(2012) 68 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 191 at 195. 
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 Costs of outsourcing tax activities to an external tax adviser (Ce), where the usage of 
external resources (external tax adviser) is denoted by (Re).  
 
For simplicity, it is postulated in the model that the marginal cost of external tax activities Ceꞌ 
(Re) is constant and equal to the market price Pe that is, Ceꞌ (Re) = Pe . Furthermore, it is assumed 
that simple tax activities are executed first by in-house personnel before the business taxpayer 
turns for the assistance of external adviser regarding more complex and sophisticated tax 
activities. Hence, we can presume that the marginal costs of in-house tax compliance activities 
increases as the range of tax compliance activities grows. This relationship can be shown as: 
          
                                            Cpꞌꞌ (Rp) > 0,   Cc ꞌꞌ (Rc) > 0    
 
These assumptions should allow us to obtain an interior solution (a point where the isocost2 
line is tangent to isoquant3 curve). This point of tangency gives the most optimal combination 
of resources used for fulfilling tax compliance obligations. The total tax compliance burden is 
therefore defined as: 
 
                                                      C = Cp + Cc + Ce                              (2) 
 
 
Since the sum of resources expended on tax compliance should be enough to fulfil the amount 
of the tax compliance obligation, a business taxpayer faces the following constraint: 
 
                                             A (E, Ok) ≤ Ɵ • Rp + ω • Rc + Re                 (3) 
 
Here A (E, Ok) is the quantity of the necessary compliance activity, which in turn depends on 
the size of earnings (E) and tax planning option (Ok). Ɵ is the efficiency parameter of the 
personnel-intensive tax compliance strategy and ω is the capital intensive tax compliance 
                                                     
2 A line that represents all the combinations of firm’s inputs that have the same total costs. 
3 A contour line that is drawn through all the possible combinations of input factors’ amounts that generate the 
same level of output.   
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strategy. For simplicity, the production efficiency of the external tax advisers is postulated to 
be equal to 1.  
According to the empirical literature,4 the quantity of the tax compliance activity A (E, Ok), 
which we can consider as the burden of tax compliance, is positively correlated with the size 
of the business. This in turn implies the positive correlation between A and pre-tax earnings E, 
which can be expressed mathematically as ( 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝐸
> 0). Due to economies of scale the relative 
compliance costs burden decreases as pre-tax earnings increase, that is (
𝜕𝐴2 
𝜕2  𝐸
< 0).  
Therefore, the tax compliance costs burden can be interpreted in this model as a kind of 
additional and regressive tax payment being deductible from the assessable income. 5  
Furthermore, planning option Ok (for example, income-shifting) entails more tax compliance 
activity which implies a positive derivative   (
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑂𝑘 
> 0).  
Equipped with all these assumptions and having determined target function (1) and 
administration constraint (3), we can now move to obtaining the optimum solution by using 
the following Lagrangian function6: 
 
 
          L = E – T (E, C, Ok) – Cp – Cc – Ce - 𝜆 • (A (E, Ok) - Ɵ • Rp - ω • Rc - Re)     (4)      
                                                                                                                 
  
Here  𝜆  denotes the Lagrange multiplier.7 The first order conditions with respect to resources 
(Rp), (Rc) and (Re) as well as to specific tax option (Ok) will be as follows: 
                                                     
4  Binh Tran-Nam, and others “Tax Compliance Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from 
Australia” (2000) 52 National Tax Journal 229 cited in Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 1, at 196. 
5  Eichfelder and Schorn, above n 1, at 196. 
6  See n 7 below for the explanation.  
7  Lagrange multiplier, named after Joseph Lagrange, is the mathematical method of finding local maxima and 
minima of a function that is finding such points where function is “locally” maximum or minimum, subject to 
equality constraint. For example:              maximize f(x,y) 
                                                                       subject to g(x,y) = 0 
   Therefore, Lagrange function or Lagrangian can be written as: 
202 
 
                       𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑅𝑝    =  - Cꞌp • (1 + 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐶
) + λ • Ɵ   =   0     (5)  
                      𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑅𝑐     =  - Cꞌc  • (1 + 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐶
) + λ • ω =  0            (6)    
                     𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑅𝑒      =   - pe   • (1 + 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐶
) + λ     =    0           (7)    
                     𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑂𝑘      =  - 𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑂𝑘 – λ • 𝜕𝐴/𝜕𝑂𝑘 ≥  0                  (8)  
 
 
From the first order condition obtained optimal (cost-efficient) use of resource mix to comply 
with tax obligations can be derived as follows: 
 
1. The optimal resource mix will be attained where the gross marginal cost of in-house 
resource unit will be equal market price of the external tax adviser: 
 








=  𝑝𝑒                               (9) 
        
Therefore, under the assumption of rational choice a business taxpayer will choose the cost-
optimal mix of resources according to this condition.  
 
2. Using (7) and (8) we can obtain the following relationship between tax compliance A, 
tax option Ok  and the size of tax payment T:    
                      
                                   pe   • (1 + 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐶
) • 𝜕𝐴/𝜕𝑂𝑘 +   𝜕𝑇/𝜕𝑂𝑘    ≤ 0  (10)   
 
Hence this relationship implies that a cost minimising business taxpayer will use tax option 
(Ok) until the moment when the marginal increase in tax compliance burden (𝜕𝐴) will be 
greater than the marginal decrease in tax payment (𝜕𝑇) caused by this tax option strategy.   
 
                                                     
  L (x,y,λ) = f (x,y) – λ*g(x,y) , where  λ is Lagrange multiplier. 
   We need to find such (x0,y0,λ0), where the Lagrangian is maximized that is partial derivatives of L on x0,y0,λ0 
are equal 0. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide for Tax Practitioners 
 
 
Purpose of the interview: 
Specifically, the interview seeks to establish the following aspects:  
 
I. The magnitude, composition and general perception of the burden of tax compliance 
costs in large enterprises.  
II. The causes of tax compliance costs and factors influencing the magnitude of the tax 
compliance costs burden.  
III. Are tax planning, audit and tax disputes viewed as a part of the tax compliance activity?  
IV. How tax compliance administration is organized and is it efficient in reducing tax 
compliance costs at a large enterprise level? 
 
The list of possible interview questions is presented next.  
Possible interview questions 
 
I. This set of questions asks about the magnitude, composition and general perception of  tax 
compliance costs burden of large enterprises 
Q1. In general, what kind of tax–related services would a large enterprise purchase from your 
firm?  
For example: 
A. Tax return preparation (business income tax, GST, FBT) 
B. Tax planning/tax advice    
C. Responding to IR claims and notices, dispute resolution  
D. Others   
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Q2. (In the case tax return preparation has been stated) Can you give the fee range that you 
would charge a large enterprise for the preparation of a tax return? 
Q3.  What type of taxes would require most of your time? What is the reason for the preparation 
of this tax return being so time-consuming? (Complexity, ambiguity of tax regulation, nature 
of the business, other) 
Q.4 Of the tax services that you usually provide to large enterprises what is the percentage 
share of preparation of tax return service in your total fee for tax services?  
Q.5. In your experience, what is the main difference (if there is any) between preparation of 
tax return for SMEs and large enterprises?      
Q6. (In the case tax planning/tax advice has been named) What is your best estimate of the 
amount you would charge this firm for the tax planning/tax advice services?  
Q7. Of the tax services that you usually provide to large enterprises, what is the percentage 
share of the tax planning/tax advice services in your total fee for tax services? 
Q8. In your experience, do large enterprises usually require more tax planning/tax advice 
services compared to SMEs? What is the reason for that?   
Q9. What aspects of taxation do most large enterprises seek tax planning and tax advice?  
Q10. (In the case responding to IR claims and notices has been stated). Can you give the fee 
range that you would charge this firm for responding to IR claims and notices, and dispute 
resolution?  
Q11. Of the tax services that you usually provide to large enterprises, what is the percentage 
share of the responding to IR claims and notices/ dispute resolution service in your total fee? 
 
Q12. Compared to SMEs, do large enterprises frequently get involved in disputes with IR? 
What is the reason for that?    
 
II. This set of questions asks about the causes of the tax compliance costs burden of a large 
enterprise and factors driving these costs 
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Q1.   What aspect(s) of the current tax regulations is/are most responsible for the cost of large 
enterprises’ complying with their tax obligation: business income tax, GST, FBT, PAYE and 
other kind of taxes?  
Q2.  In your opinion, what are the main factors driving costs of tax compliance in large 
enterprises?   
 Q3    In your experience, do costs of tax compliance change significantly, if a large enterprise 
has overseas subsidiaries (CFC) or investments in foreign entities (CFC or FIF) or simply 
engages in cross-border transactions?   
Q4.   What suggestions would you make to simplify current tax rules in order to reduce tax 
compliance costs for large enterprises?  
 
III. This set of questions asks if the interviewee views tax planning and tax disputes as a part 
of overall tax compliance of a large enterprise. 
Q1.  Do you agree that tax planning should be viewed as a part of a large enterprise’s overall 
tax compliance activity?  
Q2.  Do you agree that dealing with IR should be viewed as a part of a large enterprise’s overall 
tax compliance activity?  
 
IV. This set of questions asks interviewee about their opinion on whether costs of tax 
compliance in large enterprises can be reduced through cost-efficient tax compliance 
administration. 
Q1. Can you explain how tax compliance administration is organized in large enterprises? 
Q2.  Is it typical for large enterprises to outsource some types of tax compliance activities while 
performing others in-house? 
Q3.  What is the rationale for such a strategy?  
Q4. Do you believe that a part of tax compliance costs can be reduced through cost-efficient 
tax compliance administration?   
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Q5. From your perspective and drawing on your experience, do you believe that tax compliance 























Appendix 3: Interview Guide for IR Official 
 
Below is the list of possible questions to ask an IR official about the definition of large 
enterprises and how the IR monitors compliance of large enterprises in New Zealand.  
Ⅰ. Questions asking about definition of large enterprises:  
Q1. What current criteria the IR uses today to define large enterprises? 
Q2. Is the majority of large enterprises in New Zealand are New Zealand based or foreign 
owned?   
Q3. Is it correct to think that the majority of multinationals operating in New Zealand are large 
enterprises? 
Ⅱ. Questions asking about methods the IR uses to monitor tax compliance of large enterprises?   
Q4. What areas of compliance of large enterprises does your unit monitor? 
Q5. Do existing measures of monitoring tax compliance of large enterprises in New Zeeland 
(submission of the Basic Compliance Package, binding ruling) effectively assist in 
preventing tax avoidance? 
Q6. Is working closely with large enterprises effective for preventing tax avoidance?  
Q7. How does communication between your unit and large enterprises happen? Do you 
communicate through tax manager of LE or external tax adviser? 
Q8. What are the greatest difficulties that the IR sees in monitoring tax compliance of large 
enterprises in New Zealand? What does IR do in order to overcome address these issues?  
Q9. Has IR or your unit done any research or survey to investigate how much large enterprises 
spend on submission of additional information requested by the IR, applying for binding 
rulings or Advanced Price Agreement?   
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Appendix 4: Covering Letter to Tax Practitioners 
                                   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
  Department:   Accounting and Information Systems  
Email:           nikolay.shekhovtsev@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
  8 February 2018                                                       
Dear  
My name is Nikolay Shekhovtsev and I am a PhD student in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury.  
As a part of my PhD program, I am seeking your assistance in understanding a crucial aspect of 
New Zealand taxation – the magnitude and extent of tax compliance costs borne by large enterprises. 
Being considered a hidden form of taxation, tax compliance costs serve as a proxy for measurement 
of the complexity of tax rules. Therefore, a thorough understanding of their magnitude and factors 
influencing them can provide a good insight into the burden caused by an (overly) complex tax 
system. In this regard, the purpose of my research is to investigate tax compliance costs in large 
New Zealand enterprises and therefore to contribute to this largely under-researched area.   
 
I am writing to ask you if you could give me 35-45 minutes of your time to participate in an 
interview, during which you will be asked a number of questions about the magnitude, extent of tax 
compliance costs and factors influencing them in large enterprises. Your involvement is entirely 
voluntarily and you can withdraw from an interview at any time or decline to answer any given 
question. The content of the interview will be recorded for the subsequent transcription and analysis, 
provided you give your consent. Neither your name nor your organisation’s name will be mentioned 
during the interview and therefore your participation (and that of your organisation) will remain 




Additional information about research topic and interview is contained in the attached Information 
Sheet and Consent Form.  
 
Your participation in the interview will be greatly appreciated. This is a great opportunity for you 
to contribute to exploring how the tax compliance environment for large enterprises in New Zealand 
could be made simpler and less burdensome.  
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influencing them can provide a good insight into the burden caused by an (overly) complex tax 
system. In this regard, the purpose of my research is to investigate tax compliance costs in large 
New Zealand enterprises and therefore to contribute to this largely under-researched area.   
 
I am writing to ask you if you could give me 35-45 minutes of your time to participate in an 
interview, during which you will be asked a number of questions about how the IR defines large 
enterprises, what methods it uses in order to monitor tax compliance of large enterprises and whether 
current approach used by the IR is effective. Your involvement is entirely voluntarily and you can 
withdraw from an interview at any time or decline to answer any given question. The content of the 
interview will be recorded for the subsequent transcription and analysis, provided you give your 
consent. Your name will not be mentioned during the interview and therefore your participation will 
remain confidential.       
Additional information about research topic and interview is contained in the attached Information 
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Appendix 6: Information Sheet and Consent Form for Tax Practitioners 
 
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                  
Department:   Accounting and Information Systems  
Email:            nikolay.shekhovtsev@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 





The Costs of Tax Compliance for Large Enterprises: Application of a 
Conceptual Framework to New Zealand Large Enterprises  
 
 
Information Sheet for interview participants  
My name is Nikolay Shekhovtsev and I am a PhD student in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems of the University of Canterbury. As a part of my PhD program, I am seeking 
your assistance in understanding a crucial aspect of New Zealand taxation – the magnitude and 
extent of tax compliance costs borne by large enterprises. Being considered a hidden form of 
taxation, tax compliance costs serve as a proxy for measurement of the complexity of tax rules. 
Therefore, a thorough understanding of their magnitude and factors influencing them can provide a 
good insight into the burden caused by an overly complex tax system. To date very little is known 
about the magnitude, composition and drivers of the tax compliance costs in large enterprises in 
New Zealand, as the focus of the previous research has been traditionally concentrated on small and 
medium scale enterprises. In this regard, the purpose of my research is to investigate tax compliance 
costs in large New Zealand enterprises and therefore to contribute to this largely understudied area.   
 
If you choose to partake in this study, your involvement will be limited to taking part in an interview, 
during which you will be asked several questions about the magnitude, extent of tax compliance 
costs and factors influencing them in large enterprises. It is expected that the interview will last 
approximately 35-45 minutes. The content of the interview will be recorded for the subsequent 
transcription and analysis provided you give your consent. Neither your name nor your 
organisation’s name will be mentioned during the interview and therefore your participation will 
remain confidential.       
 
As a follow-up to this investigation, I may contact you later via e-mail simply for clarification of 
your answers. It will be entirely up to you whether to respond to this follow-up.  
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage or decline to answer any 
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given question without penalty. You may ask for your raw data to be returned to you or destroyed 
at any point. If you withdraw, I will remove information relating to you. However, once analysis of 
raw data commences, it will become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on 
the analyzed results. The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the 
complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public. 
To  ensure anonymity and confidentiality, your answers will be assigned a code and no real names 
will be used in the process of interview and subsequent analysis. All audio records will be 
immediately destroyed upon completion of the interview transcription. The file with the transcribed 
text will be securely stored on my university desk computer under my account name and protected 
by the password known to me only. There will be only three people, two of my academic supervisors 
and me, who will have an access to this data. This will guarantee the integrity and confidentiality 
of the interview data. A thesis, which will include analysis of the data, is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library. However, as has been mentioned earlier, no names will 
be revealed in the thesis.  
 
However, please be aware that in spite of all the precautionary measures to protect the identity of 
your enterprise described above, there is a possibility that your enterprise could be associated with 
the obtained data due to the small number of large enterprises in New Zealand. This possibility is 
beyond the researcher’s control and should be considered as an inherent risk.  
 
The copy of any ensuing publication, thesis or presentation in which reference will be made to the 
interview data, will be provided to you should you so request.  
 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for PhD degree by Nikolay Shekhovtsev under the 
supervision of Professor Adrian Sawyer and Associate Professor Andrew Maples who can be 
contacted at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz and andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, 
University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the consent form and return the 
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Department    Accounting and Information Systems  
Email:            nikolay.shekhovtsev@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
The Costs of Tax Compliance for Large Enterprises: Application of a 
Conceptual Framework to New Zealand Large Enterprises 
 
Consent Form  
Include a statement regarding each of the following: 
 
□ I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
□ I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
□ I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without 
penalty. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any 
information I have provided should this remain practically achievable. In addition, I 
may refuse to answer any given question without penalty. 
□ I have been advised about inherent risks associated with this research.  
□ I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and his academic supervisors and that any published or reported results will not 
identify the participants and their organisation. I understand that a thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library.  
□ I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities 
and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after ten years. 
□ I understand that I can contact the researcher or his supervisors for further information. 
If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
□ I would like a summary of the results of the project. 




Name: Signed: Date:  
 
Email address (for report of findings, if applicable): 
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Information Sheet for interview participants  
My name is Nikolay Shekhovtsev and I am a PhD student in the Department of Accounting and 
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your assistance in understanding a crucial aspect of New Zealand taxation – the magnitude and 
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Therefore, a thorough understanding of their magnitude and factors influencing them can provide a 
good insight into the burden caused by an overly complex tax system. To date very little is known 
about the magnitude, composition and drivers of the tax compliance costs in large enterprises in 
New Zealand, as the focus of the previous research has been traditionally concentrated on small and 
medium scale enterprises. In this regard, the purpose of my research is to investigate tax compliance 
costs in large New Zealand enterprises and therefore to contribute to this largely understudied area.   
 
If you choose to partake in this study, your involvement will be limited to taking part in an interview, 
during which you will be asked several questions about how the IR defines large enterprises, what 
methods it uses in order to monitor tax compliance of large enterprises and whether current approach 
used by the IR is effective. It is expected that the interview will last approximately 35-45 minutes. 
The content of the interview will be recorded for the subsequent transcription and analysis provided 
you give your consent. Your name will not be mentioned during the interview and therefore your 
participation will remain confidential.       
 
As a follow-up to this investigation, I may contact you later via e-mail simply for clarification of 
your answers. It will be entirely up to you whether to respond to this follow-up.  
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage or decline to answer any 
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given question without penalty. You may ask for your raw data to be returned to you or destroyed 
at any point. If you withdraw, I will remove information relating to you. However, once analysis of 
raw data commences, it will become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on 
the analyzed results. The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the 
complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public. 
To  ensure anonymity and confidentiality, your answers will be assigned a code and no real names 
will be used in the process of interview and subsequent analysis. All audio records will be 
immediately destroyed upon completion of the interview transcription. The file with the transcribed 
text will be securely stored on my university desk computer under my account name and protected 
by the password known to me only. There will be only three people, two of my academic supervisors 
and me, who will have an access to this data. This will guarantee the integrity and confidentiality 
of the interview data. A thesis, which will include analysis of the data, is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library. However, as has been mentioned earlier, no names will 
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The copy of any ensuing publication, thesis or presentation in which reference will be made to the 
interview data, will be provided to you should you so request.  
 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for PhD degree by Nikolay Shekhovtsev under the 
supervision of Professor Adrian Sawyer and Associate Professor Andrew Maples who can be 
contacted at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz and andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, 
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Consent Form  
Include a statement regarding each of the following: 
 
□ I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
□ I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
□ I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without 
penalty. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any 
information I have provided should this remain practically achievable. In addition, I 
may refuse to answer any given question without penalty. 
□ I have been advised about inherent risks associated with this research.  
□ I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and his academic supervisors and that any published or reported results will not 
identify the participants and their organisation. I understand that a thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library.  
□ I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities 
and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after ten years. 
□ I understand that I can contact the researcher or his supervisors for further information. 
If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
□ I would like a summary of the results of the project. 
□ By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
 
Name: Signed: Date:  
 
Email address (for report of findings, if applicable):   
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HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
 
Secretary, Rebecca Robinson  
Telephone: +64 03 369 4588, Extn 94588  
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz   
  
Ref:  HEC 2017/141   
  
  
12 January 2018  
   
Nikolay Shekhovtsev  
Accounting and Information Systems  
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY  
   
  
Dear Nikolay   
  
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “The Costs of Tax Compliance for 
Large Enterprises:  Application of Conceptual Framework to a New Zealand Case Study” has been 
considered and approved.    
  
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have provided in 
your email of 8th January 2018.   
  
Best wishes for your project.  
   
Yours sincerely  
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 Professor Jane Maidment     
